(Ir)rationality and cognitive biases in large language models
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Do large language models (LLMs) display rational reasoning? LLMs have been shown to contain human biases due to the data they have been trained on; whether this is reflected in rational reasoning remains less clear. In this paper, we answer this question by evaluating seven language models using tasks from the cognitive psychology literature. We find that, like humans, LLMs display irrationality in these tasks. However, the way this irrationality is displayed does not reflect that shown by humans. When incorrect answers are given by LLMs to these tasks, they are often incorrect in ways that differ from human-like biases. On top of this, the LLMs reveal an additional layer of irrationality in the significant inconsistency of the responses. Aside from the experimental results, this paper seeks to make a methodological contribution by showing how we can assess and compare different capabilities of these types of models, in this case with respect to rational reasoning.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810 · cited 3×
“The cognitive tasks used in this paper were designed to show that human reasoning is not always rational, and that humans often employ heuristics or display cognitive biases [5, 6].”
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Reasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 1×
“Based primarily on work by Gigerenzer [45, 46], a series of facilitated versions of these tasks were developed, emphasising the impact of context and presentation of the problem.”
Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior
Park, J. S., O'Brien, J., Cai, C. J., Morris, M. R., Liang, P., & Bernstein, M. S. (2023) · Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology · doi:10.1145/3586183.3606763 · Cited by 2,187 · cited 1×
“Park et al. [23] combine large language models with computational interactive agents to simulate human behaviour, both individual and within social settings.”
Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior
Park, J. S., O'Brien, J. C., Cai, C. J., Morris, M. R., Liang, P., & Bernstein, M. S. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2304.03442 · Cited by 2,173
Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4
Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar, E., Lee, P., Lee, Y. T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.12712 · Cited by 1,526
Rahwan, I., Cebrian, M., Obradovich, N., Bongard, J., Bonnefon, J.-F., Breazeal, C., Crandall, J. W., Christakis, N. A., Couzin, I. D., Jackson, M. O., et al. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-019-1138-y · Cited by 1,364 · cited 1×
“Further to this, some have even discussed the potential of using LLMs as participants in cognitive experiments instead of humans [17], although some see this proposal as too optimistic [18], and others warn against excessive anthropomorphism [19].”
Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learning
Shinn, N., Cassano, F., Berman, E., Gopinath, A., Narasimhan, K., & Yao, S. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.11366 · Cited by 1,087 · cited 1×
“Others have focused on specific qualities of human decision-making that are not possessed by LLMs, namely the ability to reflect and learn from mistakes, and propose an approach using verbal reinforcement to address this limitation [27].”
BackgroundLaMDA: Language Models for Dialog Applications
Thoppilan, R., De Freitas, D., Hall, J., Shazeer, N., Kulshreshtha, A., Cheng, H.-T., Jin, A., Bos, T., Baker, L., Du, Y., et al. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2201.08239 · Cited by 778 · cited 1×
“5 [40] and GPT-4 [41], Google’s Bard powered by LaMDA [42], Anthropic’s Claude 2 [43], and three versions of Meta’s Llama 2 model: the 7 billion (7b), 13 billion (13b) and 70 billion (70b) parameter versions [44].”
MethodUsing cognitive psychology to understand GPT-3
Binz, M., & Schulz, E. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2218523120 · Cited by 559 · cited 6×
“A number of studies have taken a similar approach, however they do not generally compare across different model types [12, 16, 29–35], or those that do are not evaluating rational reasoning [36].”
Influential
Cited by
On the creativity of large language models
Franceschelli, G., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-024-02127-3 · Cited by 113
Self-citationHagendorff, T., Dasgupta, I., Binz, M., Chan, S. C. Y., Lampinen, A., Wang, J. X., Akata, Z., & Schulz, E. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.13988 · Cited by 68
Inherent and emergent liability issues in LLM-based agentic systems: a principal-agent perspective
Gabison, G. A., & Xian, R. P. (2025) · Proceedings of the 1st Workshop for Research on Agent Language Models (REALM 2025) · doi:10.18653/v1/2025.realm-1.9 · Cited by 19
Niu, Q., Liu, J., Bi, Z., Feng, P., Peng, B., Chen, K., Li, M., Yan, L. K., Zhang, Y., Yin, C. H., et al. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2409.02387 · Cited by 16
The bewitching AI: The Illusion of Communication with Large Language Models
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Metadata
- Authors
- Macmillan-Scott, O., & Musolesi, M.
- Venue
- Royal Society Open Science
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2024-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 240255-240255
- ISSN
- 2054-5703 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4399356353
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 19.40
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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