The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol
Open accessAbstract
The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack taking the scheme of Hillery, Bu\ifmmode \check{z}\else \v{z}\fi{}ek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999)] as an example. By distinguishing between two mixed states, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a dishonest participant can attain all the information without introducing any error, which shows that the HBB protocol is insecure against dishonest participants. It is easy to verify that the attack scheme of Karlsson, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59, 162 (1999)] is a special example of our results. To demonstrate our results further, we construct an explicit attack scheme according to the necessary and sufficient conditions. Our work completes the security analysis of the HBB protocol, and the method presented may be useful for the analysis of other similar protocols.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Quantum detection and estimation theory
Helstrom, C. W. (1969) · Journal of Statistical Physics · doi:10.1007/bf01007479 · Cited by 3,776
Hillery, M., Bužek, V., & Berthiaume, A. (1999) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.59.1829 · Cited by 3,347
Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Shor, P. W., & Preskill, J. (2000) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.85.441 · Cited by 3,047
Cleve, R., Gottesman, D., & Lo, H.-K. (1999) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.83.648 · Cited by 1,373
Quantum entanglement for secret sharing and secret splitting
Karlsson, A., Koashi, M., & Imoto, N. (1999) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.59.162 · Cited by 1,020
Optimal Eavesdropping in Quantum Cryptography with Six States
Bruß, D. (1998) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.81.3018 · Cited by 864
Theory of quantum secret sharing
Gottesman, D. (2000) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.61.042311 · Cited by 618
Improving the security of multiparty quantum secret sharing against Trojan horse attack
Deng, F.-G., Li, X.-H., Zhou, H.-Y., & Zhang, Z.-J. (2005) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.72.044302 · Cited by 578
Tripartite Quantum State Sharing
Lance, A. M., Symul, T., Bowen, W. P., Sanders, B. C., & Lam, P. K. (2004) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.92.177903 · Cited by 521
Optimal eavesdropping in quantum cryptography. I. Information bound and optimal strategy
Fuchs, C. A., Gisin, N., Griffiths, R. B., Niu, C.-S., & Peres, A. (1997) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.56.1163 · Cited by 474
Cited by
Entanglement of single-atom quantum bits at a distance
Moehring, D. L., Maunz, P., Olmschenk, S., Younge, K. C., Matsukevich, D. N., Duan, L.-M., & Monroe, C. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06118 · Cited by 820
Open-system dynamics of entanglement:a key issues review
Aolita, L., de Melo, F., & Davidovich, L. (2015) · Refubium (Universitätsbibliothek der Freien Universität Berlin) · doi:10.17169/refubium-20820 · Cited by 258
Metadata
- Authors
- Qin, S.-J., Gao, F., Wen, Q.-Y., & Zhu, F.-C.
- Venue
- Physical Review A
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2007-12-27
- Volume
- 76
- Issue
- 6
- ISSN
- 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
- 1050-2947
- 1094-1622
- OpenAlex
- W2005998556
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 16.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1103/physreva.76.062324
- The paper
- Qin, S.-J., Gao, F., Wen, Q.-Y., & Zhu, F.-C. (2007). Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol. Physical Review A. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.76.062324
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.