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Cited by 363

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Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol

Open access
Qin, Su-Juan, Gao, Fei, Wen, Qiao-Yan, Zhu, Fu-Chen·2007·Physical Review A

Abstract

The participant attack is the most serious threat for quantum secret-sharing protocols. We present a method to analyze the security of quantum secret-sharing protocols against this kind of attack taking the scheme of Hillery, Bu\ifmmode \check{z}\else \v{z}\fi{}ek, and Berthiaume (HBB) [Phys. Rev. A 59, 1829 (1999)] as an example. By distinguishing between two mixed states, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a dishonest participant can attain all the information without introducing any error, which shows that the HBB protocol is insecure against dishonest participants. It is easy to verify that the attack scheme of Karlsson, Koashi, and Imoto [Phys. Rev. A 59, 162 (1999)] is a special example of our results. To demonstrate our results further, we construct an explicit attack scheme according to the necessary and sufficient conditions. Our work completes the security analysis of the HBB protocol, and the method presented may be useful for the analysis of other similar protocols.

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Metadata

Authors
Qin, S.-J., Gao, F., Wen, Q.-Y., & Zhu, F.-C.
Venue
Physical Review A
Published
2007-12-27
Volume
76
Issue
6
ISSN
  • 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
  • 1050-2947
  • 1094-1622
OpenAlex
W2005998556
Cited by
363
References
20
FWCI
16.94
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1103/physreva.76.062324
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Qin, S.-J., Gao, F., Wen, Q.-Y., & Zhu, F.-C. (2007). Cryptanalysis of the Hillery-Bužek-Berthiaume quantum secret-sharing protocol. Physical Review A. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.76.062324

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