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Cited by 167

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Simple security analysis of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

Open access
Lin, Jie, Lütkenhaus, Norbert·2018·Physical Review A

Abstract

Variations of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (PM-MDI QKD) protocols have been investigated before, but it was recently discovered that this type of protocol (under the name of twin-field QKD) can beat the linear scaling of the repeaterless bound on secret key capacity. We propose a variation of PM-MDI QKD protocol, which reduces the sifting cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as test states. We provide a security proof in the infinite key limit. Our proof is conceptually simple and gives tight key rates. We obtain an analytical key rate formula for the loss-only scenario, confirming the square root scaling and also showing the loss limit. We simulate the key rate for realistic imperfections and show that PM-MDI QKD can overcome the repeaterless bound with currently available technology.

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Metadata

Authors
Lin, J., & Lütkenhaus, N.
Venue
Physical Review A
Published
2018-10-25
Volume
98
Issue
4
ISSN
  • 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
  • 2469-9926
  • 2469-9934
OpenAlex
W2884610938
Cited by
167
References
2
FWCI
11.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Simple security analysis of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1103/physreva.98.042332
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Lin, J., & Lütkenhaus, N. (2018). Simple security analysis of phase-matching measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution. Physical Review A. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.98.042332

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