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Insight into the so-called spatial reciprocity.
Abstract
Up to now, there have been a great number of studies that demonstrate the effect of spatial topology on the promotion of cooperation dynamics (namely, the so-called "spatial reciprocity"). However, most researchers probably attribute it to the positive assortment of strategies supported by spatial arrangement. In this paper, we analyze the time course of cooperation evolution under different evolution rules. Interestingly, a typical evolution process can be divided into two evident periods: the enduring (END) period and the expanding (EXP) period where the former features that cooperators try to endure defectors' invasion and the latter shows that perfect C clusters fast expand their area. We find that the final cooperation level relies on two key factors: the formation of the perfect C cluster at the end of the END period and the expanding fashion of the perfect C cluster during the EXP period. For deterministic rule, the smooth expansion of C cluster boundaries enables cooperators to reach a dominant state, whereas, the rough boundaries for stochastic rule cannot provide a sufficient beneficial environment for the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, we show that expansion of the perfect C cluster is closely related to the cluster coefficient of interaction topology. To some extent, we present a viable method for understanding the spatial reciprocity mechanism in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.
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RL agents employing additional interaction strategies exhibit two evident phases in their learning process: the END period and the EXP period.
“However, RL agents employing additional interaction strategies exhibit two evident phases in their learning process, aligning with observations from previous EGT experiments [Wang et al. , 2013]: the END period and the EXP period.”
From Enhancing Cooperation through Selective Interaction and Long-term Experiences in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (2024) · cites this paper as Wang et al., 2013
Citations
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Sorted by citations
Ren, T., & Zeng, X.-J. (2024) · Proceedings of the Thirty-ThirdInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.24963/ijcai.2024/22 · Cited by 8
“Figure 3 additional interaction strategies exhibit two evident phases in their learning process, aligning with observations from previous EGT experiments [Wang et al. , 2013]: the END period and the EXP period.”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Wang, Z., Kokubo, S., Tanimoto, J., Fukuda, E., & Shigaki, K.
- Affiliations
- Hong Kong Baptist University (HK)
- Kyushu University (JP)
- Venue
- Physical Review E
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2013-10-29
- Volume
- 88
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 042145-042145
- ISSN
- 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
- 1550-2376
- OpenAlex
- W2334840341
- Cited by
- 254
- References
- 4
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 33
- FWCI
- 89.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Physical Review E (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (25560165)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- spatial reciprocity, evolution of cooperation, spatial topology, cooperation clusters, cluster expansion, clustering coefficient, social dilemmas
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