Cited by 254Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationMathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology ModelsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Insight into the so-called spatial reciprocity.

Abstract

Up to now, there have been a great number of studies that demonstrate the effect of spatial topology on the promotion of cooperation dynamics (namely, the so-called "spatial reciprocity"). However, most researchers probably attribute it to the positive assortment of strategies supported by spatial arrangement. In this paper, we analyze the time course of cooperation evolution under different evolution rules. Interestingly, a typical evolution process can be divided into two evident periods: the enduring (END) period and the expanding (EXP) period where the former features that cooperators try to endure defectors' invasion and the latter shows that perfect C clusters fast expand their area. We find that the final cooperation level relies on two key factors: the formation of the perfect C cluster at the end of the END period and the expanding fashion of the perfect C cluster during the EXP period. For deterministic rule, the smooth expansion of C cluster boundaries enables cooperators to reach a dominant state, whereas, the rough boundaries for stochastic rule cannot provide a sufficient beneficial environment for the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, we show that expansion of the perfect C cluster is closely related to the cluster coefficient of interaction topology. To some extent, we present a viable method for understanding the spatial reciprocity mechanism in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas.

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Crossref · 10.1103/physreve.88.042145

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  • RL agents employing additional interaction strategies exhibit two evident phases in their learning process: the END period and the EXP period.

    “However, RL agents employing additional interaction strategies exhibit two evident phases in their learning process, aligning with observations from previous EGT experiments [Wang et al. , 2013]: the END period and the EXP period.”

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Metadata

Authors
Wang, Z., Kokubo, S., Tanimoto, J., Fukuda, E., & Shigaki, K.
Affiliations
  • Hong Kong Baptist University (HK)
  • Kyushu University (JP)
Venue
Physical Review E
Published
2013-10-29
Volume
88
Issue
4
Pages
042145-042145
ISSN
  • 1539-3755 (ISSN-L)
  • 1550-2376
OpenAlex
W2334840341
Cited by
254
References
4
Citations by year
2026: 7 · 2025: 11 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 18 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 33
FWCI
89.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Physical Review E (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (25560165)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Applied Mathematics › Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
spatial reciprocity, evolution of cooperation, spatial topology, cooperation clusters, cluster expansion, clustering coefficient, social dilemmas

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