The Evolution of Cooperation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
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In the citing paper
“In Axelrod's seminal iterated Prisoner's Dilemma tournaments, the benchmark strategy was Tit-for-Tat (TFT), which simply mirrors the opponent's last move [88].”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [88]
In the citing paper
“Alternatively, communities can leverage repeated interaction. When people know that they are going to be dealing with others again and again, they generally forecast that it is in their best long-term interest to cooperate (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).”
From Stories in Action. (2022) · cites this paper as Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981
In the citing paper
“Axelrod's (1984) work in game theory helped identify the now-classic concepts of tit-for-tat and all-defect game strategies (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981).”
From Implications of an Emerging Integration of Universal and Culturally Specific Psychologies (2006) · cites this paper as Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981
In the citing paper
“In both species, cooperation among group members is essential for individuals to gain access to benefits from engaging in intergroup conflict.”
From Oxytocin reactivity during intergroup conflict in wild chimpanzees (2017) · cites this paper as [16]
Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4
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An Introduction to Genetic Algorithms
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Complex networks: structure and dynamics
BOCCALETTI, S., LATORA, V, MORENO, Y., CHAVEZ, M., & HWANG, D. (2006) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2005.10.009 · Cited by 11,010
Metadata
- Authors
- Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- ORCID
- Axelrod, Robert
- Venue
- Science
- Published
- 1981-03-27
- Volume
- 211
- Issue
- 4489
- Pages
- 1390-1396
- ISSN
- 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
- 1095-9203
- OpenAlex
- W2062663664
- Cited by
- 20,065
- References
- 39
- Citations by year
- 2026: 294 · 2025: 435 · 2024: 368 · 2023: 366 · 2022: 382 · 2021: 556 · 2020: 570 · 2019: 608 · 2018: 621 · 2017: 592 · 2016: 769 · 2015: 817 · 2014: 803 · 2013: 873 · 2012: 856
- FWCI
- 449.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Virtual Defense Library (Ministerio de Defensa) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics › Animal Behavior and Reproduction
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, reciprocity, evolutionarily stable strategy, prisoner's dilemma, invasion resistance, territoriality, mating systems, disease
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Humans, Mathematics, Models, Biological, Selection, Genetic
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- Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.