Board structure and ownership in Malaysia: the case of distressed listed companies
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Purpose: This study seeks to examine the influence of board independence, CEO duality and ownership structure on the firm financial distressed status using a sample of distressed companies and a matched‐pair sample of non‐distressed companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia. Design/methodology/approach: This study utilized publicly available data from annual reports of a sample of 86 non‐finance distressed firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia and a sample of matched 86 non‐distressed firms for a period covering the 1999‐2001 financial years. Findings: Board independence and CEO duality are not associated with financial distressed status. Management and non‐executive directors' interests are associated negatively with financial distress. A negative association is also documented for outside blockholders. The evidence also supports the contention that ownership by non‐executive directors and outside blockholders effectively increases their incentives to monitor management in ensuring their wealth in the firms is intact. Research limitations/implications: One limitation of this research is that it relies on publicly available data and agency theory. Future research could apply other theories, such as resource dependency and stewardship. Use of process‐oriented data could also improve the findings. Practical implications: Independent directors need to undergo training to help them improve and be aware of their responsibilities. Originality/value: This paper offers evidence on the extent to which distress is associated with corporate governance from a developing country. The paper should be of interest to the regulatory bodies and practitioners.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
Altman, E. I. (1968) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00843.x · Cited by 14,888
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 1×
“Large shareholders could limit agency problems ( Shleifer and Vishny, 1986”
Background
Cited by
Shahwan, T. M. (2015) · Corporate Governance · doi:10.1108/cg-11-2014-0140 · Cited by 276
Habib, A. M., & Kayani, U. N. (2022) · Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society · doi:10.1108/cg-12-2021-0440 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Nahar Abdullah, S.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society
- Publisher
- Emerald
- Published
- 2006-10-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 582-594
- ISSN
- 1472-0701 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2001223235
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 12.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board structure and ownership in Malaysia: the case of distressed listed companies. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1108/14720700610706072
- The paper
- Nahar Abdullah, S. (2006). Board structure and ownership in Malaysia: the case of distressed listed companies. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700610706072
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.