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A Comprehensive Security Analysis of a SCADA Protocol: From OSINT to Mitigation

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Rosa, Luis, Freitas, Miguel, Mazo, Sergey, Monteiro, Edmundo, Cruz, Tiago, Simoes, Paulo · 2019 · IEEE Access
Cited by 41

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

It is an established fact that the security of Industrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) strongly depends on the robustness of the underlying supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network protocols (among other factors). This becomes especially evident when considering the extent to which certain protocols, designed with poor or nonexistent security mechanisms, have led to a considerable number of past incident reports affecting critical infrastructures and essential services. Considering the current situation, it is rather obvious why the proper auditing and analysis of SCADA protocols are considered as key when it comes to design and/or protect IACS infrastructures. However, while the security of some protocols, such as Modbus or DNP3, has already been extensively analyzed, the same cannot be said for other protocols and technologies being used in the same domain that have not received the same amount of attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive security analysis of the PCOM SCADA protocol, including a dissection of PCOM, a demonstration of several attacks scenarios on PCOM-based systems, and also an analysis of possible mitigation strategies against these potential attacks. Moreover, this paper also describes a number of open-source tools that we developed for further analysis and research of PCOM security aspects, including a PCOM Wireshark dissector, a Nmap NSE PCOM scan, multiple Metasploit PCOM modules, a set of Snort PCOM rules, and several network traffic datasets containing multiple samples of different types of PCOM operations.

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Citations

Cites

  • Cyber-Physical Systems Security—A Survey

    Humayed, A., Lin, J., Li, F., & Luo, B. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2703172 · Cited by 1,185 · cited 1×

    “RELATED WORK SCADA security has been widely discussed [10] [11] [12] and several security design flaws have already been identified.”
    Background
  • A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems

    Zhu, B., Joseph, A., & Sastry, S. (2011) · 2011 International Conference on Internet of Things and 4th International Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing · doi:10.1109/ithings/cpscom.2011.34 · Cited by 458 · cited 1×

    “Several types of attacks have been referred in the literature [13], focused mainly on intelligence gathering, network reconnaissance, accessing and changing restricted process parameters and, finally, disrupting the physical processes under control (with its inherent consequences).”
    Background
  • Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: A survey of techniques

    Nazir, S., Patel, S., & Patel, D. (2017) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.06.010 · Cited by 167 · cited 1×

    “RELATED WORK SCADA security has been widely discussed [10] [11] [12] and several security design flaws have already been identified.”
    Background

Show all 3 references

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Cited by

See all 41

Metadata

Authors
Rosa, L., Freitas, M., Mazo, S., Monteiro, E., Cruz, T., & Simoes, P.
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2019
Volume
7
Pages
42156-42168
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2939784618
Cited by
41
References
3
FWCI
2.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold
Funders
Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (700581)

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Comprehensive Security Analysis of a SCADA Protocol: From OSINT to Mitigation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/access.2019.2906926
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Rosa, L., Freitas, M., Mazo, S., Monteiro, E., Cruz, T., & Simoes, P. (2019). A Comprehensive Security Analysis of a SCADA Protocol: From OSINT to Mitigation. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2906926

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