Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 15 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
Industrial control systems (ICS) are being used for surveillance and controlling numerous industrial process plants in national critical infrastructures. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is a core component in ICS systems for continuous monitoring and controlling these process plants. Legacy SCADA systems are working in isolated networks and using proprietary communication protocols which made them less exposed to cyber threats. In recent times, these ICS systems have been connected to Internet and corporate networks for data sharing and remote monitoring. They are also using open protocols and operating systems. This leads to vulnerabilities of the system to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity threats are more prevalent than ever in ICS systems. These attacks may be external or internal. Modbus is a widely deployed communication protocol for SCADA communications. There is no security in design of Modbus protocol, and it is vulnerable to numerous cyberattacks. In this paper, we worked for False Command Injection attack, False Access Injection attack, and replay attacks on Modbus protocol. Initially, a real-time SCADA testbed was set up, and we envisaged the impact of these attacks on Modbus protocol data using the testbed. In this work, we used local area network (LAN) environment only for simulating the attacks. We assumed that the attacks penetrated the LAN network. We proposed and developed (a) a method to detect replay attacks by incorporating time stamp and sequence number in Modbus communications and (b) a frame filtering module which will block unauthorized attacks like False Command Injection and False Access Injection attacks to reach programmable logic controller (PLC). Numbers of attacks were simulated and the performance of the method was measured using attack block rate (ABR). It blocked 97% of malicious Modbus transactions or attacks to reach the PLC. It protects SCADA systems from attackers, which is a core component of industrial control systems. The solution enhanced the security of SCADA systems with Modbus protocol.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
The paper builds a real-time SCADA testbed to demonstrate replay, False Command Injection (FCI), and False Access Injection (FAI) attacks on Modbus, then proposes a frame filtering module plus sequence-number/timestamp additions to detect and block them. The integrated framework blocked 97% of malicious Modbus transactions with 1.6% round-trip time overhead.
Key findings
- The frame filtering module blocked 97% of FCI and FAI attacks (True Positive Rate 97%, True Negative Rate 3%); in three iterations of 100, 150, and 200 attacks it blocked 98, 148, and 197 commands respectively, allowing only 2, 2, and 3.
- Replay attacks were detected by adding a 2-byte sequence number and 8-byte timestamp to the Modbus frame; with a 500 ms threshold, requests delayed beyond 500 ms were rejected.
- Overhead: 10 extra bytes per frame, giving 4% overhead on reading requests and 77% on command frames, versus 291% in prior work [33]; average round-trip delay was 16 ms for a 1000 ms poll interval (1.6% overhead), versus 66% latency in [51].
- Testbed attacks confirmed impact: replay caused the pump to stop on stale tank-level values, and FCI stopped the pump mid-transfer at 11:06:28.
Methods
- Real-time lab testbed: SCADA HMI/DAQ server (HP Z420, Vijeo Citect), Schneider M340 PLC, attacker PC with Modbus simulator, managed Netgear switch, web server, and a two-tank water transfer process with Panasonic MS-UA11-1 level sensors, ASCO solenoid valves, and a 0.5 HP pump; interlock logic stopped the pump at 90 cm destination level.
- Attacks simulated with Ettercap (ARP spoofing/MITM) and Wireshark capture; replay frames were re-sent at intervals from 10 ms to 5 hrs, with 100 requests per interval.
- Proposed solution: a frame filtering module (configured with allowed IP addresses, function codes, starting addresses, and register counts) placed in a gateway PC between HMI and PLC, plus an "open solution" using two gateway modules that add/remove the sequence-number and timestamp fields transparently; performance measured as Attack Block Rate (ABR = blocked/generated × 100).
Limitations
- Stated: the study used LAN connectivity only and assumed attacks penetrated the LAN from outside; it is applicable to internal attacks only, with WAN/Internet and other cyberattacks left for future work.
- Stated: the timestamp threshold must be tuned to polling interval and data-block count, and the sequence number is a cyclic integer (0–255) that can repeat after n iterations, so the method is not suitable when multiple requests are sent without waiting for responses.
- Evident from the text: the frame-modifying solution breaks interoperability with other vendors (hence the gateway workaround), and the comparison table's overhead figures (4%/77%) are not broken down per request type in the extracted text.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
2 Valid · 1 Not valid · 10 Not checked · 38 Own results and interpretations
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It blocked 97% of malicious Modbus transactions or attacks to reach the PLC.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > Abstract
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“e frame filtering module (FFM) rejected the connection because the IP address (192.168.1.6)was not configured in the module.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 4. Results, Discussion, and Feature Scope
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Next, we simulated False Command Injection to stop the pump, while fluid was transferring.en the ramp trend was stopped suddenly as shown in Figure 9 at 11 : 06 : 28.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 2.2.2. False Command and Access Injection Attacks.
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“e same experiment was conducted 100 times.e mean value of allowed commands in total experiment was 3 commands.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 4. Results, Discussion, and Feature Scope
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this experiment, the pump was stopped unexpectedly because of simulation of False Command Injection.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 2.2.2. False Command and Access Injection Attacks.
plainstates a causeSingle case- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
14 more claims
Create a free account to see all 51 claims and every source verdict.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 4
- It may state two separate claims as one. 27
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > (8)
“In the second case, the time duration for one cycle of data blocks is 60 ms in our project.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > (8)
“en HMI started first data block at 0 ms and PLC took 4 ms for execution of request.HMI received response frame at 64 ms with 60 ms of transmission delay.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 4.2. Comparison of Solution with Existing Related Works.
“192.168.1.2(A) 5 (A) 0 × 10005 (A) 1 (A) A Frame is accepted”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 5. Conclusion
“| 192.168.1.2 | 1 4 | 0 × 10000 0 × 25000 | 200 50 |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 2.1. Testbed Setup.
“e pump will start whenever the destination tank level reaches 90 cm.But the stop command was sent to pump because of replay attack.”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 2.1. Testbed Setup.
“Whenever destination tank level reaches 90 cm, the pump will stop automatically by logic.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 4. Results, Discussion, and Feature Scope
“e connection was accepted by frame filtering module because IP address of the connection was impersonated by HMI IP address (192.168.1.3).”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 5. Conclusion
“| SCADA HMI | HP Z420 | 8 GB RAM with Intel processor | 192.168.1.1 | Schneider Vijeo Citect SCADA HMI package was loaded in this system | | |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 4.2. Comparison of Solution with Existing Related Works.
“192.168.1.3(A) 5 (A) 0 × 00001 1 R e memory address is not configured”
§ Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol > 5. Conclusion
“| 192.168.1.3 | 1 3 | 0 × 02001 0 × 40000 | 4000 600 |”
Citations
Cites
Malicious Data Attacks on the Smart Grid
Kosut, O., Jia, L., Thomas, R. J., & Tong, L. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2163807 · Cited by 784
Review of security issues in industrial networks
Cheminod, M., Durante, L., & Valenzano, A. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2012.2198666 · Cited by 349
A survey of intrusion detection on industrial control systems
Hu, Y., Yang, A., Li, H., Sun, Y., & Sun, L. (2018) · International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks · doi:10.1177/1550147718794615 · Cited by 185
Liu, X., Zhu, P., Zhang, Y., & Chen, K. (2015) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2418280 · Cited by 163
A Survey of Security in SCADA Networks: Current Issues and Future Challenges
Ghosh, S., & Sampalli, S. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2926441 · Cited by 154
Design and Implementation of a Secure Modbus Protocol
Fovino, I. N., Carcano, A., Masera, M., & Trombetta, A. (2009) · IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04798-5_6 · Cited by 138
Implementing attacks for modbus/TCP protocol in a real-time cyber physical system test bed
Chen, B., Pattanaik, N., Goulart, A., Butler-Purry, K. L., & Kundur, D. (2015) · IEEE International Workshop Technical Committee on Communications Quality and Reliability (CQR) · doi:10.1109/cqr.2015.7129084 · Cited by 130
Security Challenges in Control Network Protocols: A Survey
Volkova, A., Niedermeier, M., Basmadjian, R., & de Meer, H. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2872114 · Cited by 114
Anomaly detection for industrial control systems using process mining
Myers, D., Suriadi, S., Radke, K., & Foo, E. (2018) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2018.06.002 · Cited by 108
Security of SCADA systems against cyber–physical attacks
Do, V. L., Fillatre, L., Nikiforov, I., & Willett, P. (2017) · IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine · doi:10.1109/maes.2017.160047 · Cited by 101
Research works printed but not linked: 7
- 2006, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, The Role of Authenticated Communications for Electric Power Distribution, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
- ICS-CERT, 2020, Year in review 2015
- K. Imtiaz, 2019, Security challenges of industrial communication protocols: threats vulnerabilities and solutions, International Journal of Computer Science and Telecommunications, 10
- Modbus over Serial Line Specification and Implementation Guide V1.02
- Modbus Messaging on TCP/IP Implementation Guide V1.0b
- Modbus Application Protocol Specification V1.1b3
- K. Rambabu, 2018, Contemporary affirmation of security and intrusion handling strategies of internet of things in recent literature, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Information Technology, 96, 2729
Cited by
Asiri, M., Saxena, N., Gjomemo, R., & Burnap, P. (2023) · ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems · doi:10.1145/3587255 · Cited by 109
“The response in the frame may reflect an outdated state of the physical parameters, but the HMI will process the received frame and the falsified measurements will be displayed on the SCADA monitor [119].”
BackgroundMohammed, S. H., Al-Jumaily, A. H. J., Singh, M. S. J., Jiménez, V. P. G., Jaber, A. S., Hussein, Y. S., Al-Najjar, M. M. A. K., & Al‐Jumeily, D. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3370911 · Cited by 92
“In [108] created an intrusion detection module for detecting malicious assaults in the SCADA system using network traces.”
MethodPinto, S. J., Siano, P., & Parente, M. (2023) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en16041651 · Cited by 76
Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22208024 · Cited by 45
“Finally, in [9], a framework is developed to prevent false command injection, false access injection, and replay attacks in the Modbus protocol in SCADA systems.”
Mohammed, A. S., Anthi, E., RANA, O. F., et al. (2022) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.103007 · Cited by 37
Metadata
- Authors
- L, R., & Satyanarayana, P.
- Affiliations
- Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation, K L Deemed to be University, Vaddeswaram, Guntur 522 502, Andhra Pradesh, India
- Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation (IN)
- Venue
- Security and Communication Networks
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-09-27
- Volume
- 2021
- Pages
- 1-15
- ISSN
- 1939-0114 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0122
- OpenAlex
- W3202430088
- Cited by
- 28
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 7
- FWCI
- 2.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Security and Communication Networks (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Koneru Lakshmaiah Education Foundation
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- SCADA security, Modbus, replay attacks, attack detection, attack blocking, programmable logic controller, industrial control systems, frame filtering, critical infrastructure cybersecurity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-06, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-06 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1155/2021/8887666
- The paper
- L, R., & Satyanarayana, P. (2021). Detection and Blocking of Replay, False Command, and False Access Injection Commands in SCADA Systems with Modbus Protocol. Security and Communication Networks. https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/8887666
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.