Detecting Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing Using Actuator Power Signatures
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Abstract
Additive manufacturing (AM), a.k.a. 3D printing is increasingly used to manufacture functional parts of safety-critical systems. The AM's dependence on computerization raises the concern that the AM process can be tampered with, and a part's mechanical properties sabotaged. To address this threat, we propose a novel approach for detecting sabotage attacks based on trusted monitoring of the current delivered to each printer motor. The proposed approach offers numerous advantages: 1) it is non-invasive in a time-critical process, 2) it can be retrofitted in legacy systems, and 3) it can be air-gapped from the computerized components of the AM process, making simultaneous compromise more difficult. We evaluated the approach on five categories of toolpath command-level manipulations that impact the geometry of the 3D printed object. Our evaluation showed that all but one tested category of attacks can be reliably detected, even if a single toolpath command is modified.
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Cited by
Additive Manufacturing Cyber-Physical System: Supply Chain Cybersecurity and Risks
Gupta, N., Tiwari, A., Bukkapatnam, S. T. S., & Karri, R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2978815 · Cited by 144
“Developments have taken place in mitigating risks of counterfeiting [18], [19], transparency [20], [21] and the manufacturing process [22], [23] in the AM security.”
BackgroundRais, M. H., Li, Y., & Ahmed, I. (2021) · Additive Manufacturing · doi:10.1016/j.addma.2021.102200 · Cited by 19
“Schemes based on optical-encoders [23] or electric current measurement [11] can be utilized effectively with more research.”
SCREAM: Secure Channels for Real-time Evaluation of Additive Manufacturing
Basu Roy, P., Blocklove, J., Bhargava, M., Pearce, H., Krishnamurthy, P., Sinanoglu, O., Gupta, N., Khorrami, F., & Karri, R. (2026) · Proceedings of the ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3779208.3805981
Metadata
- Authors
- Gatlin, J., Belikovetsky, S., Moore, S. B., Solewicz, Y., Elovici, Y., & Yampolskiy, M.
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 133421-133432
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2961964091
- Cited by
- 39
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 2.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Gatlin, J., Belikovetsky, S., Moore, S. B., Solewicz, Y., Elovici, Y., & Yampolskiy, M. (2019). Detecting Sabotage Attacks in Additive Manufacturing Using Actuator Power Signatures. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2019.2928005
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