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Cited by 257Smart Grid Security and ResilienceElectric Vehicles and InfrastructureVehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)

Cybersecurity of Smart Electric Vehicle Charging: A Power Grid Perspective

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Acharya, Samrat, Dvorkin, Yury, Pandzic, Hrvoje, Karri, Ramesh·2020·IEEE Access
DOI 10.1109/access.2020.3041074
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Abstract

With the roll-out of electric vehicles (EVs), the automobile industry is transitioning away from conventional gasoline-fueled vehicles. As a result, the EV charging demand is continuously growing and to meet this growing demand, various types of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) are being deployed for commercial and residential use. This nexus of EVs, EVCSs, and power grids creates complex cyber-physical interdependencies that can be maliciously exploited to damage each of these components. This paper describes and analyzes cyber vulnerabilities that arise at this nexus and points to the current and emerging gaps in the security of the EV charging ecosystem. These vulnerabilities must be addressed as the number of EVs continue to grow worldwide and their impact on the power grid becomes more viable. The purpose of this paper is to list and characterize all backdoors that can be exploited to seriously harm either EV and EVCS equipments, or power grid, or both. The presented issues and challenges intend to ignite research efforts on cybersecurity of smart EV charging and enhancing power grid resiliency against such demand-side cyberattacks in general.

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  • Current grid monitoring systems heavily rely on data quality, communication latency, and integration with consumer behavior models.

    “Current grid monitoring systems heavily rely on data quality, communication latency, and integration with consumer behavior models [112],[113].”

    From Economic Impacts and Mitigation for the Grid Connected Electric Vehicle Charging: A Technical and Operational Overview (2026) · cites this paper as [113]

    The STRIDE Threat Model section (page unavailable) describes grid monitoring measurements and warns that tampered data can lead operators to erroneous decisions. It also identifies timely access to information as a concern, but does not establish a general dependence on communication latency. Neither that section nor the EVCS–BEMS interface section (page unavailable) says monitoring systems rely on integration with consumer behavior models. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Storage can help reduce these restrictions, but the full benefits of storage are only felt if the dispatch of storage is optimized and coupled with grid signals, a point difficult to achieve in unregulated or customer-owned installations.

    “Storage can help to reduce these restrictions, but the full benefits of storage are only felt if the dispatch of storage is optimized and coupled with grid signals, a point that is difficult to achieve in unregulated or customer-owned installations [113].”

    From Economic Impacts and Mitigation for the Grid Connected Electric Vehicle Charging: A Technical and Operational Overview (2026) · cites this paper as [113]

    The EVCS–BEMS–Power Grid Interface section describes grid scheduling and pricing signals for demand-response participation by charging stations, but does not address storage dispatch. Searches for optimized storage dispatch and customer-owned or unregulated installations found no passage establishing the claimed benefits or difficulty. (LLM, conf=0.72)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Authors
Acharya, S., Dvorkin, Y., Pandzic, H., & Karri, R.
Affiliations
New York University (US)
ORCID
Venue
IEEE Access
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Published
2020
Volume
8
Pages
214434-214453
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1109/access.2020.3041074
OpenAlex
W3108634995
Cited by
257
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 40 · 2025: 68 · 2024: 66 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 17
FWCI
10.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • U.S. National Science Foundation (ECCS-2029158, ECCS-1847285)
  • Croatian Science Foundation
  • European Union through the European Social Fund under project Flexibility of Converter-based Microgrids—FLEXIBASE (PZS-2019-02-7747)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
Keywords
electric vehicle charging, cybersecurity, power grid, electric vehicle charging stations, cyber-physical interdependencies, backdoors, cyberattacks, grid resilience, smart charging

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