Cited by 14Network Security and Intrusion DetectionSmart Grid Security and ResilienceNetwork Packet Processing and Optimization

The DOI matches its Crossref record; the references it cites are not checked yet.

Unknown Payload Anomaly Detection Based on Format and Field Semantics Inference in Cyber-Physical Infrastructure Systems

Open access
Kim, Hyunjin, Kim, Sungjin, Jo, Wooyeon, Kim, Ki-Hyun, Shon, Taeshik·2021·IEEE Access

Abstract

A cyber-physical infrastructure system (CPIS) is a system that controls and manages critical infrastructure such as smart manufacturing, water treatment facilities, power generation, and distribution facilities. Although these CPISs focus on the security of air-gapped network environments, strict isolation from the outside network is difficult to achieve, leading to various attacks. CPISs also comprise various devices and proprietary communication protocols that are used exclusively for each domain and site. Therefore, experts have to adopt a customized strategy to enhance security in CPIS networks after analyzing each domain, device, and protocol in advance. These methods require a significant amount of time, cost, and manpower; consequently, they are difficult to apply existing security methods in the real field. As a solution, a method is proposed herein that includes the following: 1) inferencing the CPIS protocol format and field semantics based on the characteristics of CPIS networks and protocols; 2) multilevel anomaly detection based on the meaning and values of each inferred field. The proposed method does not require knowledge of each site and protocol. In addition, the inference method can be used to analyze the payload field, including the state and measurement value, as well as the header field. Finally, we validate the proposed technique using an open-source CPIS network dataset including response injection, command injection, denial-of-service, and reconnaissance attacks. In addition, in the aspect of detection efficiency, the proposed technique exhibits comparable performance to that of existing knowledge-based anomaly detection methods.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2021.3080081

Cites

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Protocol-aware methods are particularly suitable for detecting attacks that directly exploit industrial protocol semantics such as command and response injection, replay, spoofing, and MITM because they evaluate deviations in function codes, addressing schemes, request-response matching, and state-transition rules rather than only in coarse traffic statistics.

    “First, protocol-aware methods are particularly suitable for detecting attacks that directly exploit industrial protocol semantics such as command and response injection, replay, spoofing, and MITM because they evaluate deviations in function codes, addressing schemes, request-response matching, and state-transition rules rather than only in coarse traffic statistics [47,49].”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [47]

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Kim et al.'s method uses MAC/IP/port and length information to construct external signature groups, and multiple sequence alignment and field-distribution analysis automatically decompose headers and payloads into constant, categorical, and numerical fields.

    “MAC/IP/port and length information are used to construct external signature groups. Multiple sequence alignment (MSA) and field-distribution analysis automatically decompose headers and payloads into constant, categorical, and numerical fields.”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [47]

    Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Even relatively simple ML/DL classifiers can benefit from carefully engineered protocol features.

    “Third, the current work also highlights that even relatively simple ML/DL classifiers can benefit from carefully engineered protocol features.”

    From AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review (2025) · cites this paper as [47]

    The Proposed Method and Evaluation sections report inferring protocol fields from raw data and using them for anomaly detection, with F1 scores comparable to some existing methods (page numbers unavailable in our copy). This supports the value of protocol-field features, but the paper does not show that relatively simple ML/DL classifiers benefit from them; its reported results concern a multilayer detection method. (LLM, conf=0.79)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Kim et al. demonstrate that unsupervised field-semantic inference combined with rule-based multilevel detection can capture a broad range of protocol-abuse scenarios without prior protocol specifications.

    “while Kim et al. [47] demonstrate that unsupervised field-semantic inference combined with rule-based multilevel detection can capture a broad range of protocol-abuse scenarios without prior protocol specifications.”
  • Kim et al.'s inferred structure and semantics generate rules for external information, fixed fields, traffic patterns, and payload values, enabling multi-stage detection of response/command injections, DoS, and reconnaissance.

    “Based on the inferred structure and semantics, rules are generated for external information, fixed fields, traffic patterns, and payload values. These rules enable multi-stage detection of various attacks, including response/command injections, DoS, and reconnaissance.”

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet

References 40 · Cited by 14

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. chang, 2017, One stage more: Automatic ICS protocol field analysis, Proc Int Conf Crit Inf Infrastruct Secur, 241
  2. 2018, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems
  3. 2020, ICS Threat Predictions for 2021
  4. dhanabal, 2015, A study on NSL-KDD dataset for intrusion detection system based on classification algorithms, Int J Adv Res Comput Commun Eng, 4, 446
  5. lemay, 2016, Providing SCADA network datasets for intrusion detection research, Proc 9th Workshop Cyber Secur Experimentation Test (CSET), 1
  6. morris, 2015, Industrial control system simulation and data logging for intrusion detection system research, Proc 7th Annu Southeastern Cyber Secur Summit, 3

Metadata

Authors
Kim, H., Kim, S., Jo, W., Kim, K.-H., & Shon, T.
Affiliations
Ajou University (KR)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2021
Volume
9
Pages
75542-75552
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3163210918
Cited by
14
References
40
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3
FWCI
1.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Institute of Information and Communications Technology Planning and Evaluation (IITP) Grant by the Korean Government through the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) (2018-0-00336)
  • Energy Cloud Research and Development Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) Grant by the Ministry of Science and ICT (2019M3F2A1073385)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Network Packet Processing and Optimization
Keywords
denial-of-service attacks, reconnaissance attacks, critical infrastructure security

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review