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The “Cyber Security via Determinism” Paradigm for a Quantum Safe Zero Trust Deterministic Internet of Things (IoT)

Open access
Szymanski, Ted H. · 2022 · IEEE Access

Abstract

The next-generationInternet of Things(IoT) will control the critical infrastructure of the 21st century, including theSmart Power GridandSmart Cities. It will also supportDeterministic Communications, where ‘deterministic traffic flows’ (D-flows) receive strictQuality-of-Service(QoS) guarantees. A‘Cybersecurity via Determinism’paradigm for the next-generation‘Industrial and Tactile Deterministic IoT’is presented. A forwarding sub-layer of simple and secure ‘deterministic packet switches’ (D-switches) is introduced into layer-3. This sub-layer supports many deterministicSoftware Defined Wide Area Networks(SD-WANs), along with 3 new tools for improving cyber security:Access Control,Rate Control, andIsolation Control. ASoftware Defined Networking(SDN) control-plane configures each D-switch (ie FPGA) with multiple deterministic schedules to support D-flows. The SDN control-plane can embed millions of isolatedDeterministic Virtual Private Networks(DVPNs) into layer 3. This paradigm offers several benefits: 1) All congestion, interference, andDistributed Denial-of-Service(DDOS) attacks are removed; 2) Buffer sizes in D-switches are reduced by 1000+ times; 3) End-to-end IoT delays can be reduced to ultra-low latencies, i.e., the speed-of-light in fiber; 4) The D-switches do not require Gigabytes of memory to store large IP routing tables; 5) Hardware support is provided in layer 3 for the US NISTZero Trust Architecture; 6) Packets within a DVPN can be entirely encrypted usingQuantum Safeencryption, which is impervious to attacks byQuantum Computersusing existing quantum algorithms; 7) The probability of an undetected cyberattack targeting a DVPN can be made arbitrarily small by using longQuantum Safeencryption keys; and 8) Savings can reach$\$ $10s of Billions per year, through reduced capital, energy and operational costs.

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Crossref · 10.1109/access.2022.3169137

Cites

103 of 103 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Figures

FIGURE 1 Critical infrastructures that are subject to cyberattacks. (a) USA electricity transmission grid. (b) USA natural gas pipeline network (source: US EIA).
FIGURE 1 Critical infrastructures that are subject to cyberattacks. (a) USA electricity transmission grid. (b) USA natural gas pipeline network (source: US EIA).CC-BY · From the PDF
FIGURE 2 (a) Layer-3 IoT with BE IP routers, and sub-layer-3a with D-switches. (b) A Deterministic IoT spanning the USA with 3 DVPNs, originating at Los Angeles (LA), Seattle and Miami. Solid black lines denote fiber-optic edges. Dotted lines denote virtual 'point-to-point' links (i.e., D-flows). A DVPN with fully-encrypted D-flows from LA to every other major city are shown with bold red lines.
FIGURE 2 (a) Layer-3 IoT with BE IP routers, and sub-layer-3a with D-switches. (b) A Deterministic IoT spanning the USA with 3 DVPNs, originating at Los Angeles (LA), Seattle and Miami. Solid black lines denote fiber-optic edges. Dotted lines denote virtual 'point-to-point' links (i.e., D-flows). A DVPN with fully-encrypted D-flows from LA to every other major city are shown with bold red lines.CC-BY · From the PDF
FIGURE 3 A CIOQ D-switch with 5 deterministic controllers.
FIGURE 3 A CIOQ D-switch with 5 deterministic controllers.CC-BY · From the PDF
FIGURE 6 (a) End-to-end queuing delay CDF on selected D-Flows. (b) End-to-end queueing delay jitter distribution for all D-flows. (c) Packets queued per D-switch, versus time. (d) Distribution of packets queued per D-switch.
FIGURE 6 (a) End-to-end queuing delay CDF on selected D-Flows. (b) End-to-end queueing delay jitter distribution for all D-flows. (c) Packets queued per D-switch, versus time. (d) Distribution of packets queued per D-switch.CC-BY · From the PDF
FIGURE 7 Occupancy of two VOQs in the Las Vegas switch (in packets).
FIGURE 7 Occupancy of two VOQs in the Las Vegas switch (in packets).CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 6
CC-BY · From the PDF
Image 7
CC-BY · From the PDF

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Citations

Cites

Show all 104 references

Research works printed but not linked: 21

  1. 0, Cisco Annual Internet Report (2018-2023)
  2. 2008, NAE grand challenges for engineering Secure cyberspace
  3. 2015, Industrial Internet of Things Unleashing the Potential of Connected Products and Services
  4. 0, Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Cybersecurity Beyond the Hype AI in Your SOC
  5. 0, Global—2021 Forecast Highlights
  6. 2012, Deterministic Ethernet 802 1 Standards for Real-Time Process Control Industrial Automation and Vehicular Networks
  7. 2021, Mitigating Log4shell and Other Log4j- Related Vulnerabilities
  8. 2021, NIST NVD (National Vulnerability Database)
  9. 2021, Executive order on improving the nation’s cybersecurity
  10. 2021, Ransomware Task Force Combatting Ransomware—A Comprehensive Framework for Action Key Recommendations From the Ransomware Task Force
  11. daemen, 1999, AES proposal Rijndael
  12. 2001, Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
  13. 2020, Zero Trust Architecture
  14. huston, 2021, A Survey on Secure Inter-Domain routing Part 2—Approaches to Securing BGP
  15. huston, 2020, BGP in 2019—The BGP Table
  16. hadad, 2021, Apache Log4j Vulnerability CVE-2021- 44228 Raises Widespread Concern
  17. 2015, Industrial Internet Insights Report for 2015
  18. evens, 2012, Industrial Internet Pushing the Boundaries of Minds and Machines
  19. 2021, Quantum Computing and Post Quantum Cryptography FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions)
  20. szymanski, 2020, Reduced-complexity integrated guaranteed-rate optical packet switch
  21. szymanski, 2017, Method to achieve bounded buffer sizes and quality of service guarantees in the internet network

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Szymanski, T. H.
Affiliations
McMaster University (CA)
Corresponding author
Szymanski, Ted H.
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2022
Volume
10
Pages
45893-45930
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4226420754
Cited by
59
References
104
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 2
FWCI
5.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software-Defined Networks and 5G
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
Keywords
deterministic communication, software-defined networking, zero-trust architecture, quantum-safe encryption, cybersecurity, access control, rate control, FPGA, quality of service, DDoS attacks, buffer size reduction, low latency, smart grid, smart cities

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The “Cyber Security via Determinism” Paradigm for a Quantum Safe Zero Trust Deterministic Internet of Things (IoT). https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/access.2022.3169137
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Szymanski, T. H. (2022). The “Cyber Security via Determinism” Paradigm for a Quantum Safe Zero Trust Deterministic Internet of Things (IoT). IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3169137

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