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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 160 of the 161 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 65 of the 205 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey

Open access

Abstract

We present a detailed survey of the Zero Trust (ZT) security paradigm which has a growing number of advocates in the critical infrastructure risk management space. The article employs a descriptive approach to present the fundamental tenets of ZT and provides a review of numerous potential options available for successful realization of this paradigm. We describe the role of authentication and access control in Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) and present an in-depth discussion of state-of-the-art techniques for authentication and access control in different scenarios. Furthermore, we comprehensively discuss the conventional approaches to encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation available for instantiating a ZTA. The article also details various challenges associated with contemporary authentication mechanisms, access control schemes, trust and risk computation techniques, micro-segmentation approaches, and Software-Defined Perimeter, that can impact the implementation of ZT in its true sense. Based upon our analysis, we finally pinpoint the potential future research directions for successful realization of ZT in critical infrastructures.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This survey synthesizes Zero Trust Architecture tenets and state-of-the-art techniques for authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation, with a focus on critical infrastructure. It finds that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA and identifies persistent shortcomings and future research directions.

Key findings

  • The survey identifies authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation as essential ZTA techniques, but concludes that all have shortcomings and that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA.
  • It reviewed more than 180 articles and reports and reports specific security concerns: 128-bit AES on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break via differential and correlation power analysis, and 2048-bit RSA could be cracked in around eight hours by a 20-million-qubit quantum computer, while only 128 qubits currently exist.
  • It recommends context-aware/continuous authentication, risk-aware access control such as Function-Based Access Control (FBAC), lightweight encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and ML-supported trust/security automation; one cited microservices perimeterization approach (eZTrust) achieved 2–5 times lower packet latency and 1.5–2.5 times lower CPU overhead than other approaches.
  • Device authentication findings include PUF vulnerability to modelling attacks, ECC vulnerability to quantum attacks, device fingerprinting usable only on specific devices, and a lightweight mutual authentication scheme taking around 125 ms on constrained devices but evaluated only on a Texas development kit.

Methods

  • Descriptive survey/horizon scan of ZTA for critical infrastructure, comparing its approach with existing reviews in Table 1 and organizing analysis around NIST ZTA tenets and logical components.
  • Reviewed more than 180 articles and reports using keywords including zero trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation.
  • Qualitative synthesis of state-of-the-art techniques, challenges, and future research directions; no primary experiments or new empirical evaluation are reported.

Limitations

  • The paper states that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA; all essential techniques—authentication, access control, encryption, and security automation—have shortcomings, and trust computation for enterprise networks or critical infrastructure lacks direct literature, so ad hoc IoT techniques are described as extendable.
  • The paper states that risk computation implementation details remain obscure; current trust algorithms are designed for ad hoc or P2P networks and are not directly applicable to enterprise/CPS settings; micro-segmentation is difficult for complex workflows, legacy/monolithic applications, and translating workflow access into network/application policies; SDP requires major network/client/server changes and its central controller can become an attack target.
  • Evident from the text: the provided full text is fragmented/truncated, with some sections and tables incomplete, and the survey is qualitative without primary empirical validation of its recommendations.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/access.2022.3174679

Cites

160 of 160 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

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Citations

Cites

Show all 161 references

Research works printed but not linked: 32

  1. Brewster, 2018, We Broke Into a Bunch of Android Phones With a 3D-Printed Head
  2. Goodin, 2016, Breaking the Iris Scanner Locking Samsung’s Galaxy S8 is Laughably Easy
  3. 2020, RSA SecureID
  4. 2020, YubiKeys
  5. PG, 2011, Electromyography analysis for person identification, Int. J. Biometrics Bioinf. (IJBB), 5, 172
  6. ID, 2020, SRAM PUF Technology by Intrinsic ID
  7. 2020, IoT Platform
  8. Alliance, 2022, Fido UAF Architectural Overview
  9. Alliance, 2022, Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) Overview
  10. 2022, Web Authentication: An API for Accessing Public Key Credentials
  11. 2022, Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)
  12. 2022, Oath Reference Architecture, Release 2.0
  13. 2017, User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for OAuth 2.0 Authorization
  14. LABS, 2020, Decentralized Cloud Storage is Here
  15. 2020, The New Standard in Data Security
  16. 2020, Homomorphic Encryption Standardization
  17. Buchanan, 2020, PHOTON
  18. WJ, 2020, XTEA (eXtended TEA)
  19. 2022, CLEFIA
  20. Agency, 2021, Quantum Computing and Post-Quantum Cryptography: Frequently Asked Questions
  21. Lerner, 2017, Microsegmentation
  22. 2020, Illumio
  23. 2020, Cilium
  24. 2020, Application Centric Infrastructure
  25. Staff, 2014, What is VMware NSX and VMware SDN?
  26. 2020, Helping Security and IT Teams Navigate Risk
  27. 2020, Microsegmentation Drives Network Isolation
  28. 2020, Connect
  29. 2022, Micro-Segmentation With Istio Authorization
  30. Abiezzi, 2019, Fine-grained IoT access control via device proxies and SDN-based micro-segmentation
  31. Olivier, IoT attack detection with deep learning
  32. Takayuki, 2018, Ear acoustic authentication technology: Using sound to identify the distinctive shape of the ear canal, NEC Tech. J., 13, 87

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R.
Affiliations
Deakin University (AU)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2022
Volume
10
Pages
57143-57179
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4285205927
Cited by
406
References
161
Citations by year
2026: 131 · 2025: 141 · 2024: 88 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 9
FWCI
98.90
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Australian Department of Defence
  • Defence Science and Technology Group’s Operations Research Network
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
Keywords
zero-trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, security automation, software-defined perimeter, critical infrastructure security, network security

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/access.2022.3174679
The paper
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022). Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2022.3174679

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.