Zero Trust Architecture
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 37 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Findingown data§ Additional information
The current state of the ZTA ecosystem is not mature enough for widespread adoption.
“This survey concluded that the current state of the ZTA ecosystem is not mature enough for widespread adoption.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data§ Additional information
There is no single solution that provides all the necessary components for ZTA.
“there is no single solution that provides all the necessary components.”
- Also stated in: § B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between Components · plain
“During the technology survey, it became apparent that no one vendor offers a single solution that will provide zero trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between Components · plain
- Findingown data§ Additional information
Few ZTA components available today can be used for all of the various workflows present in an enterprise.
“few ZTA components available today can be used for all of the various workflows present in an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingcitation§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA Environment
Some users readily accept MFA if the process is streamlined and involves devices they are used to using or having with them (e.g., applications on a smartphone).
“Some users readily accept MFA if the process is streamlined and involves devices they are used to using or having with them (e.g., applications on a smartphone).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [4] 4. CSA-SDP] Cloud Security Alliance (2015) SDP Specification 1.0. Available at https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/sdp-specification-v1-0/
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [5] 5. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199 source
- Findingown data§ B.4.7 Resilience of ZTA to Enterprise and Network Disruption
Most products and services surveyed relied on a cloud presence to provide robustness.
“Most products and services surveyed relied on a cloud presence to provide robustness, but even cloud services have been known to become unreachable through either an attack or simple error.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Premisecitation§ Figure 3: Device Agent/Gateway Model
For enterprises that heavily utilize cloud services, the device agent/gateway model is a client-server implementation of the CSA SDP.
“For enterprises that heavily utilize cloud services, this is a client-server implementation of the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Software Defined Perimeter (SDP) [CSA-SDP].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites CSA-SDP
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 3.2.2 Enclave-Based Deployment
Enclave-based deployment may allow subjects to see resources which they do not have privileges to access.
“This may also allow for subjects to see resources which they do not have privileges to access.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1 Subversion of ZTA Decision Process
A compromised PA could allow access to resources that would otherwise not be approved.
“Likewise, a compromised PA could allow access to resources that would otherwise not be approved (e.g., to a subverted, personally-owned device).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network Disruption
If an attacker disrupts or denies access to the PEP(s) or PE/PA, it can adversely impact enterprise operations.
“If an attacker disrupts or denies access to the PEP(s) or PE/PA (i.e., DoS attack or route hijack), it can adversely impact enterprise operations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.3 Resource Portal-Based Deployment
The primary benefit of resource portal-based deployment over the others is that a software component does not need to be installed on all client devices.
“The primary benefit of this model over the others is that a software component does not need to be installed on all client devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm Variations
A contextual trust algorithm can mitigate threats where an attacker stays close to a normal set of access requests for a compromised subject account or insider attack.
“A contextual TA can mitigate threats where an attacker stays close to a”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Figure 6: Application Sandboxes
If the asset cannot be scanned for vulnerabilities, individual sandboxed applications may be protected from a potential malware infection on the host asset.
“If the asset cannot be scanned for vulnerabilities, these individual, sandboxed applications may be protected from a potential malware infection on the host asset.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1.2 ZTA Using Micro-Segmentation
In micro-segmentation ZTA, gateway components act as the PEP that shields resources from unauthorized access and/or discovery.
“This approach requires an identity governance program (IGP) to fully function but relies on the gateway components to act as the PEP that shields resources from unauthorized access and/or discovery.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ Figure 6: Application Sandboxes
The main advantage of device application sandboxing is that individual applications are segmented from the rest of the asset.
“The main advantage of this model variant is that individual applications are segmented from the rest of the asset.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider Threat
Accounts with access policies around resources that an attacker is interested in would be the primary targets for attackers.
“This means that accounts with access policies around resources that an attacker is interested in would be the primary targets for attackers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network Disruption
An operational error could prevent an entire enterprise from functioning if the policy engine or policy administrator component becomes inaccessible from the network.
“An operational error could prevent an entire enterprise from functioning if the policy engine or policy administrator component becomes inaccessible from the network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network Disruption
A hosting provider may accidentally take a cloud-based PE or PA offline.
“A hosting provider may also accidentally take a cloud-based PE or PA offline.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.5 Storage of System and Network Information
The management tool used to encode access policies is another source of reconnaissance information for an attacker in a ZT enterprise.
“Another source of reconnaissance information for an attacker in a ZT enterprise is the management tool used to encode access policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or Solutions
This lack of common standards can lead to instances where an enterprise is locked into a subset of providers due to interoperability issues.
“This can lead to instances where an enterprise is locked into a subset of providers due to interoperability issues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation§ 5.4 Visibility on the Network
Machine learning techniques can be used to analyze traffic that cannot be decrypted and examined.
“Machine learning techniques [Anderson] can be used to analyze traffic that cannot be decrypted and examined.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Anderson
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider Threat
A contextual trust algorithm is more likely to detect and respond quickly to a stolen-credential/insider attack than when occurring in a legacy, perimeter-based network.
“In addition, a contextual trust algorithm (see Section 3.3.1) is more likely to detect and respond quickly to this attack than when occurring in a legacy, perimeter-based network.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.4 Visibility on the Network
This opaque traffic may originate from nonenterprise-owned assets or applications/services that are resistant to passive monitoring.
“This traffic may originate from nonenterprise-owned assets (e.g., contracted services that use the enterprise infrastructure to access the internet) or applications/services that are resistant to passive monitoring.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network Disruption
An attacker could intercept and block traffic to a PEP or PA from a portion or all of the user accounts within an enterprise.
“It is also possible that an attacker could intercept and block traffic to a PEP or PA from a portion or all of the user accounts within an enterprise (e.g., a branch office or even a single remote employee).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider Threat
If compromised credentials are not authorized to access a particular resource, they will continue to be denied access to that resource.
“If the compromised credentials are not authorized to access a particular resource, they will continue to be denied access to that resource.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given§ 5.4 Visibility on the Network
Some (possibly the majority) of the traffic on the enterprise network may be opaque to layer 3 network analysis tools.
“However, as also mentioned, some (possibly the majority) of the traffic on the enterprise network may be opaque to layer 3 network analysis tools.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management Architecture
Subject provisioning is a key component of ZTA.
“Subject provisioning is a key component of ZTA.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.5 Storage of System and Network Information
If an attacker can successfully gain access to stored monitoring data, they may be able to gain insight into the enterprise architecture and identify assets for further reconnaissance and attack.
“If an attacker can successfully gain access to this information, they may be able to gain insight into the enterprise architecture and identify assets for further reconnaissance and attack.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or Solutions
Because ZTA is heavily dependent on the dynamic access of information (both enterprise and service providers), disruption can affect the core business functions of an enterprise.
“Like DoS attacks, this risk is not unique to ZTA, but because ZTA is heavily dependent on the dynamic access of information (both enterprise and service providers), disruption can affect the core business functions of an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.4 Visibility on the Network
Employing this type of machine learning would allow the enterprise to categorize traffic as valid or possibly malicious and subject to remediation.
“Employing this type of machine learning would allow the enterprise to categorize traffic as valid or possibly malicious and subject to remediation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider Threat
An attacker with valid credentials (or a malicious insider) may still be able to access resources for which the account has been granted access.
“However, an attacker with valid credentials (or a malicious insider) may still be able to access resources for which the account has been granted access.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or Solutions
If one provider has a security issue or disruption, an enterprise may not be able to migrate to a new provider without extreme cost or going through a long transition program.
“If one provider has a security issue or disruption, an enterprise may not be able to migrate to a new provider without extreme cost (e.g., replacing several assets) or going through a long transition program (e.g., translating policy rules from one proprietary format to another).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management Framework
ZTA planning and implementation may change the authorization boundaries defined by the enterprise.
“ZTA planning and implementation may change the authorization boundaries defined by the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning§ B.2.1 Lack of Common Terms for ZTA Design, Planning, and Procurement
The lack of common terms makes it difficult for organizations (e.g., federal agencies) to develop coherent requirements and policies for designing zero trust enterprise infrastructure and procuring components.
“This makes it difficult for organizations (e.g., federal agencies) to develop coherent requirements and policies for designing zero trust enterprise infrastructure and procuring components.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation§ B.2.2 Perception that ZTA Conflicts with Existing Federal Cybersecurity Policies
If an agency has a mature ID management system and robust CDM capabilities in place, it is on the road to a ZTA.
“If an agency has a mature ID management system and robust CDM capabilities in place, it is on the road to a ZTA (see Section 7.3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Section 7.3
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation§ B.2.2 Perception that ZTA Conflicts with Existing Federal Cybersecurity Policies
Federal agencies have been encouraged to take a more zero trust approach to cybersecurity through existing guidance.
“Federal agencies have been encouraged to take a more zero trust approach to cybersecurity through existing guidance (see Section 6).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Section 6
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between Components
On the customer side, the lack of standards generates additional problems when developing requirements for purchasing products.
“On the customer side, this generates additional problems when developing requirements for purchasing products.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 258
- May combine two claims. 72
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsSome solutions may require additional steps to perform a given workflow, which may change how enterprise subjects perform the workflow.
“Some solutions may require additional steps to perform a given workflow.This may change how enterprise subjects perform the workflow.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsSome solutions assume that requested resources will reside in the cloud (north-south traffic) and not within an enterprise perimeter (east-west traffic).
“Some solutions assume that requested resources will reside in the cloud (so-called north-south traffic) and not within an enterprise perimeter (east-west traffic).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingreasoning§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsCurrently, there is a wide variety of models and solutions seeking to become the leading authority of ZTA.
“Currently, there is a wide variety of models and solutions seeking to become the leading authority of ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThere are no standards that purchasers can rely on to identify compatibility between products.
“There are no standards that purchasers can rely on to identify compatibility between products.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsSome solutions may support a broad range of protocols (web, SSH, etc.) and transports (IPv4 and IPv6), while others may only work with a narrow focus such as web or email.
“Some solutions may support a broad range of protocols (web, secure shell [SSH], etc.) and transports (IPv4 and IPv6), while others may only work with a narrow focus such as web or email.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Findingnone given§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThe spectrum of components within the wider enterprise is vast, with many products focusing on a single niche within zero trust and relying on other products to provide either data or some service to another component.
“The spectrum of components within the wider enterprise is vast, with many products focusing on a single niche within zero trust and relying on other products to provide either data or some service to another component (e.g., integration of MFA for resource access).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.2.1 Lack of Common Terms for ZTA Design, Planning, and ProcurementIndustry has not yet coalesced around a single set of terms or concepts to describe ZTA components and operations.
“Industry has not yet coalesced around a single set of terms or concepts to describe ZTA components and operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingreasoning§ B.4 Knowledge Gaps in ZTA and Future Areas of ResearchThe gaps listed in B.4 do not hinder an organization from adopting a ZTA for its enterprise.
“The gaps listed here do not hinder an organization from adopting a ZTA for its enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingreasoning§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentThere has not been a rigorous examination of how end users act in an enterprise that is using a ZTA.
“There has not been a rigorous examination of how end users act in an enterprise that is using a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsVendors are required to implement and maintain wrappers for each partner component to allow maximum compatibility and interoperability.
“Additionally, vendors are required to implement and maintain wrappers for each partner component to allow maximum compatibility and interoperability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.2.2 Perception that ZTA Conflicts with Existing Federal Cybersecurity PoliciesThere is a misconception that ZTA is a single framework with a set of solutions that are incompatible with the existing view of cybersecurity.
“There is a misconception that ZTA is a single framework with a set of solutions that are incompatible with the existing view of cybersecurity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.2.1 Lack of Common Terms for ZTA Design, Planning, and ProcurementZero trust as a strategy for the design and deployment of enterprise infrastructure is still a forming concept.
“Zero trust as a strategy for the design and deployment of enterprise infrastructure is still a forming concept.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.3 Systemic Gaps that Impact ZTASystemic gaps affect initial implementation and deployment of ZTA and continued operation/maturity.
“These are the gaps that affect initial implementation and deployment of ZTA and continued operation/maturity.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone given§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsVendors too often rely on proprietary APIs provided by partner companies rather than standardized, vendor-independent APIs to achieve integration.
“Vendors too often rely on proprietary APIs provided by partner companies rather than standardized, vendorindependent APIs to achieve this integration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsMany MFA product vendors are required to create a different wrapper for each cloud provider or identity management system to be usable in different kinds of client combinations.
“For example, many MFA product vendors are required to create a different wrapper for each cloud provider or identity management system to be usable in different kinds of client combinations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingcitation§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentSome users resent having to use personally-owned devices for business processes or feel that they are being constantly monitored for possible violations of IT policies.
“However, some users resent having to use personally-owned devices for business processes or feel that they are being constantly monitored for possible violations of IT policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [4] 4. CSA-SDP] Cloud Security Alliance (2015) SDP Specification 1.0. Available at https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/sdp-specification-v1-0/
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [5] 5. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone given§ B.4.7 Resilience of ZTA to Enterprise and Network DisruptionThe survey of the ZTA vendor ecosystem displayed the wide range of infrastructure that an enterprise deploying a ZTA would need to consider.
“The survey of the ZTA vendor ecosystem displayed the wide range of infrastructure that an enterprise deploying a ZTA would need to consider.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisereasoning§ 1 IntroductionThe complexity of a typical enterprise's infrastructure has outstripped legacy methods of perimeter-based network security because there is no single, easily identified perimeter for the enterprise.
“This complexity has outstripped legacy methods of perimeter-based network security as there is no single, easily identified perimeter for the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 1 IntroductionPerimeter-based network security is insufficient because once attackers breach the perimeter, further lateral movement is unhindered.
“Perimeter-based network security has also been shown to be insufficient since once attackers breach the perimeter, further lateral movement is unhindered.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsA contextual trust algorithm can detect an attack whereas a singular trust algorithm may fail to detect the new behavior.
“These are examples where a contextual TA can detect an attack whereas a singular TA may fail to detect the new behavior.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsA contextual trust algorithm requires the PE to maintain some state information on all subjects and applications but may be more likely to detect an attacker using subverted credentials to access information in a pattern atypical for the subject.
“This means the PE must maintain some state information on all subjects and applications but may be more likely to detect an attacker using subverted credentials to access information in a pattern that is atypical of what the PE sees for the given subject.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisereasoning§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsThe idea of zero trust is to explicitly authenticate and authorize all subjects, assets and workflows that make up the enterprise.
“The idea is to explicitly authenticate and authorize all subjects, assets and workflows that make up the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesThere are several ways that an enterprise can enact a ZTA for workflows.
“There are several ways that an enterprise can enact a ZTA for workflows.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.2 Enclave-Based DeploymentEnclave-based deployment requires the enterprise to have a robust asset and configuration management program in place to install/configure device agents.
“The enterprise needs a robust asset and configuration management program in place to install/configure the device agents.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisereasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionIn ZTA, enterprise resources cannot connect to each other without the PA's permission and, possibly, configuration action.
“Enterprise resources cannot connect to each other without the PA's permission and, possibly, configuration action.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionBotnets such as Mirai produce massive DoS attacks against key internet service providers and disrupt service to millions of internet users.
“Botnets such as Mirai produce massive DoS attacks against key internet service providers and disrupt service to millions of internet users.5”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [5] 5. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ Figure 6: Application SandboxesIn device application sandboxing, the PEP will refuse requests from other applications on the asset.
“The applications can communicate with the PEP to request access to resources, but the PEP will refuse requests from other applications on the asset.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceIn enhanced identity governance-based approaches, network access is initially granted to all assets but access to enterprise resources is restricted to identities with the appropriate access privileges.
“Network access is initially granted to all assets but access to enterprise resources are restricted to identities with the appropriate access privileges.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 1 IntroductionWhen balanced with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, identity and access management, continuous monitoring, and best practices, a ZTA can protect against common threats and improve an organization's security posture by using a managed risk approach.
“When balanced with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, identity and access management, continuous monitoring, and best practices, a ZTA can protect against common threats and improve an organization's security posture by using a managed risk approach.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Zero trust security models assume that an attacker is present in the environment.
- The authors state this as an assumption: An enterprise-owned environment is no different or no more trustworthy than any nonenterprise-owned environment.
- The authors state this as an assumption: No resource is inherently trusted.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 1 IntroductionZT is not a single architecture but a set of guiding principles for workflow, system design and operations that can be used to improve the security posture of any classification or sensitivity level.
“ZT is not a single architecture but a set of guiding principles for workflow, system design and operations that can be used to improve the security posture of any classification or sensitivity level [FIPS199].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites FIPS199
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceThe enhanced identity governance approach uses the identity of actors as the key component of policy creation.
“The enhanced identity governance approach to developing a ZTA uses the identity of actors as the key component of policy creation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.2.3 Resource Portal-Based DeploymentResource portal-based deployment can only scan and analyze assets and devices once they connect to the PEP portal and may not be able to continuously monitor them for malware, unpatched vulnerabilities, and appropriate configuration.
“This model can only scan and analyze assets and devices once they connect to the PEP portal and may not be able to continuously monitor them for malware, unpatched vulnerabilities, and appropriate configuration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4 Deployment Scenarios/Use CasesAny organization can benefit from a zero trust architecture.
“That said, any organization can benefit from a zero trust architecture.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.2 Enclave-Based DeploymentIn enclave-based deployment, the gateway protects a collection of resources and may not be able to protect each resource individually.
“The downside is that the gateway protects a collection of resources and may not be able to protect each resource individually.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesAn organization looking to develop a ZTA may find that its chosen use case and existing policies point to one approach over others.
“An organization looking to develop a ZTA for its enterprise may find that its chosen use case and existing policies point to one approach over others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceIdentity-driven approaches also work well for enterprises that use cloud-based applications/services that may not allow for enterprise-owned or -operated ZT security components to be used (such as many SaaS offerings).
“Identity-driven approaches also work well for enterprises that use cloud-based applications/services that may not allow for enterprise-owned or -operated ZT security components to be used (such as many SaaS offerings).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsTo allow the PDP/PEP to be as specific as possible, the implicit trust zone must be as small as possible.
“To allow the PDP/PEP to be as specific as possible, the implicit trust zone must be as small as possible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2 Deployed Variations of the Abstract ArchitectureDepending on how an enterprise network is set up, multiple ZTA deployment models may be in use for different business processes in one enterprise.
“Depending on how an enterprise network is set up, multiple ZTA deployment models may be in use for different business processes in one enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesEach ZTA approach implements all the tenets of ZT but may use one or two (or one component) as the main driver of policies.
“Each approach implements all the tenets of ZT (see Section 2.1) but may use one or two (or one component) as the main driver of policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.2.3 Resource Portal-Based DeploymentIn resource portal-based deployment, there is no local agent that handles requests, so the enterprise may not have full visibility or arbitrary control over assets as it can only see/scan them when they connect to a portal.
“The main difference with this model is there is no local agent that handles requests, and so the enterprise may not have full visibility or arbitrary control over assets as it can only see/scan them when they connect to a portal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ 5.1 Subversion of ZTA Decision ProcessIn ZTA, the policy engine and policy administrator are key components of the entire enterprise.
“In ZTA, the policy engine and policy administrator are the key components of the entire enterprise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesOther approaches may be more difficult to implement and may require more fundamental changes to how the enterprise currently conducts business flows.
“That does not mean the other approaches would not work but rather that other approaches may be more difficult to implement and may require more fundamental changes to how the enterprise currently conducts business flows.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesCertain approaches lend themselves to some use cases more than others.
“Certain approaches lend themselves to some use cases more than others.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsAnalysis of subject behavior can be used to provide a model of acceptable use, and deviations from this behavior could trigger additional authentication checks or resource request denials.
“Analysis of subject behavior can be used to provide a model of acceptable use, and deviations from this behavior could trigger additional authentication checks or resource request denials.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 3.4 Network/Environment ComponentsIn a ZT environment, there should be a separation (logical or possibly physical) of the communication flows used to control and configure the network and application/service communication flows used to perform the actual work of the organization.
“In a ZT environment, there should be a separation (logical or possibly physical) of the communication flows used to control and configure the network and application/service communication flows used to perform the actual work of the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4 Deployment Scenarios/Use CasesAny enterprise environment can be designed with zero trust tenets in mind.
“Any enterprise environment can be designed with zero trust tenets in mind.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationown data§ Figure 6: Application SandboxesOne disadvantage of device application sandboxing is that enterprises must maintain these sandboxed applications for all assets and may not have full visibility into client assets.
“One of the disadvantages of this model is that enterprises must maintain these sandboxed applications for all assets and may not have full visibility into client assets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4 Deployment Scenarios/Use CasesThere will likely be a period when ZTA components and perimeter-based network infrastructure are concurrently in operation in an enterprise.
“As discussed in Section 7.2, there will likely be a period when ZTA components and perimeter-based network infrastructure are concurrently in operation in an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Figure 3: Device Agent/Gateway ModelIn device agent/gateway deployment, access is possible only via the device agent, which can be placed on enterprise-owned assets.
“Access is possible only via the device agent, which can be placed on enterprise-owned assets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsThe PDP/PEP applies a set of controls so that all traffic beyond the PEP has a common level of trust.
“The PDP/PEP applies a set of controls so that all traffic beyond the PEP has a common level of trust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2.1 Tenets of Zero TrustMost definitions of ZT continue to define themselves in relation to perimeters in some way (such as micro-segmentation or microperimeters) as part of the functional capabilities of a ZTA.
“However, most of these definitions continue to define themselves in relation to perimeters in some way (such as micro-segmentation or microperimeters; see Section 3.1) as part of the functional capabilities of a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceFor the enhanced identity governance approach, enterprise resource access policies are based on identity and assigned attributes.
“For this approach, enterprise resource access policies are based on identity and assigned attributes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsDeveloping a set of criteria or weights/threshold values for each resource requires planning and testing.
“Developing a set of criteria or weights/threshold values for each resource requires planning and testing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 1 IntroductionMost enterprise infrastructures will operate in a hybrid zero trust/perimeter-based mode while continuing to invest in IT modernization initiatives and improve organization business processes.
“Most enterprise infrastructures will operate in a hybrid zero trust/perimeter-based mode while continuing to invest in IT modernization initiatives and improve organization business processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionIn ZTA, the PA is the key component for resource access.
“In ZTA, the PA is the key component for resource access.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1 Variations of Zero Trust Architecture ApproachesA full ZT solution will include elements of all three approaches.
“A full ZT solution will include elements of all three approaches.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1.2 ZTA Using Micro-SegmentationThe key necessity to micro-segmentation ZTA is that the PEP components are managed and should be able to react and reconfigure as needed to respond to threats or change in the workflow.
“The key necessity to this approach is that the PEP components are managed and should be able to react and reconfigure as needed to respond to threats or change in the workflow.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 3.4 Network/Environment ComponentsThe separation of communication flows is often broken down to a control plane for network control communication and a data plane for application/service communication flows.
“This is often broken down to a control plane for network control communication and a data plane for application/service communication flows [Gilman].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Gilman
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 4.5 Enterprise with Public-or Customer-Facing ServicesFor a general, public-facing resource that does not require login credentials to access, the tenets of ZTA do not directly apply.
“For a general, public-facing resource that does not require login credentials to access (e.g., public web page), the tenets of ZTA do not directly apply.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceEnhanced identity governance-based approaches for enterprises are often employed using an open network model or an enterprise network with visitor access or frequent nonenterprise devices on the network.
“Enhanced identity governance-based approaches for enterprises are often employed using an open network model or an enterprise network with visitor access or frequent nonenterprise devices on the network (such as with the use case in Section 4.3 below).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsZero trust applies to two basic areas: authentication and authorization.
“This implies that zero trust applies to two basic areas: authentication and authorization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsThe Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and agency perimeter firewalls provide strong internet gateways.
“The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) and agency perimeter firewalls provide strong internet gateways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsContinually prompting a subject for reauthentication against behavior that is consistent with historical trends and norms for their mission function and role within the organization can lead to usability issues.
“Continually prompting a subject for reauthentication against behavior that is consistent with historical trends and norms for their mission function and role within the organization can lead to usability issues.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceThere is a downside in granting basic network connectivity as malicious actors could still attempt network reconnaissance and/or use the network to launch denial of service attacks either internally or against a third party.
“There is a downside in granting basic network connectivity as malicious actors could still attempt network reconnaissance and/or use the network to launch denial of service attacks either internally or against a third party.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceThe enterprise can use the identity of requestors to form and enforce policy on cloud-based platforms.
“The enterprise can use the identity of requestors to form and enforce policy on these platforms.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionThis mitigation reduces the risk but does not eliminate it.
“This mitigates the risk but does not eliminate it.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 5.1 Subversion of ZTA Decision ProcessIn ZTA, no communication between enterprise resources occurs unless it is approved and possibly configured by the PE and PA.
“No communication between enterprise resources occurs unless it is approved and possibly configured by the PE and PA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1.3 ZTA Using Network Infrastructure and Software Defined PerimetersWhen ZTA using network infrastructure and SDP is implemented at the application network layer (layer 7), the most common deployment model is the agent/gateway.
“When the approach is implemented at the application network layer (i.e., layer 7), the most common deployment model is the agent/gateway (see Section 3.2.1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 2.1 Tenets of Zero TrustThese tenets are the ideal goal, though not all tenets may be fully implemented in their purest form for a given strategy.
“These tenets are the ideal goal, though it must be acknowledged that not all tenets may be fully implemented in their purest form for a given strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisereasoning§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsUnauthorized lateral movement within the environment has been one of the biggest challenges for federal agencies.
“As a result, unauthorized lateral movement within the environment has been one of the biggest challenges for federal agencies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1.2 ZTA Using Micro-SegmentationMicro-segmentation ZTA requires an identity governance program (IGP) to fully function.
“This approach requires an identity governance program (IGP) to fully function but relies on the gateway components to act as the PEP that shields resources from unauthorized access and/or discovery.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceOther factors such as device used, asset status, and environmental factors may alter the final confidence level calculation or tailor the result in some way, such as granting only partial access to a given data source based on network location.
“Other factors such as device used, asset status, and environmental factors may alter the final confidence level calculation (and ultimate access authorization) or tailor the result in some way, such as granting only partial access to a given data source based on network location.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3. The enterprise can observe all network traffic.Enterprise resources should not be reachable without accessing a PEP.
“Enterprise resources should not be reachable without accessing a PEP.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 3. The enterprise can observe all network traffic.The PEP is the only component that accesses the policy administrator as part of a business flow.
“The PEP is the only component that accesses the policy administrator as part of a business flow.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionEnterprises can mitigate the DoS/network disruption threat by having the policy enforcement reside in a properly secured cloud environment or be replicated in several locations following guidance on cyber resiliency.
“Enterprises can mitigate this threat by having the policy enforcement reside in a properly secured cloud environment or be replicated in several locations following guidance on cyber resiliency .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsContextual, score-based trust algorithms provide the ability to offer more dynamic and granular access control, since the score provides a current confidence level for the requesting account and adapts to changing factors more quickly than static policies modified by human administrators.
“However, contextual, score-based TAs would provide the ability to offer more dynamic and granular access control, since the score provides a current confidence level for the requesting account and adapts to changing factors more quickly than static policies modified by human administrators.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsEnterprise administrators may encounter issues during the initial implementation of ZTA where access requests that should be approved are denied due to misconfiguration.
“Enterprise administrators may encounter issues during the initial implementation of ZTA where access requests that should be approved are denied due to misconfiguration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceThe primary requirement for resource access in the enhanced identity governance approach is based on the access privileges granted to the given subject.
“The primary requirement for resource access is based on the access privileges granted to the given subject.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.1 Subversion of ZTA Decision ProcessAny enterprise administrator with configuration access to the PE's rules may be able to perform unapproved changes or make mistakes that can disrupt enterprise operations.
“Any enterprise administrator with configuration access to the PE's rules may be able to perform unapproved changes or make mistakes that can disrupt enterprise operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.3.1 Trust Algorithm VariationsA singular trust algorithm can allow faster evaluations, but there is a risk that an attack can go undetected if it stays within a subject's allowed role.
“This can allow faster evaluations, but there is a risk that an attack can go undetected if it stays within a subject's allowed role.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 4.1 Enterprise with Satellite FacilitiesZT principles take the view that there should be no difference between enterprise-owned and -operated network infrastructure and infrastructure owned and operated by any other service provider.
“As discussed in Section 2.2, ZT principles take the view that there should be no difference between enterprise-owned and -operated network infrastructure and infrastructure owned and operated by any other service provider.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 3.2.3 Resource Portal-Based DeploymentResource portal-based deployment allows attackers to discover and attempt to access the portal or attempt a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the portal.
“This model also allows attackers to discover and attempt to access the portal or attempt a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the portal.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisereasoning§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsZero trust provides a set of principles and concepts around moving the PDP/PEPs closer to the resource.
“Zero trust provides a set of principles and concepts around moving the PDP/PEPs closer to the resource.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 2 Zero Trust BasicsThe PDP/PEP cannot apply additional policies beyond its location in the flow of traffic.
“The PDP/PEP cannot apply additional policies beyond its location in the flow of traffic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 3.1.1 ZTA Using Enhanced Identity GovernanceThe identity-driven approach works well with the resource portal model since device identity and status provide secondary support data to access decisions.
“The identity-driven approach works well with the resource portal model ( see Section 3.2.3)since device identity and status provide secondary support data to access decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 4.1 Enterprise with Satellite FacilitiesIn the multi-cloud use case, the application hosted in Cloud Provider A should be able to connect directly to the data source hosted in Cloud Provider B rather than force the application to tunnel back through the enterprise network.
“For performance and ease of management, the application hosted in Cloud Provider A should be able to connect directly to the data source hosted in Cloud Provider B rather than force the application to tunnel back through the enterprise network.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatThe contextual TA can detect access patterns that are out of normal behavior and deny the compromised account or insider threat access to sensitive resources.
“The contextual TA can detect access patterns that are out of normal behavior and deny the compromised account or insider threat access to sensitive resources.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureEnterprises need a clear set of subject attributes and policies that can be used by a PE to evaluate access requests.
“Enterprises need a clear set of subject attributes and policies that can be used by a PE to evaluate access requests.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 6 Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal GuidanceSeveral existing federal policies and guidance intersect with the planning, deployment, and operation of a ZTA.
“Several existing federal policies and guidance intersect with the planning, deployment, and operation of a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkThis includes personal information used by the enterprise to support ZTA operations and any biometric attributes used in access request evaluations.
“This includes personal information used by the enterprise to support ZTA operations and any biometric attributes used in access request evaluations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkSome of this traffic may contain private information or have associated privacy risks.
“Some of this traffic may contain private information or have associated privacy risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone given§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureThe policy engine cannot determine if attempted connections are authorized to connect to a resource if the PE has insufficient information to identify associated subjects and resources.
“The policy engine cannot determine if attempted connections are authorized to connect to a resource if the PE has insufficient information to identify associated subjects and resources.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkNIST produced a Privacy Framework for use by organizations.
“In response, NIST produced a Privacy Framework for use by organizations [NISTPRIV].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites NISTPRIV
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkThe NIST Privacy Framework could help in developing a formal process to identify and mitigate any privacy-related risks to an enterprise developing a zero trust architecture.
“The NIST Privacy Framework [NISTPRIV] could help in developing a formal process to identify and mitigate any privacy-related risks to an enterprise developing a zero trust architecture.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites NISTPRIV
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationArtificial intelligence and other software-based agents are being deployed to manage security issues on enterprise networks.
“Artificial intelligence and other software-based agents are being deployed to manage security issues on enterprise networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6 Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal GuidanceThese policies do not prohibit an enterprise from moving to a more zero trust-oriented architecture but can influence development of a zero trust strategy for an agency.
“These policies do not prohibit an enterprise from moving to a more zero trust-oriented architecture but can influence development of a zero trust strategy for an agency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0TIC 3.0 has an updated TIC Security Capability Handbook, which defines two types of security capabilities: Universal Security Capabilities and PEP Security Capabilities.
“In addition, TIC 3.0 has an updated TIC Security Capability Handbook, which defines two types of security capabilities:”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionThis could happen due to a DDoS attack or simply due to unexpected heavy usage.
“This could happen due to a DDoS attack or simply due to unexpected heavy usage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatImplementation of MFA for access requests may reduce the risk of information loss from a compromised account.
“Implementation of MFA for access requests may reduce the risk of information loss from a compromised account.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or SolutionsOften, the assets used to store and process this information do not have a common, open standard on how to interact and exchange information.
“Often, the assets used to store and process this information do not have a common, open standard on how to interact and exchange information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkThe NIST Privacy Framework provides a framework to describe privacy risks and mitigation strategies, as well as a process for an enterprise to identify, measure, and mitigate risks to user privacy and private information stored and processed by an organization.
“This document provides a framework to describe privacy risks and mitigation strategies, as well as a process for an enterprise to identify, measure, and mitigate risks to user privacy and private information stored and processed by an organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites NISTPRIV
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureStrong subject provision and authentication policies need to be in place before moving to a more zero trust-aligned deployment.
“Strong subject provision and authentication policies need to be in place before moving to a more zero trust-aligned deployment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management FrameworkFor a federal agency to perform its mission, there is an acceptable level of risk.
“For a federal agency to perform its mission, there is an acceptable level of risk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)NCPS (operationally known as EINSTEIN) is an integrated system-of-systems that delivers intrusion detection, advanced analytics, information sharing, and intrusion prevention capabilities to defend the Federal Government from cyber threats.
“NCPS (operationally known as EINSTEIN) is an integrated system-of-systems that delivers intrusion detection, advanced analytics, information sharing, and intrusion prevention capabilities to defend the Federal Government from cyber threats.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationAn attacker could gain access to a software agent's credentials and impersonate the agent when performing tasks.
“There is also a risk that an attacker could gain access to a software agent's credentials and impersonate the agent when performing tasks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management FrameworkA ZTA deployment involves developing access policies around acceptable risk to the designated mission or business process.
“A ZTA deployment involves developing access polices around acceptable risk to the designated mission or business process (see Section 7. 3.3).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationThese software-based agents need to interact with the management components of ZTA (e.g., policy engine, policy administrator), sometimes in lieu of a human administrator.
“These components need to interact with the management components of ZTA (e.g., policy engine, policy administrator), sometimes in lieu of a human administrator.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management FrameworkThis change is due to the addition of new components (e.g., policy engine, policy administrator, and PEPs) and a reduction of reliance on network perimeter defenses.
“This is due to the addition of new components (e.g., policy engine, policy administrator, and PEPs) and a reduction of reliance on network perimeter defenses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatAttackers may use phishing, social engineering, or a combination of attacks to obtain credentials of valuable accounts.
“Attackers may use phishing, social engineering, or a combination of attacks to obtain credentials of valuable accounts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationThis risk can be reduced with regular retuning analysis to correct mistaken decisions and improve the decision process.
“This can be reduced with regular retuning analysis to correct mistaken decisions and improve the decision process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkOrganizations will need to identify any possible risks associated with intercepting, scanning, and logging network traffic.
“Organizations will need to identify any possible risks associated with intercepting, scanning, and logging network traffic [NISTIR 8062].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites NISTIR 8062
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatZTA reduces risk and prevents any compromised accounts or assets from moving laterally throughout the network.
“ZTA reduces risk and prevents any compromised accounts or assets from moving laterally throughout the network.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0TIC 3.0 is focused on network-based security protections, whereas ZTA is a more inclusive architecture addressing application, user, and data protections.
“TIC 3.0 is focused on network-based security protections, whereas ZTA is a more inclusive architecture addressing application, user, and data protections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management FrameworkIt is possible to deny all network access to a resource and allow access only via a connected terminal, but this is disproportionately restrictive in the majority of cases and could inhibit work from being accomplished.
“It is possible to deny all network access to a resource and allow access only via a connected terminal, but this is disproportionately restrictive in the majority of cases and could inhibit work from being accomplished.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0TIC 2.0 provides a list of network-based security capabilities to be deployed at the TIC Access Point at the agency's perimeter; many of these capabilities are aligned with ZT principles.
“TIC 2.0 provides a list of network-based security capabilities (e.g.content filtering, monitoring, authentication, and others) to be deployed at the TIC Access Point at the agency's perimeter; many of these capabilities are aligned with ZT principles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0TIC 3.0 has been updated to accommodate cloud services and mobile devices.
“TIC 3.0 has been updated to accommodate cloud services and mobile devices [M-19-26].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M-19-26
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionThis is also possible in legacy remote-access VPNs and is not unique to ZTA.
“This is also possible in legacy remote-access VPNs and is not unique to ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.5 Storage of System and Network InformationIf monitor scans, network traffic, and metadata are being stored for building contextual policies, forensics, or later analysis, that data becomes a target for attackers.
“If monitor scans, network traffic, and metadata are being stored for building contextual policies, forensics, or later analysis, that data becomes a target for attackers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationThe software agent may have a lower bar for authentication (e.g., API key versus MFA) to perform administrative or security-related tasks compared with a human user.
“The software agent may have a lower bar for authentication (e.g., API key versus MFA) to perform administrative or security-related tasks compared with a human user.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationIf an attacker can interact with the agent, they could theoretically trick the agent into allowing the attacker greater access or into performing some task on behalf of the attacker.
“If an attacker can interact with the agent, they could theoretically trick the agent into allowing the attacker greater access or into performing some task on behalf of the attacker.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0PEP Security Capabilities may be applied at any appropriate PEP located along a given data flow instead of at a single PEP at the agency perimeter.
“The PEP Security Capabilities may be applied at any appropriate PEP located along a given data flow instead of at a single PEP at the agency perimeter.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.5 Storage of System and Network InformationThe management tool contains access policies to resources and can give an attacker information on which accounts are most valuable to compromise.
“Like stored traffic, this component contains access policies to resources and can give an attacker information on which accounts are most valuable to compromise (e.g., the ones that have access to the desired data resources).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 5.4 Visibility on the NetworkAll traffic is inspected and logged on the network and analyzed to identify and react to potential attacks against the enterprise.
“As mentioned in Section 3.4.1,all traffic is inspected and logged on the network and analyzed to identify and react to potential attacks against the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0TIC is a federal cybersecurity initiative jointly managed by OMB, DHS, and the General Services Administration (GSA), and is intended to establish a network security baseline across the Federal Government.
“TIC is a federal cybersecurity initiative jointly managed by OMB, DHS, and the General Services Administration (GSA), and is intended to establish a network security baseline across the Federal Government.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionCloud services have experienced disruptions in the past, both infrastructure as a service (IaaS) and SaaS.
“Cloud services have experienced disruptions in the past, both infrastructure as a service (IaaS)foot_6 and SaaS.7”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [6] 6. Gilman E, Barth D (2017) Zero Trust Networks: Building Secure Systems in Untrusted Networks (O'Reilly Media, Inc., Sebastopol, CA), 1st Ed.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [7] 7. Department of Homeland Security (2015) Hardware Asset Management (HWAM) Capability Description. Available at https://www.us- cert.gov/sites/default/files/cdm_files/HWAM_CapabilityDescription.pdf
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0Historically, TIC was a perimeter-based cybersecurity strategy which required agencies to consolidate and monitor their external network connections.
“Historically, TIC was a perimeter-based cybersecurity strategy which required agencies to consolidate and monitor their external network connections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureAs ZTA is heavily dependent on precise identity management, any ZTA effort will need to integrate the agency's ICAM policy.
“As ZTA is heavily dependent on precise identity management, any ZTA effort will need to integrate the agency's ICAM policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Threats Associated with Zero Trust ArchitectureWhen complemented with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, identity and access management, continuous monitoring, and general cyber hygiene, a properly implemented and maintained ZTA can reduce overall risk and protect against common threats.
“When complemented with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, identity and access management, continuous monitoring, and general cyber hygiene, a properly implemented and maintained ZTA can reduce overall risk and protect against common threats.”
- Also stated in: § 6 Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal Guidance · hedged
“When complemented with existing cybersecurity policies and guidance, ICAM, continuous monitoring, and general cyber hygiene, ZTA may reinforce an organization's security posture and protect against common threats.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Also stated in: § 6 Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal Guidance · hedged
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)EINSTEIN sensors enable CISA's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to defend federal networks and respond to significant incidents at federal agencies.
“EINSTEIN sensors enable CISA's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) to defend federal networks and respond to significant incidents at federal agencies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionEnterprise resources may not be reachable from the PA, so even if access is granted to a subject, the PA cannot configure the communication path from the network.
“There is also the risk that enterprise resources may not be reachable from the PA, so even if access is granted to a subject, the PA cannot configure the communication path from the network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatA properly developed and implemented ZTA should prevent a compromised account or asset from accessing resources outside its normal purview or access patterns.
“A properly developed and implemented ZTA should prevent a compromised account or asset from accessing resources outside its normal purview or access patterns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.2 Denial-of-Service or Network DisruptionIn such cases, only a portion of enterprise subjects is affected.
“In such cases, only a portion of enterprise subjects is affected.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureM-19-17 calls on all federal agencies to form an ICAM office to govern efforts related to identity issuance and management.
“The memo calls on all federal agencies to form an ICAM office to govern efforts related to identity issuance and management.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M-19-17
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureOMB issued M-19-17 on improving identity management for the Federal Government.
“The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued M-19-17 on improving identity management for the Federal Government.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M-19-17
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone given§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkPart of the core requirements for ZT is that an enterprise should inspect and log traffic (or at least log and inspect metadata when dealing with traffic that cannot be decrypted by monitoring systems) in its environment.
“Part of the core requirements for ZT is that an enterprise should inspect and log traffic (or at least log and inspect metadata when dealing with traffic that cannot be decrypted by monitoring systems) in its environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatThe ZT principle of no implicit trust based on network location means attackers need to compromise an existing account or device to gain a foothold in an enterprise.
“The ZT principle of no implicit trust based on network location means attackers need to compromise an existing account or device to gain a foothold in an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationAn attacker may be able to induce or coerce an NPE to perform some task that the attacker is not privileged to perform.
“The associated risk is that an attacker will be able to induce or coerce an NPE to perform some task that the attacker is not privileged to perform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 5.6 Reliance on Proprietary Data Formats or SolutionsZTA relies on several different data sources to make access decisions, including information about the requesting subject, asset used, enterprise and external intelligence, and threat analysis.
“ZTA relies on several different data sources to make access decisions, including information about the requesting subject, asset used, enterprise and external intelligence, and threat analysis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.1 ZTA and NIST Risk Management FrameworkThe overall process described in the NIST Risk Management Framework will not change in a ZTA.
“The overall process described in the RMF will not change in a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)The goals of NCPS align with the overarching goals of zero trust: to manage cyber risk, improve cyber protection, and empower partners to secure cyber space.
“The goals of NCPS, which align with the overarching goals of zero trust, are to manage cyber risk, improve cyber protection, and empower partners to secure cyber space.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.4 ZTA and Trusted Internet Connections 3.0Many TIC 3.0 security capabilities directly support ZTA.
“Many of these TIC 3.0 security capabilities directly support ZTA (e.g., encrypted traffic, strong authentication, microsegmentation, network and system inventory, and others).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.3 ZTA and Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management ArchitectureMany of these management policies should use the recommendations in NIST SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines.
“Many of these management policies should use the recommendations in NIST SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines [SP800-63].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-63
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 5.3 Stolen Credentials/Insider ThreatProperly implemented ZT, information security and resiliency policies, and best practices reduce the risk of an attacker gaining broad access via stolen credentials or insider attack.
“Properly implemented ZT, information security and resiliency policies, and best practices reduce the risk of an attacker gaining broad access via stolen credentials or insider attack.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.2 Zero Trust and NIST Privacy FrameworkProtecting the privacy of users and private information is a prime concern for organizations.
“Protecting the privacy of users and private information (e.g., personally identifiable information) is a prime concern for organizations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 5.7 Use of Non-person Entities (NPE) in ZTA AdministrationThe biggest risk when using automated technology for configuration and policy enforcement is the possibility of false positives and false negatives impacting the security posture of the enterprise.
“The biggest risk when using automated technology for configuration and policy enforcement is the possibility of false positives (innocuous actions mistaken for attacks) and false negatives (attacks mistaken for normal activity) impacting the security posture of the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkA change in digital certificate providers may not appear to have a significant impact but may involve certificate root store management, Certificate Transparency log monitoring, and other factors that are not apparent at first.
“For example, a change in digital certificate providers may not appear to have a significant impact but may involve certificate root store management, Certificate Transparency log monitoring, and other factors that are not apparent at first.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureThis may include additional organizational changes depending on how the enterprise is currently set up and operating.
“This may include additional organizational changes depending on how the enterprise is currently set up and operating.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)The placement of NCPS sensors for DHS situational awareness is based on a perimeter network defense in the Federal Government, while ZTA moves protections closer to the assets, data and all other resources.
“The placement of NCPS sensors for DHS situational awareness is based on a perimeter network defense in the Federal Government, while ZTA moves protections closer to the assets, data and all other resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramVital to that posture is an agency's insight into the assets, configuration, and subjects within itself.
“Vital to that posture is an agency's insight into the assets, configuration, and subjects within itself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureThe degree of success depends on how dependent this new infrastructure is on existing resources.
“The degree of success depends on how dependent this new infrastructure is on existing resources (e.g., ID management systems).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)Additional logs from ZTA may be saved for after-the-fact analyses by incident responders.
“Information generated in a ZTA may better inform event impact quantification; machine learning tools could use ZTA data to improve detection; and additional logs from ZTA may be saved for after-thefact analyses by incident responders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseSubjects could encompass both human and possible NPEs, such as service accounts that interact with resources.
“Subjects could encompass both human and possible NPEs, such as service accounts that interact with resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)Incident responders could potentially leverage information from the authentication, traffic inspection, and logging of agency traffic available to federal agencies that have implemented a zero trust architecture.
“Incident responders could potentially leverage information from the authentication, traffic inspection, and logging of agency traffic available to federal agencies that have implemented a zero trust architecture.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureMost enterprises will continue to operate in a hybrid zero-trust/perimeter-based mode for an indefinite period while continuing to invest in ongoing IT modernization initiatives.
“Most enterprises will continue to operate in a hybrid zero-trust/perimeter-based mode for an indefinite period while continuing to invest in ongoing IT modernization initiatives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureOnce the workflows are identified, the enterprise can narrow down the components needed and begin to map how the individual components interact.
“Once the workflows are identified, the enterprise can narrow down the components needed and begin to map how the individual components interact.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureHaving an IT modernization plan that includes moving to an architecture based on ZT principles may help an enterprise form roadmaps for small scale workflow migrations.
“Having an IT modernization plan that includes moving to an architecture based on ZT principles may help an enterprise form roadmaps for small scale workflow migrations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseOne of the key requirements of ZTA is the ability to identify and manage devices.
“As mentioned in Section 2.1, one of the key requirements of ZTA is the ability to identify and manage devices.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkBefore undertaking an effort to bring ZTA to an enterprise, there should be a survey of assets, subjects, data flows, and workflows.
“Before undertaking an effort to bring ZTA to an enterprise, there should be a survey of assets, subjects, data flows, and workflows.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThe ability to manage enterprise assets is key to the successful deployment of ZTA.
“The ability to manage enterprise assets is key to the successful deployment of ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramTo move to ZTA, an enterprise must have a system to discover and record physical and virtual assets to create a usable inventory.
“For example, to move to ZTA, an enterprise must have a system to discover and record physical and virtual assets to create a usable inventory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramThe DHS CDM program has initiated several efforts to build the capabilities needed within federal agencies to move to a ZTA.
“The DHS CDM program has initiated several efforts to build the capabilities needed within federal agencies to move to a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramAgencies must have visibility into the assets active on the network (or those accessing resources remotely) to categorize, configure, and monitor the network's activity.
“Agencies must have visibility into the assets active on the network (or those accessing resources remotely) to categorize, configure, and monitor the network's activity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureThe enterprise needs to make sure that the common elements (e.g., ID management, device management, event logging) are flexible enough to operate in a ZTA and perimeter-based hybrid security architecture.
“The enterprise needs to make sure that the common elements (e.g., ID management, device management, event logging) are flexible enough to operate in a ZTA and perimeter-based hybrid security architecture.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThe ability to observe the current state of an asset is part of the process of evaluating access requests.
“The ability to observe the current state of an asset is part of the process of evaluating access requests (see Section 2.1).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyData resources and applications and services that are primarily cloud-based or primarily used by remote workers are good candidates for a ZTA approach because the subjects and resources are located outside of the enterprise network perimeter and are likely to see the most benefit in use, scalability, and security.
“Data resources and applications and services that are primarily cloudbased or primarily used by remote workers are good candidates for a ZTA approach (see Section 7.3.3)because the subjects and resources are located outside of the enterprise network perimeter and are likely to see the most benefit in use, scalability, and security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)As ZTA is adopted across the Federal Government, the NCPS implementation would need to continually evolve, or new capabilities would need to be deployed to fulfill NCPS objectives.
“As ZTA is adopted across the Federal Government, the NCPS implementation would need to continually evolve, or new capabilities would need to be deployed to fulfill NCPS objectives.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis goes beyond simply cataloging and maintaining a database of enterprise assets.
“This goes beyond simply cataloging and maintaining a database of enterprise assets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureMigration to a ZTA approach to the enterprise may take place one business process at a time.
“Migration to a ZTA approach to the enterprise may take place one business process at a time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkThese steps can be mapped to the steps in the RMF as any adoption of a ZTA is a process to reduce risk to an agency's business functions.
“These steps can be mapped to the steps in the RMF [SP800-37] as any adoption of a ZTA is a process to reduce risk to an agency's business functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-37
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramHaving a strong CDM program implementation is key to the success of ZTA.
“Having a strong CDM program implementation is key to the success of ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseZTA also requires the ability to identify and monitor nonenterprise-owned devices that may be on enterprise-owned network infrastructure or that access enterprise resources.
“ZTA also requires the ability to identify and monitor nonenterprise-owned devices that may be on enterprise-owned network infrastructure or that access enterprise resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyThis inventory is critical to determining what business processes and resources would benefit from implementing a ZTA.
“This inventory is critical to determining what business processes and resources would benefit from implementing a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseFor a zero trust enterprise to operate, the PE must have knowledge of enterprise subjects.
“For a zero trust enterprise to operate, the PE must have knowledge of enterprise subjects.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyThese policies require agencies to inventory and assess how they collect, store, and access data, both on premises and in the cloud.
“These policies require agencies to inventory and assess how they collect, store, and access data, both on premises and in the cloud.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureIn these cases, it might be possible to introduce ZT concepts to some degree.
“In these cases, it might be possible to introduce ZT concepts to some degree.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseZTA deployments may require administrators to satisfy a more stringent confidence level or criteria as outlined in NIST SP 800-63A, Section 5.
“ZTA deployments may require administrators to satisfy a more stringent confidence level or criteria as outlined in NIST SP 800-63A, Section 5 [SP800-63A].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-63A
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureMigrating an existing workflow to a ZTA will likely require (at least) a partial redesign.
“Migrating an existing workflow to a ZTA will likely require (at least) a partial redesign.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyAgencies using a ZTA for these assets may need to take collaboration or publication requirements into account when developing the strategy.
“Agencies using a ZTA for these assets may need to take collaboration or publication requirements into account when developing the strategy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureEnterprises may take this opportunity to adopt secure system engineering practices if they have not already done so for workflows.
“Enterprises may take this opportunity to adopt secure system engineering [SP800-160v1] practices if they have not already done so for workflows.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-160v1
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)Information generated in a ZTA may better inform event impact quantification.
“Information generated in a ZTA may better inform event impact quantification; machine learning tools could use ZTA data to improve detection; and additional logs from ZTA may be saved for after-thefact analyses by incident responders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureIn a greenfield approach, it would be possible to build a zero trust architecture from the ground up.
“In a greenfield approach, it would be possible to build a zero trust architecture from the ground up.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramThe DHS Hardware Asset Management (HWAM) program is an effort to help agencies identify devices on their network infrastructure to deploy a secure configuration.
“For example, the DHS Hardware Asset Management (HWAM) [HWAM] program is an effort to help agencies identify devices on their network infrastructure to deploy a secure configuration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites HWAM
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyOne additional consideration with the Federal Data Strategy is how to make agency data assets accessible to other agencies or the public.
“One additional consideration with the Federal Data Strategy is how to make agency data assets accessible to other agencies or the public.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureEnterprise architects may also want to restrict ZTA candidate solutions to those that can interface with existing components.
“Enterprise architects may also want to restrict ZTA candidate solutions to those that can interface with existing components.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkThis knowledge is accessed by the PE when evaluating resource requests.
“This knowledge is accessed by the PE when evaluating resource requests.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyThe Cloud Smart strategy, updated Data Center Optimization Initiative policy, and Federal Data Strategy all influence some requirements for agencies planning a ZTA.
“The Cloud Smartfoot_8 strategy, updated Data Center Optimization Initiative [M-19-19] policy, and Federal Data Strategyfoot_9 all influence some requirements for agencies planning a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M-19-19
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureIt is unlikely that any significant enterprise can migrate to zero trust in a single technology refresh cycle.
“It is unlikely that any significant enterprise can migrate to zero trust in a single technology refresh cycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis includes hardware components (e.g., laptops, phones, IoT devices) and digital artifacts (e.g., user accounts, applications, digital certificates).
“This includes hardware components (e.g., laptops, phones, IoT devices) and digital artifacts (e.g., user accounts, applications, digital certificates).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.2 Hybrid ZTA and Perimeter-Based ArchitectureThere may be an indefinite period when ZTA workflows coexist with non-ZTA workflows in an enterprise.
“There may be an indefinite period when ZTA workflows coexist with non-ZTA workflows in an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureAn agency could design newly needed infrastructure around ZT principles and secure system engineering, such as evaluating subjects' trust before granting access and establishing micro-perimeters around new resources.
“The agency could design the newly needed infrastructure around ZT principles and secure system engineering [SP8900-160v1], such as evaluating subjects' trust before granting access and establishing micro-perimeters around new resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP8900-160v1
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureImplementing a ZTA is a journey rather than a wholesale replacement of infrastructure or processes.
“Implementing a ZTA is a journey rather than a wholesale replacement of infrastructure or processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseIt may not be possible to conduct a complete census on all enterprise-owned assets, so an enterprise should consider building the capability to quickly identify, categorize, and assess newly discovered assets that are on enterprise-owned infrastructure.
“It may not be possible to conduct a complete census on all enterprise-owned assets, so an enterprise should consider building the capability to quickly identify, categorize, and assess newly discovered assets that are on enterprise-owned infrastructure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)The NCPS program is evolving to ensure that situational awareness is preserved through utilization of security information about cloud-based traffic, helping to set the foundation for expanded situational awareness telemetry from ZTA systems.
“The NCPS program is evolving to ensure that situational awareness is preserved through utilization of security information about cloud-based traffic, helping to set the foundation for expanded situational awareness telemetry from ZTA systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkIncomplete knowledge will most often lead to a business process failure where the PE denies requests due to insufficient information.
“Incomplete knowledge will most often lead to a business process failure where the PE denies requests due to insufficient information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)NCPS intrusion prevention functions would also require evolution to be able to inform policy enforcement at both the current NCPS locations as well as ZTA systems.
“NCPS intrusion prevention functions would also require evolution to be able to inform policy enforcement at both the current NCPS locations as well as ZTA systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureFrom that point, it is an engineering and organizational exercise in building the infrastructure and configuring the components.
“From that point, it is an engineering and organizational exercise in building the infrastructure and configuring the components.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramThis is similar to the first steps in developing a road map to ZTA.
“This is similar to the first steps in developing a road map to ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone given§ 6.6 ZTA and DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigations (CDM) ProgramThe DHS CDM program is an effort to improve federal agency information technology (IT).
“The DHS CDM program is an effort to improve federal agency information technology (IT).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureThe enterprise needs this information before it can develop a list of candidate business processes and the subjects/assets involved in this process.
“The enterprise needs this information before it can develop a list of candidate business processes and the subjects/assets involved in this process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkAn enterprise cannot determine what new processes or systems need to be in place if there is no knowledge of the current state of operations.
“An enterprise cannot determine what new processes or systems need to be in place if there is no knowledge of the current state of operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkThis awareness forms the foundational state that must be reached before a ZTA deployment is possible.
“This awareness forms the foundational state that must be reached before a ZTA deployment is possible.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkThese surveys can be conducted in parallel, but both are tied to examination of the business processes of the organization.
“These surveys can be conducted in parallel, but both are tied to examination of the business processes of the organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkAfter the initial inventory is created, there is a regular cycle of maintenance and updating.
“After the initial inventory is created, there is a regular cycle of maintenance and updating.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureThis baseline includes having assets, subjects, business processes, traffic flows and dependency mappings identified and cataloged for the enterprise.
“This baseline includes having assets, subjects, business processes, traffic flows and dependency mappings identified and cataloged for the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis also includes configuration management and monitoring.
“This also includes configuration management and monitoring.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.5 ZTA and EINSTEIN (NCPS -National Cybersecurity Protection System)Machine learning tools could use ZTA data to improve detection.
“Information generated in a ZTA may better inform event impact quantification; machine learning tools could use ZTA data to improve detection; and additional logs from ZTA may be saved for after-thefact analyses by incident responders.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 6.7 ZTA, Cloud Smart, and the Federal Data StrategyThis corresponds with the cross-enterprise collaboration ZTA use case.
“This corresponds with the cross-enterprise collaboration ZTA use case (see Section 4.4).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseZTA should allow developers and administrators to have sufficient flexibility to satisfy their business requirements while using logs and audit actions to identify access behavior patterns.
“ZTA should allow developers and administrators to have sufficient flexibility to satisfy their business requirements while using logs and audit actions to identify access behavior patterns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseIn many legacy security architectures, these accounts may have blanket permission to access all enterprise resources.
“In many legacy security architectures, these accounts may have blanket permission to access all enterprise resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureThere may be times when an organization is asked to fulfill a new responsibility that would require building its own infrastructure.
“However, there may be times when an organization is asked to fulfill a new responsibility that would require building its own infrastructure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureAn enterprise should reach a baseline of competence before it becomes possible to deploy a significant ZT-focused environment.
“An enterprise should reach a baseline of competence before it becomes possible to deploy a significant ZT-focused environment [ACT-IAC].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites ACT-IAC
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.1 Identify Actors on the EnterpriseUsers with special privileges, such as developers or system administrators, require additional scrutiny when being assigned attributes or roles.
“Users with special privileges, such as developers or system administrators, require additional scrutiny when being assigned attributes or roles.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.1 Pure Zero Trust ArchitectureIn practice, this is rarely a viable option for federal agencies or any organization with an existing network.
“In practice, this is rarely a viable option for federal agencies or any organization with an existing network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis means that the enterprise must be able to configure, survey, and update enterprise assets, such as virtual assets and containers.
“This means that the enterprise must be able to configure, survey, and update enterprise assets, such as virtual assets and containers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkMigrating to ZTA requires an organization to have detailed knowledge of its assets (physical and virtual), subjects (including user privileges), and business processes.
“Migrating to ZTA requires an organization to have detailed knowledge of its assets (physical and virtual), subjects (including user privileges), and business processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3 Steps to Introducing ZTA to a Perimeter-Based Architected NetworkThis updating may either change business processes or not have any impact, but an evaluation of business processes should be conducted.
“This updating may either change business processes or not have any impact, but an evaluation of business processes should be conducted.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ Migrating to a Zero Trust ArchitectureHow an enterprise migrates to a strategy depends on its current cybersecurity posture and operations.
“How an enterprise migrates to a strategy depends on its current cybersecurity posture and operations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsSolutions that require components installed on client assets may limit business processes where nonenterprise-owned assets are used or desired, such as BYOD or cross-agency collaborations.
“This may limit business processes where nonenterprise-owned assets are used or desired, such as BYOD or cross-agency collaborations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThis adds an additional burden on vendors and consumers: vendors need to expend resources to change their products, and consumers need to apply updates to multiple products when one vendor makes a change to its proprietary API.
“This adds an additional burden on vendors and consumers: vendors need to expend resources to change their products, and consumers need to apply updates to multiple products when one vendor makes a change to its proprietary API.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.4 Formulating Policies for the ZTA CandidateAfter the asset or workflow is identified, identify all upstream resources, downstream resources, and entities that are used or affected by the workflow.
“After the asset or workflow is identified, identify all upstream resources (e.g., ID management systems, databases, micro-services), downstream resources (e.g., logging, security monitoring), and entities (e.g., subjects, service accounts) that are used or affected by the workflow.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentStudies on how users react to MFA and other security operations that are part of a ZTA enterprise could form the basis of predicting end user experience and behavior when using ZTA workflows in an enterprise.
“There have, however, been studies on how users react to MFA and other security operations that are part of a ZTA enterprise, and this work could form the basis of predicting end user experience and behavior when using ZTA workflows in an enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis work would need to exist enterprise-or agency-wide before any business process could be (re)designed with a ZTA.
“This work would need to exist enterprise-or agency-wide before any business process could be (re)designed with a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessRather than project the enterprise perimeter into the cloud or bring clients into the enterprise network via a VPN, enterprise clients can request cloud services directly.
“Rather than project the enterprise perimeter into the cloud or bring clients into the enterprise network via a VPN, enterprise clients can request cloud services directly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessThe enterprise's PEPs ensure that enterprise policies are followed before resource access is granted to a client.
“The enterprise's PEPs ensure that enterprise policies are followed before resource access is granted to a client.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsThe Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has produced a framework for Software Defined Perimeter (SDP) that may also be useful in ZTA.
“The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has produced a framework for Software Defined Perimeter (SDP) [2] that may also be useful in ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [2] 2. Anderson B, McGrew D (2017) Machine Learning for Encrypted Malware Traffic Classification: Accounting for Noisy Labels and Non- Stationarity. Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (ACM, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada), pp 1723-1732. https://doi.org/10.1145/3097983.3098163 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThe problem with relying on proprietary APIs is that these APIs are proprietary and single-vendor controlled.
“The problem with this approach is that these APIs are proprietary and single-vendor controlled.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone given§ B.4.5 Attacker Response to ZTAThe tenets of ZTA aim to reduce the exposure of resources to attackers and minimize or prevent lateral movement within an enterprise should a host asset be compromised.
“The tenets of ZTA aim to reduce the exposure of resources to attackers and minimize or prevent lateral movement within an enterprise should a host asset be compromised.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.7 Expanding the ZTAIf a change occurs to the workflow, the operating ZT architecture needs to be reevaluated.
“However, if a change occurs to the workflow, the operating ZT architecture needs to be reevaluated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentSecurity fatigue is the phenomenon wherein end users are confronted with so many security policies and challenges that it begins to impact their productivity in a negative way.
“Security fatigue [3] is the phenomenon wherein end users are confronted with so many security policies and challenges that it begins to impact their productivity in a negative way.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [3] 3. Department of Defense CIO (2007). Department of Defense Global Information Grid Architecture Vision Version 1.0 June 2007. Available at http://www.acqnotes.com/Attachments/DoD%20GIG%20Architectural% 20Vision,%20June%2007.pdf
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThis requires close partnerships between communities of vendors to ensure early notification of modifications within APIs, which may affect compatibility between products.
“This requires close partnerships between communities of vendors to ensure early notification of modifications within APIs, which may affect compatibility between products.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThese programs must be designed to be expandable and adaptable to changes in the enterprise, not only when migrating to ZTA but also when accounting for new assets, services, and business processes that become part of the enterprise.
“These programs must be designed to be expandable and adaptable to changes in the enterprise, not only when migrating to ZTA but also when accounting for new assets, services, and business processes that become part of the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentThe lack of large ZTA use cases available for analysis is the main reason there has not been a rigorous examination of end user behavior in ZTA.
“This is mainly due to the lack of large ZTA use cases available for analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsThe controlling vendor can change the API behavior, and integrators are required to update their products in response.
“The controlling vendor can change the API behavior, and integrators are required to update their products in response.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessAn enterprise may wish to start with a low-risk business process for the first transition to ZTA as disruptions will likely not negatively impact the entire organization.
“An enterprise may wish to start with a low-risk business process for the first transition to ZTA as disruptions will likely not negatively impact the entire organization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseAgencies may also have a list of ZTA candidate processes that involve High Value Assets (HVA) that have been identified as key to the agency mission.
“Agencies may also have a list of ZTA candidate processes that involve High Value Assets (HVA) [M-19-03] that have been identified as key to the agency mission.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites M-19-03
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsA key component of ZT is the collection and use of data related to the process flow that feeds back into the PE when making access decisions.
“A key component of ZT is the collection and use of data related to the process flow that feeds back into the PE when making access decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsThere is an opportunity for a set of open, standardized protocols or frameworks to be developed to aid organizations in migrating to a ZTA.
“This indicates that there is an opportunity for a set of open, standardized protocols or frameworks to be developed to aid organizations in migrating to a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis information is not only used for access decisions (as collaborator and BYOD assets may need to contact PEPs) but also for monitoring and forensics logging by the enterprise.
“This information is not only used for access decisions (as collaborator and BYOD assets may need to contact PEPs) but also for monitoring and forensics logging by the enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis also includes both its physical (as best estimated) and network location.
“This also includes both its physical (as best estimated) and network location.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.4 Formulating Policies for the ZTA CandidateThe process of identifying a candidate service or business workflow depends on several factors: the importance of the process to the organization, the group of subjects affected, and the current state of resources used for the workflow.
“The process of identifying a candidate service or business workflow depends on several factors: the importance of the process to the organization, the group of subjects affected, and the current state of resources used for the workflow.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ B.4 Knowledge Gaps in ZTA and Future Areas of ResearchMost of the knowledge gaps arise from a lack of time and experience with mature zero trust deployments.
“These are gray areas in knowledge about operational ZTA environments, and most arise from a lack of time and experience with mature zero trust deployments.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis may include whatever is visible by the enterprise (e.g., MAC address, network location) and augmented by administrator data entry.
“This may include whatever is visible by the enterprise (e.g., MAC address, network location) and augmented by administrator data entry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseAgencies that have established CDM program capabilities, such as HWAM and SWAM, have a rich set of data to draw from when enacting a ZTA.
“Agencies that have established CDM program capabilities, such as HWAM [HWAM] and Software Asset Management (SWAM) [SWAM], have a rich set of data to draw from when enacting a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites HWAM
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites SWAM
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessOnce enough experience is gained, more critical business processes can become candidates.
“Once enough experience is gained, more critical business processes can become candidates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ B.3 Systemic Gaps that Impact ZTASystemic gaps could slow the adoption of ZTA in agencies or result in fragmentation of the ZTA component industry.
“These gaps could slow the adoption of ZTA in agencies or result in fragmentation of the ZTA component industry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.6 Initial Deployment and MonitoringOperating the new ZT business workflow in reporting-only mode for some time allows the enterprise to gain an understanding of baseline asset and resource access requests, behavior, and communication patterns.
“This also allows the enterprise to gain an understanding of baseline asset and resource access requests, behavior, and communication patterns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseMany federal agencies have already begun identifying enterprise assets.
“Many federal agencies have already begun identifying enterprise assets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseShadow IT presents a special problem in that these resources are enterprise-owned but not managed like other resources.
“Shadow IT presents a special problem in that these resources are enterprise-owned but not managed like other resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.7 Expanding the ZTASignificant changes to the system-such as new devices, major updates to software (especially ZT logical components), and shifts in organizational structure-may result in changes to the workflow or policies.
“Significate changes to the system-such as new devices, major updates to software (especially ZT logical components), and shifts in organizational structure-may result in changes to the workflow or policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.4.5 Attacker Response to ZTAA properly implemented ZTA for an enterprise will improve the enterprise's cybersecurity posture over traditional network perimeter-based security.
“A properly implemented ZTA for an enterprise will improve the enterprise's cybersecurity posture over traditional network perimeter-based security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationcitation§ 7.3.4 Formulating Policies for the ZTA CandidateThe value of the asset or workflow based on risk to the asset or workflow can be evaluated using the NIST Risk Management Framework.
“The value of the asset or workflow based on risk to the asset or workflow can be evaluated using the NIST Risk Management Framework [SP800-37].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites SP800-37
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseCertain ZTA approaches (mainly network-based) may even cause shadow IT components to become unusable as they may not be known and included in network access policies.
“Certain ZTA approaches (mainly network-based) may even cause shadow IT components to become unusable as they may not be known and included in network access policies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.2.2 Perception that ZTA Conflicts with Existing Federal Cybersecurity PoliciesThe perception that ZTA conflicts with existing federal cybersecurity policies is based on a misconception of ZTA and how it has evolved from previous cybersecurity paradigms.
“This gap is based on a misconception of ZTA and how it has evolved from previous cybersecurity paradigms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.3 Standardization of Interfaces Between ComponentsIt is very difficult to create a multiyear road map for moving into ZTA because it is impossible to identify a minimum set of compatibility requirements for components.
“Hence, it is very difficult to create a multiyear road map for moving into ZTA because it is impossible to identify a minimum set of compatibility requirements for components.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsAs there is no single solution to developing a ZTA, there is no single set of tools or services for a zero trust enterprise.
“As there is no single solution to developing a ZTA, there is no single set of tools or services for a zero trust enterprise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationreasoning§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsIt is impossible to have a single protocol or framework that enables an enterprise to move to a ZTA.
“Thus, it is impossible to have a single protocol or framework that enables an enterprise to move to a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessPlanners should also consider potential tradeoffs in performance, user experience, and possible increased workflow fragility that may occur when implementing ZTA for a given business process.
“Planners should also consider potential tradeoffs in performance, user experience, and possible increased workflow fragility that may occur when implementing ZTA for a given business process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessBusiness processes should inform the circumstances under which resource access requests are granted and denied.
“Business processes should inform the circumstances under which resource access requests are granted and denied.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.6 Initial Deployment and MonitoringOnce the baseline activity patterns for the workflow have been established, anomalous behavior can be more easily identified.
“Once the baseline activity patterns for the workflow has been established, anomalous behavior can be more easily identify.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisecitation§ B.3.4 Emerging Standards that Address Overreliance on Proprietary APIsThe IETF has specified protocols (XMPP-Grid) that may be useful in exchanging threat information.
“SDOs like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have specified protocols that may be useful in exchanging threat information (called XMPP-Grid [1]).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [1] 1. ACT-IAC] American Council for Technology and Industry Advisory Council (2019) Zero Trust Cybersecurity Current Trends. Available at https://www.actiac.org/zero-trust-cybersecurity-current-trends
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.5 Identifying Candidate SolutionsThe location of candidate business process resources will influence candidate solutions as well as the ZTA for the process.
“The location of candidate business process resources will influence candidate solutions as well as the ZTA for the process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ B.3 Systemic Gaps that Impact ZTAOpen standards (produced either by an SDO or industry consortium) can help address systemic gaps.
“Systemic gaps are areas where open standards (produced either by a standards development organization [SDO] or industry consortium) can help.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.2 Identify Assets Owned by the EnterpriseThis information should inform the PE when making resource access decisions.
“This information should inform the PE when making resource access decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessThe third inventory that an agency should undertake is to identify and rank the business processes, data flows, and their relation in the missions of the agency.
“The third inventory that an agency should undertake is to identify and rank the business processes, data flows, and their relation in the missions of the agency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ 7.3.3 Identify Key Processes and Evaluate Risks Associated with Executing ProcessBusiness processes that utilize cloud-based resources or are used by remote workers are often good candidates for ZTA and would likely see improvements to availability and security.
“Business processes that utilize cloud-based resources or are used by remote workers are often good candidates for ZTA and would likely see improvements to availability and security.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone given§ Additional informationA ZTA makes many COOP factors easier as remote workers may have the same access to resources that they had on-premises.
“A ZTA makes many COOP factors easier as remote workers may have the same access to resources that they had on-premises.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.4.7 Resilience of ZTA to Enterprise and Network DisruptionIf one vital component is disrupted or unreachable, there could be a cascade of failures that impact one or multiple business processes.
“If one vital component is disrupted or unreachable, there could be a cascade of failures that impact one or multiple business processes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Additional informationPolicies like MFA may have a negative impact if users are not properly trained or lack experience.
“However, policies like MFA may also have a negative impact if users are not properly trained or lack experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Additional informationPE and PA components located in a cloud may be reachable during a DDoS attack but may not be able to reach all PEPs located with resources.
“For example, PE and PA components located in a cloud may be reachable during a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack but may not be able to reach all PEPs located with resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationreasoning§ B.4.7 Resilience of ZTA to Enterprise and Network DisruptionEnterprises will purchase several different services and products, which can lead to a web of dependencies for components.
“As a result, enterprises will purchase several different services and products, which can lead to a web of dependencies for components.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation§ B.4.6 User Experience in a ZTA EnvironmentStudies show that MFA may alter user behavior, but the overall change is mixed.
“Other studies show that MFA may alter user behavior, but the overall change is mixed [4] [5].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [4] 4. CSA-SDP] Cloud Security Alliance (2015) SDP Specification 1.0. Available at https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/artifacts/sdp-specification-v1-0/
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [5] 5. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, DC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone given§ Additional informationUsers may forget or not have access to tokens and enterprise devices during an emergency, and that will impact the speed and effectiveness of enterprise business processes.
“Users may forget or not have access to tokens and enterprise devices during an emergency, and that will impact the speed and effectiveness of enterprise business processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationreasoning§ Additional informationThe continuity of operations (COOP) plans for an enterprise will likely need revision when adopting a ZTA.
“The continuity of operations (COOP) plans for an enterprise will likely need revision when adopting a ZTA.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
Zero trust security models assume that an attacker is present in the environment.
“Zero trust security models assume that an attacker is present in the environment and that an enterprise-owned environment is no different-or no more trustworthy-than any nonenterprise-owned environment.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
An enterprise-owned environment is no different or no more trustworthy than any nonenterprise-owned environment.
“Zero trust security models assume that an attacker is present in the environment and that an enterprise-owned environment is no different-or no more trustworthy-than any nonenterprise-owned environment.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The entire enterprise private network is not considered an implicit trust zone.
“The entire enterprise private network is not considered an implicit trust zone.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Assets should always act as if an attacker is present on the enterprise network.
“Assets should always act as if an attacker is present on the enterprise network, and communication should be done in the most secure manner available (see tenet 2 above).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Communication should be done in the most secure manner available.
“Assets should always act as if an attacker is present on the enterprise network, and communication should be done in the most secure manner available (see tenet 2 above).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Devices on the network may not be owned or configurable by the enterprise.
“Devices on the network may not be owned or configurable by the enterprise.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
No resource is inherently trusted.
“No resource is inherently trusted.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Every asset must have its security posture evaluated via a PEP before a request is granted to an enterprise-owned resource.
“Every asset must have its security posture evaluated via a PEP before a request is granted to an enterprise-owned resource (similar to tenet 6 above for assets as well as subjects).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
This evaluation should be continual for as long as the session lasts.
“This evaluation should be continual for as long as the session lasts.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Enterprise-owned devices may have artifacts that enable authentication and provide a confidence level higher than the same request coming from nonenterprise-owned devices.
“Enterprise-owned devices may have artifacts that enable authentication and provide a confidence level higher than the same request coming from nonenterpriseowned devices.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Subject credentials alone are insufficient for device authentication to an enterprise resource.
“Subject credentials alone are insufficient for device authentication to an enterprise resource.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Not all enterprise resources are on enterprise-owned infrastructure.
“Not all enterprise resources are on enterprise-owned infrastructure.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Remote enterprise subjects and assets cannot fully trust their local network connection.
“Remote enterprise subjects and assets cannot fully trust their local network connection.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Remote subjects should assume that the local (i.e., nonenterprise-owned) network is hostile.
“Remote subjects should assume that the local (i.e., nonenterprise-owned) network is hostile.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Assets should assume that all traffic is being monitored and potentially modified.
“Assets should assume that all traffic is being monitored and potentially modified.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
All connection requests should be authenticated and authorized.
“All connection requests should be authenticated and authorized, and all communications should be done in the most secure manner possible (i.e., provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and source authentication).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
All communications should be done in the most secure manner possible.
“All connection requests should be authenticated and authorized, and all communications should be done in the most secure manner possible (i.e., provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and source authentication).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Assets and workflows moving between enterprise and nonenterprise infrastructure should have a consistent security policy and posture.
“Assets and workflows moving between enterprise and nonenterprise infrastructure should have a consistent security policy and posture.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Assets and workloads should retain their security posture when moving to or from enterprise-owned infrastructure.
“Assets and workloads should retain their security posture when moving to or from enterprise-owned infrastructure.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Most organizations already have some elements of zero trust in their enterprise infrastructure or are on their way through implementation of information security and resiliency policies and best practices.
“Most organizations already have some elements of zero trust in their enterprise infrastructure or are on their way through implementation of information security and resiliency policies and best practices.”
The paper relies on this without support.
ZTA has its roots in organizations that are geographically distributed and/or have a highly mobile workforce.
“ZTA has its roots in organizations that are geographically distributed and/or have a highly mobile workforce.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The most common scenario involves an enterprise with a single headquarters and one or more geographically dispersed locations that are not joined by an enterprise-owned physical network connection.
“The most common scenario involves an enterprise with a single headquarters and one or more geographically dispersed locations that are not joined by an enterprise-owned physical network connection (see Figure 8).”
The paper relies on this without support.
One increasingly common use case for deploying a ZTA is an enterprise utilizing multiple cloud providers.
“One increasingly common use case for deploying a ZTA is an enterprise utilizing multiple cloud providers (see Figure 9).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Another common scenario is an enterprise that includes on-site visitors and/or contracted service providers that require limited access to enterprise resources to do their work.
“Another common scenario is an enterprise that includes on-site visitors and/or contracted service providers that require limited access to enterprise resources to do their work (see Figure 10).”
The paper relies on this without support.
A common feature in many enterprises is a public-facing service that may or may not include user registration.
“A common feature in many enterprises is a public-facing service that may or may not include user registration (i.e., users must create or have been issued a set of login credentials).”
The paper relies on this without support.
In some ZT product offerings currently available on the market, the PE and PA components are combined in a single service.
“In some ZT product offerings currently available on the market, the PE and PA components are combined in a single service.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Different cloud providers have unique ways of implementing similar functionality.
“One challenge is that different cloud providers have unique ways of implementing similar functionality.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some deployment models are better suited to particular workflows and current enterprise ecosystems.
“Some deployment models (see Section 3.1) are better suited to particular workflows and current enterprise ecosystems.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Some vendor solutions are better suited to some use cases than others.
“Likewise, some vendor solutions are better suited to some use cases than others.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Few enterprise policy sets are complete in their first iterations.
“Few enterprise policy sets are complete in their first iterations: important user accounts (e.g., administrator accounts) may be denied access to resources they need or may not need all the access privileges they have been assigned.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Important user accounts may be denied access to resources they need or may not need all the access privileges they have been assigned.
“Few enterprise policy sets are complete in their first iterations: important user accounts (e.g., administrator accounts) may be denied access to resources they need or may not need all the access privileges they have been assigned.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Many of the concepts and ideas of zero trust have been circulating for a long time.
“Zero trust should instead be viewed as an evolution of current cybersecurity strategies as many of the concepts and ideas have been circulating for a long time.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Determined attackers will not sit idle but will instead change behavior in the face of ZTA.
“However, determined attackers will not sit idle but will instead change behavior in the face of ZTA.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Cloud services can become unreachable through either an attack or simple error.
“Most products and services surveyed relied on a cloud presence to provide robustness, but even cloud services have been known to become unreachable through either an attack or simple error.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Although NIST SP800-207 states that software agents are compulsory, their use is optional in our design.
“Although NIST SP800-207 states that software agents are compulsory (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020), their use is optional in our design.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
Section 3.2.1 describes a deployment model that uses device agents, but Section 3.2.3 describes a resource-portal model with no local agent. NIST SP 800-207 therefore does not make software agents compulsory across its deployment models. (LLM, conf=0.92)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredFor implementing ZTA in a critical infrastructure context, a strong authentication scheme which identifies both users and devices is required.
“For implementing ZTA in a critical infrastructure context, a strong authentication scheme which identifies both users and devices is required.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Section 6.3 says strong subject authentication policies are needed before moving to a zero-trust deployment. Section 2.2 says subject credentials alone are insufficient for device authentication. These support identifying users and devices, but the paper states the requirements for enterprises generally, not specifically for critical infrastructure. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredZTA realisation necessitates the adoption of lightweight encryption schemes to account for resource-constrained devices in cyber physical systems.
“Further to these two primary principles, ZTA realisation necessitates the adoption of lightweight encryption schemes to account for resource-constrained devices in cyber physical systems.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Section 2.1 (page not provided) says ZTA communication should protect confidentiality and integrity, and Section 2 includes IoT actuators among possible resources. Neither passage requires lightweight encryption schemes or links their adoption to resource-constrained cyber-physical devices. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe seven basic tenets are aimed at achieving the optimal goal of implementing ZTA, with the option of selectively implementing some tenets and not others, in accordance with perceived need.
“NIST defines the seven basic tenets for a ZTA [3] which are aimed at achieving the optimal goal of implementing ZTA (with the option of selectively implementing some tenets and not others, in accordance with perceived need).”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Section 2.1 calls the seven tenets an ideal goal and acknowledges that not all may be fully implemented in their purest form. It does not say organizations may choose to omit tenets according to perceived need; Section 3.1 instead says each ZTA approach implements all the tenets, even if it emphasizes one or two. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredNIST defines seven basic tenets for a ZTA.
“NIST defines the seven basic tenets for a ZTA [3] which are aimed at achieving the optimal goal of implementing ZTA (with the option of selectively implementing some tenets and not others, in accordance with perceived need).”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Section 2.1 lists seven basic zero-trust tenets and describes them as an ideal goal that may not be fully implemented in their purest form. That supports the central claim, but not the sentence’s suggestion that organizations may choose to implement some tenets and omit others: Section 3.1 says each ZTA approach implements all the tenets. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
The two most common approaches to applying ZTA in an enterprise are micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters.
“The two most common approaches, which we will discuss here, are micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 describe micro-segmentation and software-defined perimeters as ZTA approaches. Section 3.1 also identifies enhanced identity governance as a third approach, and the paper does not rank the two named approaches as the most common. (LLM, conf=0.87)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe application of Zero Trust to OT environments requires adaptation of NIST SP 800-207 principles to accommodate the unique constraints of industrial systems.
“The application of Zero Trust to OT environments requires adaptation of NIST SP 800-207 principles to accommodate the unique constraints of industrial systems.[4]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
Section 2.1 says the zero-trust tenets are an ideal goal and may not be fully implemented for every strategy; Section 3.2.2 describes an approach for legacy applications that cannot have individual gateways. These passages support adapting a deployment to its constraints, but our copy does not specifically address OT environments or the unique constraints of industrial systems. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe proposed architecture is explicitly designed to align with and extend the IEC 62443 industrial security standard and NIST CSF 2.0, enabling organizations with existing compliance programs to adopt this framework as a coherent extension rather than a competing model.
“The proposed architecture is explicitly designed to align with and extend the IEC 62443 industrial security standard and NIST CSF 2.0, enabling organizations with existing compliance programs to adopt this framework as a coherent extension rather than a competing model.[4], [6], [8]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredSP 800-207 became the authoritative reference for federal Zero Trust planning.
“This publication became the authoritative reference for federal Zero Trust planning.”
From The Pathway to Implementing Zero Trust: Why Microsegmentation Remains the Critical Barrier (2026) · cites this paper as [6]
Section 6, “Zero Trust Architecture and Possible Interactions with Existing Federal Guidance” (page unavailable), discusses federal guidance relevant to agency zero-trust planning. It does not say that SP 800-207 subsequently became the authoritative reference for that planning; that status and timeline are unsupported by our copy. (LLM, conf=0.81)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThis information parameterizes the trust algorithm used by the PDP to determine a subject's risk profile.
“This information parameterizes the trust algorithm used by the PDP to determine a subject's risk profile.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
Section 3.3 says the policy engine uses subject information and other inputs in its trust algorithm to decide whether to grant access. Section 3.3.1 says some variants calculate a confidence level for a subject or requesting account, but it does not describe every trust algorithm as determining a subject’s risk profile. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredA software agent installed on each device communicates with the PEP and provides telemetry about the device such as IP address, port information, or other security artifacts for verification.
“A software agent installed on each device communicates with the PEP and provides telemetry about the device such as IP address, port information, or other security artifacts for verification (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020).”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
Section 3.2.1 describes an agent installed on each enterprise-issued asset that directs traffic to the PEP for evaluation. But Figure 3 describes IP addresses, port information, and security artifacts as connection information the policy administrator may use to configure a channel—not as device telemetry the agent provides to the PEP for verification. (LLM, conf=0.89)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe PIP provides the information it collects from the following systems to the PDP: identity, credentials and account management, intrusion detection system, user and endpoint behavior analytics, multifactor authentication, and unified endpoint management.
“The PIP provides the information it collects from the following systems to the PDP: identity, credentials and account management, intrusion detection system, user and endpoint behavior analytics, multifactor authentication, and unified endpoint management.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
The “Logical Components of Zero Trust Architecture” section describes identity management, security monitoring, and device-state information used to inform the policy engine; the section on per-session access also discusses multifactor authentication. But our copy does not describe a PIP providing information to a PDP or identify intrusion detection, user and endpoint behavior analytics, and unified endpoint management as the specified source systems. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredTo enable ZT, the following components are required: policy enforcement point (PEP), policy decision point (PDP), and policy information point (PIP).
“To enable ZT, the following components are required (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2022): policy enforcement point (PEP), policy decision point (PDP), and policy information point (PIP).”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
Section 3, “Logical Components of Zero Trust Architecture,” identifies the policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision point (PDP), which it divides into a policy engine and policy administrator. It describes data sources that inform decisions, but does not identify a policy information point (PIP) as a required component. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredRather than simply relying on entry-point authentication, the use of a context-aware and continuous authentication scheme which takes into account both the user and device contexts on an ongoing basis to actively authenticate is recommended.
“Beyond this, rather than simply relying on entry-point authentication, the use of a context-aware and continuous authentication scheme which takes into account both the user and device contexts on an ongoing basis to”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Zero trust architectures can be based on identity governance, micro-segmentation, or network infrastructure and software defined perimeters.
“The zero trust architectures can also vary based on components deployed and data sources that drive the organisation's PE [3].Zero trust architectures can be based on:”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
In terms of access control, ZTA strategies should include a risk-aware access control scheme which determines the risk associated with the granting of an access request.
“In terms of access control, ZTA strategies should include a risk-aware access control scheme which determines the risk associated with the granting of an access request.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
NIST describes three core ZTA logical components: policy enforcement point (PEP), policy administrator (PA), and policy engine (PE).
“Of these components, NIST describes three as core: policy enforcement point (PEP), policy administrator (PA), and policy engine (PE), as shown below in Figure 3.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters are recommended by NIST as core ZTA implementation strategies.
“Micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters are also recommended by NIST as core ZTA implementation strategies.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
As indicated in NIST guidelines, contextual score-based TA may be an optimal choice, as it can compute a confidence score by leveraging contextual information, thereby increasing the possibility of detecting a potentially malicious request.
“As indicated in the NIST guidelines [3], contextual scorebased TA may be an optimal choice, as it can compute a confidence score by leveraging contextual information, thereby increasing the possibility of detecting a potentially malicious request.”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
According to NIST, ZTA can be applied in an enterprise using various approaches.
“According to NIST, ZTA can be applied in an enterprise using various approaches [3].”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Another approach proposed by NIST for implementing ZTA is the use of a software defined perimeter (SDP) which acts as an overlay network to secure resource access.
“Another approach proposed by NIST for implementing ZTA is the use of a software defined perimeter (SDP) which acts as an overlay network to secure resource access [3].”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
Access policies need to be dynamically enforced and constantly re-evaluated, which facilitates effective decision making based on various data sources.
“Access policies also need to be dynamically enforced and constantly re-evaluated [3], which facilitates effective decision making based on various data sources [147].”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [3]
NIST SP 800-207 defines Zero Trust as a collection of principles that moves enterprise defenses from static, network-based perimeters to a focus on users, assets, and resources.
“NIST SP 800-207 defines Zero Trust as a collection of principles that moves enterprise defenses from static, network-based perimeters to a focus on users, assets, and resources.[4]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), as formalized by NIST SP 800-207, provides a principled alternative in which no entity whether device, user, or service is inherently trusted based on network location.
“Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), as formalized by NIST SP 800-207, provides a principled alternative: no entity whether device, user, or service is inherently trusted based on network location.[4]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
NIST ZTA foundational tenets hold that all data sources and computing services are treated as resources, all communication is secured regardless of network location, access to individual resources is granted on a per-session basis, and access decisions are determined by dynamic, context-aware policy.
“Its foundational tenets hold that all data sources and computing services are treated as resources, all communication is secured regardless of network location, access to individual resources is granted on a per-session basis, and access decisions are determined by dynamic, context-aware policy.”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
NIST SP 800-207 defined the logical components of a ZTA-policy engine, policy administrator, and policy enforcement point-and established principles for their integration across users, devices, applications, and infrastructure.
“SP 800-207 defined the logical components of a ZTA -policy engine, policy administrator, and policy enforcement point -and established principles for their integration across users, devices, applications, and infrastructure.”
From The Pathway to Implementing Zero Trust: Why Microsegmentation Remains the Critical Barrier (2026) · cites this paper as [6]
The PEP restricts access to network zones and can be implemented by a firewall or a separate component.
“The PEP restricts access to network zones and can be implemented by a firewall or a separate component.”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
NIST SP800-207 defines the terms subject as a combination of user, application, services, and devices.
“NIST SP800-207 defines the terms subject as a combination of user, application, services, and devices (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020).”
From A Zero Trust Architecture for Critical Operational Technology Systems (2025) · cites this paper as National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2020
The application of Zero Trust principles to ICS has accelerated rapidly since NIST SP 800-207 was published in 2020.
“The application of Zero Trust principles to industrial control systems has accelerated rapidly since NIST SP 800-207 [1] was published in 2020.”
The continuous verification loop satisfies NIST SP 800-207 tenets (v) and (vii), that the enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all assets and collects as much information as possible about the current state and uses it to improve security posture.
“it is what satisfies NIST SP 800-207 tenets (v) and (vii) [1] - that the enterprise monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all assets, and collects as much information as possible about the current state and uses it to improve security posture.”
The proposed solution can be classified as a hybrid between ZTA Using Enhanced Identity Governance and ZTA Using Micro-segmentation.
“By considering the possible implementation strategies for ZTA described by the NIST [22], our solution can be classified as an hybrid between ZTA Using Enhanced Identity Governance and ZTA Using Micro-segmentation.”
From A Zero Trust approach for the cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems (2022) · cites this paper as [22]
El paradigma Zero Trust redefine la seguridad bajo la premisa de que ningún actor es confiable por defecto.
“El paradigma Zero Trust, planteado por Rose et al. (2020), redefine la seguridad bajo la premisa de que ningún actor es confiable por defecto, reforzando así la resiliencia ante amenazas.”
From Entre Códigos y Corazones: Investigación e Inteligencia Artificial hacia una Tecnología más Humana (2025) · cites this paper as Rose et al. (2020)
The private keys bound to device identity certificates never leave the secure element in plaintext, ensuring that certificate-based identity cannot be extracted and replicated by an adversary with transient access to the device.
“The private keys bound to device identity certificates never leave the secure element in plaintext, ensuring that certificate-based identity cannot be extracted and replicated by an adversary with transient access to the device.[4], [5]”
From Zero Trust Architecture for Smart Factories: Securing Digital Twins and Cyber-Physical OT Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [4]
Section 2.2 says enterprise-owned devices may have authentication artifacts, and the discussion of identification factors mentions certificates. Neither passage addresses whether device-certificate private keys remain inside a secure element or resist extraction during transient access. Searches for those key-protection details found no passage that verifies the claim. (LLM, conf=0.73)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredMicrosoft Azure is actively working on integrating FIDO v2.0 authentication for Identity Provider Services and Relying Party Services.
“For what is more, as described in [108] Microsoft Azure is actively working on integrating FIDO v2.0 authentication for Identity Provider Services and Relying Party Services.”
From How many FIDO protocols are needed? Analysing the technology, security and compliance (2024) · cites this paper as [108]
Section B.3.3 (page unavailable) discusses MFA integration and cloud providers generally, but does not identify Microsoft Azure or FIDO v2.0. Searches for Azure, FIDO authentication, and identity-provider and relying-party services found no passage about the claimed integration work. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Device agent is placed on opposite sides of the connection
MinorThe deployment description places both PEP components at or in front of the resource, but its example places the device agent on the client asset and the gateway in front of the resource.
“In this deployment model, the PEP is divided into two components that reside on the resource or as a component directly in front of a resource.”
“For example, each enterprise-issued asset has an installed device agent that coordinates connections, and each resource has a component (i.e., gateway) that is placed directly in front so that the resource communicates only with the gateway, essentially serving as a proxy for the resource.”
Cites
Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations
Hu, V. C., Ferraiolo, D., Kuhn, R., Schnitzer, A., Sandlin, K., Miller, R., & Scarfone, K. (2014) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-162 · Cited by 917 · see citing works
Anderson, B., & McGrew, D. (2017) · Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining · doi:10.1145/3097983.3098163 · Cited by 295 · see citing works
Standards for security categorization of federal information and information systems
National Institute of Standards and Technology (US) (2004) · doi:10.6028/nist.fips.199 · Cited by 284 · see citing works
Rose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S. (2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-207-draft2 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
Self-citationJoint Task Force Transformation Initiative (2018) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-37r2 · Cited by 237 · see citing works
Digital identity guidelines: revision 3
Grassi, P. A., Garcia, M. E., & Fenton, J. L. (2017) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-63-3 · Cited by 230 · see citing works
Stanton, B. C., Theofanos, M. F., Prettyman, S. S., & Furman, S. (2016) · IT Professional · doi:10.1109/mitp.2016.84 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Ross, R., McEvilley, M. A., & Oren, J. C. (2018) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-160v1 · Cited by 106 · see citing works
Developing cyber resilient systems:
Ross, R., Pillitteri, V. Y., Graubart, R. D., Bodeau, D. J., & McQuaid, R. (2019) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-160v2 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
An introduction to privacy engineering and risk management in federal systems
Brooks, S., Garcia, M. E., Lefkovitz, N. B., Lightman, S., & Nadeau, E. M. (2017) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8062 · Cited by 101 · see citing works
SDN: Software Defined Networks: An Authoritative Review of Network Programmability Technologies
Nadeau, T. D., & Gray, K. (2013) · Cited by 59 · see citing works
Digital identity guidelines: enrollment and identity proofing
Grassi, P. A., Fenton, J. L., Lefkovitz, N. B., et al. (2017) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-63a · Cited by 51 · see citing works
(2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.cswp.01162020 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
An intent-based approach for network virtualization
Cohen, R., Barabash, K., Rochwerger, B., Schour, L., Crisan, D., Birke, R., Minkenberg, C., Gusat, M., Recio, R. J., & Jain, V. (2013) · IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network Management (IM) · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Zero Trust Networks: Building Secure Systems in Untrusted Networks
Barth, D., & Gilman, E. (2017) · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Policy Machine: Features, Architecture, and Specification
Ferraiolo, D. F., Gavrila, S. I., Jansen, W., & Stutzman, P. E. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.7987r1 · Cited by 41 · see citing works
Weidman, J., & Großklags, J. (2017) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference · doi:10.1145/3134600.3134629 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
PRODUCTIVITY AND USABILITY EFFECTS OF USING A TWO-FACTOR SECURITY SYSTEM
Strouble, D., Alan, M., & Alsop, S. (2009) · Journal of the Association for Information Systems · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Using Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) for Security Information Exchange
Appala, S., Pope, S., & Saint-Andre, P. (2019) · doi:10.17487/rfc8600 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Zero Trust Intrusion Containment for Telemedicine
Sood, A. K., Huang, Y., Simon, R., et al. (2002) · doi:10.21236/ada415878 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
1 of the 22 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406 · see citing works
Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography
Joseph, D., Misoczki, R., Manzano, M., Tricot, J., Pinuaga, F. D., Lacombe, O., Leichenauer, S., Hidary, J. D., Venables, P., & Hansen, R. (2022) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-04623-2 · Cited by 312 · see citing works
Guide to Operational Technology (OT) security
Stouffer, K., Pease, M., Tang, C., Zimmerman, T., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Hahn, A., Saravia, S., Sherule, A., & Thompson, M. (2023) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r3 · Cited by 315 · see citing works
A Survey on Zero Trust Architecture: Challenges and Future Trends
He, Y., Huang, D., Chen, L., Ni, Y., & Ma, X. (2022) · Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing · doi:10.1155/2022/6476274 · Cited by 260 · see citing works
Buck, C., Olenberger, C., Schweizer, A., Völter, F., & Eymann, T. (2021) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102436 · Cited by 275 · see citing works
A Security Awareness and Protection System for 5G Smart Healthcare Based on Zero-Trust Architecture
Chen, B., Qiao, S., Zhao, J., Liu, D., Shi, X., Lyu, M., Chen, H., Lu, H., & Zhai, Y. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3041042 · Cited by 213 · see citing works
Satellite-based communications security: A survey of threats, solutions, and research challenges
Tedeschi, P., Sciancalepore, S., & Pietro, R. D. (2022) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109246 · Cited by 189 · see citing works
Developing cyber-resilient systems :
Ross, R., Pillitteri, V. Y., Graubart, R. D., Bodeau, D. J., & McQuaid, R. (2021) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-160v2r1 · Cited by 169 · see citing works
Multi-Access Edge Computing Architecture, Data Security and Privacy: A Review
Ali, B., Gregory, M. A., & Li, S. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3053233 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
A Comprehensive Survey of V2X Cybersecurity Mechanisms and Future Research Paths
Sedar, R., Kalalas, C., Vázquez-Gallego, F., Alonso, L., & Alonso-Zárate, J. (2023) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2023.3239115 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
A Review of Anomaly Detection Strategies to Detect Threats to Cyber-Physical Systems
Jeffrey, N., Tan, Q., & Villar, J. R. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12153283 · Cited by 160 · see citing works
An End-to-End Framework for Machine Learning-Based Network Intrusion Detection System
Bertoli, G. D. C., Pereira, L. A., Saotome, O., dos Santos, A. L., Verri, F. A. N., Marcondes, C. A. C., Barbieri, S., Rodrigues, M. S., & de Oliveira, J. M. P. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3101188 · Cited by 144 · see citing works
The zero trust supply chain: Managing supply chain risk in the absence of trust
Collier, Z. A., & Sarkis, J. (2021) · International Journal of Production Research · doi:10.1080/00207543.2021.1884311 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
Security of Zero Trust Networks in Cloud Computing: A Comparative Review
Sarkar, S., Choudhary, G., Shandilya, S. K., Azath, H., & Kim, H. (2022) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su141811213 · Cited by 174 · see citing works
Migrating to zero trust architecture: Reviews and challenges
Teerakanok, S., Uehara, T., & Inomata, A. (2021) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2021/9947347 · Cited by 134 · see citing works
Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures
Zanasi, C., Russo, S., & Colajanni, M. (2024) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2024.103414 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Augmenting zero trust architecture to endpoints using blockchain: A state‐of‐the‐art review
Alevizos, L., Ta, V. T., & Eiza, M. H. (2021) · Security and Privacy · doi:10.1002/spy2.191 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Zero Trust Architecture for 6G Security
Chen, X., Feng, W., Ge, N., & Zhang, Y. (2023) · IEEE Network · doi:10.1109/mnet.2023.3326356 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Trust Aware Continuous Authorization for Zero Trust in Consumer Internet of Things
Dimitrakos, T., Dilshener, T., Kravtsov, A., et al. (2020) · IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00247 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Tam, T., Rao, A., & Hall, J. L. (2021) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102385 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Zero Trust Architecture Empowered Attack Detection Framework to Secure 6G Edge Computing
Sedjelmaci, H., & Ansari, N. (2024) · IEEE Network · doi:10.1109/mnet.131.2200513 · Cited by 77 · see citing works
Zero Trust Architecture: A Systematic Literature Review
Gambo, M. L., & Almulhem, A. (2025) · Journal of Network and Systems Management · doi:10.1007/s10922-025-09998-x · Cited by 86 · see citing works
LCDA: Lightweight Continuous Device-to-Device Authentication for a Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
Shah, S. W. A., Syed, N., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z. A., & Doss, R. (2021) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102351 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
Metaverse Security: Issues, Challenges and a Viable ZTA Model
Gupta, A. K., Khan, H. U., Nazir, S., et al. (2023) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics12020391 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Building A Zero Trust Architecture Using Kubernetes
D'Silva, D., & Ambawade, D. D. (2021) · International Conference for Convergence in Technology (I2CT) · doi:10.1109/i2ct51068.2021.9418203 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Survivable zero trust for cloud computing environments
Ferretti, L., Magnanini, F., Andreolini, M., & Colajanni, M. (2021) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2021.102419 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Hierarchical Security Paradigm for IoT Multiaccess Edge Computing
Singh, J., Bello, Y., Refaey, A., Erbad, A., & Mohamed, A. M. S. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3033265 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
Authentication and Authorization in Microservices Architecture: A Systematic Literature Review
de Almeida, M. G., & Canedo, E. D. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app12063023 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Blockchain-Enabled Intrusion Detection and Prevention System of APTs Within Zero Trust Architecture
Alevizos, L., Eiza, M. H., Ta, V., et al. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3200165 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Automation and Orchestration of Zero Trust Architecture: Potential Solutions and Challenges
Cao, Y., Pokhrel, S. R., Zhu, Y., Doss, R., & Li, G. (2024) · Machine Intelligence Research · doi:10.1007/s11633-023-1456-2 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
A novel zero-trust network access control scheme based on the security profile of devices and users
García‐Teodoro, P., Camacho, J., Maciá‐Fernández, G., Gómez-Hernández, J. A., & López-Marín, V. J. (2022) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2022.109068 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Strategy for Implementing of Zero Trust Architecture
Tsai, M., Lee, S., & Shieh, S. W. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Reliability · doi:10.1109/tr.2023.3345665 · Cited by 58 · see citing works
Toward Zero-Trust Security for the Metaverse
Cheng, R., Chen, S., & Han, B. (2023) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.018.2300095 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Zero-trust based dynamic access control for cloud computing
Wang, R., Li, C., Zhang, K., et al. (2025) · Cybersecurity · doi:10.1186/s42400-024-00320-x · Cited by 54 · see citing works
SysFlow: Toward a Programmable Zero Trust Framework for System Security
Hong, S., Xu, L., Huang, J., Li, H., Hu, H., & Gu, G. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2023.3264152 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
An analysis of zero-trust architecture and its cost-effectiveness for organizational security
Adahman, Z., Malik, A. W., & Anwar, Z. (2022) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.102911 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
Federated Zero Trust Architecture using Artificial Intelligence
Hussain, M., Pal, S., Jadidi, Z., Foo, E., & Kanhere, S. S. (2024) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.001.2300405 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
On Sustained Zero Trust Conceptualization Security for Mobile Core Networks in 5G and Beyond
Bello, Y., Refaey, A., Ulema, M., & Koilpillai, J. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management · doi:10.1109/tnsm.2022.3157248 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Cyber-Physical Zero Trust Architecture for Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems
Feng, X., & Hu, S. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems · doi:10.1109/ticps.2023.3333850 · Cited by 45 · see citing works
Distribution System Behind-the-Meter DERs: Estimation, Uncertainty Quantification, and Control
Srivastava, A., Zhao, J., Zhu, H., Ding, F., Lei, S., Zografopoulos, I., Haider, R., Vahedi, S., Wang, W., Valverde, G., et al. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2024.3404815 · Cited by 47 · see citing works
A Survey on Forensics and Compliance Auditing for Critical Infrastructure Protection
Henriques, J., Caldeira, F., Cruz, T., & Simões, P. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3348552 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
A Zero Trust Hybrid Security and Safety Risk Analysis Method
Papakonstantinou, N., Van Bossuyt, D. L., Linnosmaa, J., Hale, B., & O’Halloran, B. (2021) · Journal of Computing and Information Science in Engineering · doi:10.1115/1.4050685 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Jabar, T., & Singh, M. M. (2022) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s22134662 · Cited by 40 · see citing works
Performance Analysis of Zero-Trust multi-cloud
Rodigari, S., O’Shea, D., McCarthy, P., McCarry, M., & McSweeney, S. G. (2021) · IEEE ... International Conference on Cloud Computing · doi:10.1109/cloud53861.2021.00097 · Cited by 48 · see citing works
Design of a Security and Trust Framework for 5G Multi-domain Scenarios
Valero, J. M. J., Sánchez, P. M. S., Lekidis, A., et al. (2021) · Journal of Network and Systems Management · doi:10.1007/s10922-021-09623-7 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
Toward Zero Trust Security IN 5G Open Architecture Network Slices
Kholidy, H. A., Karam, A., Sidoran, J., et al. (2022) · IEEE Military Communications Conference · doi:10.1109/milcom55135.2022.10017474 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Chandramouli, R., & Butcher, Z. (2023) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-207a · Cited by 37 · see citing works
ZTA-IoT: A Novel Architecture for Zero-Trust in IoT Systems and an Ensuing Usage Control Model
Ameer, S., Praharaj, L., Sandhu, R. S., et al. (2024) · ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security · doi:10.1145/3671147 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Li, J., Li, Y., Cao, C., et al. (2021) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2021.3116422 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Zero Trust Federation: Sharing Context under User Control towards Zero Trust in Identity Federation
Hatakeyama, K., Kotani, D., & Okabe, Y. (2021) · 2021 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops and other Affiliated Events (PerCom Workshops) · doi:10.1109/percomworkshops51409.2021.9431116 · Cited by 42 · see citing works
Enabling 6G Security: The Synergy of Zero Trust Architecture and Artificial Intelligence
Sedjelmaci, H., Tourki, K., & Ansari, N. (2023) · IEEE Network · doi:10.1109/mnet.2023.3326003 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
Threat modeling framework for mobile communication systems
Rao, S. P., Chen, H., & Aura, T. (2022) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2022.103047 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Guide to Operational Technology (OT) SecurityPreprint
Stouffer, K. A., Pease, M., Tang, C., Zimmerman, T., Pillitteri, V. Y., & Lightman, S. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r3.ipd · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Blockchain Gateways, Bridges and Delegated Hash-LocksPreprint
Hardjono, T. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2102.03933 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
A Systematic Literature Review of Zero Trust Architecture for Military UAV Security Systems
Alquwayzani, A., & Albuali, A. A. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3503587 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Huang, W., Xie, X., Wang, Z., Feng, J., Han, G., & Zhang, W. (2023) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103161 · Cited by 34 · see citing works
Network Slicing Security Controls and Assurance for Verticals
Wichary, T., Batalla, J. M., Mavromoustakis, C. X., et al. (2022) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics11020222 · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Study of Zero Trust Architecture for Applications and Network Security
Qazi, F. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Smart Communities: Improving Quality of Life Using ICT, IoT and AI (HONET) · doi:10.1109/honet56683.2022.10019186 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Bandara, E., Liang, X., Shetty, S. S., Mukkamala, R., Rahman, A., & Ng, W. K. (2022) · IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON) · doi:10.1109/secon55815.2022.9918536 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Adoption of the Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP) Architecture for Infrastructure as a Service
Singh, J., Refaey, A., & Koilpillai, J. (2020) · Canadian Journal of Electrical and Computer Engineering · doi:10.1109/cjece.2020.3005316 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Intelligent Control in 6G Open RAN: Security Risk or Opportunity?
Soltani, S., Amanlou, A., Shojafar, M., & Tafazolli, R. (2025) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2025.3526215 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Guide to enterprise patch management planning :
Souppaya, M., & Scarfone, K. A. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-40r4 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Miedema, E., Waschull, S., & Emmanouilidis, C. (2025) · Computers in Industry · doi:10.1016/j.compind.2025.104409 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
ZTRAN: Prototyping Zero Trust Security xApps for Open Radio Access Network Deployments
Abdalla, A. S., Moore, J., Adhikari, N., et al. (2024) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.001.2300419 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Uche James, U., Idika, C. N., & Anebi Enyejo, L. (2023) · International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology · doi:10.32628/cseit23564522 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Detection, control and mitigation system for secure vehicular communication
Hidalgo, C., Vaca-Recalde, M. E., Nowak, M. P., et al. (2021) · Vehicular Communications · doi:10.1016/j.vehcom.2021.100425 · Cited by 28 · see citing works
A Survey for Intrusion Detection Systems in Open RAN
Amachaghi, E. N., Shojafar, M., Foh, C. H., & Moessner, K. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3408690 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
A Zero-Trust Architecture for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
Anderson, J., Huang, Q., Cheng, L., & Hu, H. (2023) · IEEE Internet Computing · doi:10.1109/mic.2023.3304893 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Ahn, G., Jang, J., Choi, S., et al. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3417182 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
ZTSFC: A Service Function Chaining-Enabled Zero Trust Architecture
Bradatsch, L., Miroshkin, O., & Kargl, F. (2023) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2023.3330706 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Secure Access Service Edge: A Zero Trust Based Framework For Accessing Data Securely
Yiliyaer, S., & Kim, Y. (2022) · IEEE Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC) · doi:10.1109/ccwc54503.2022.9720872 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
NexusLIMS: A Laboratory Information Management System for Shared-Use Electron Microscopy Facilities
Taillon, J. A., Bina, T. F., Plante, R., et al. (2021) · Microscopy and Microanalysis · doi:10.1017/s1431927621000222 · Cited by 25 · see citing works
Attribute-based access control for microservices-based applications using a service mesh
Chandramouli, R., Butcher, Z., & Chetal, A. (2021) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-204b · Cited by 25 · see citing works
A Zero Trust approach for the cybersecurity of Industrial Control Systems
Zanasi, C., Magnanini, F., Russo, S., & Colajanni, M. (2022) · 2022 IEEE 21st International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA) · doi:10.1109/nca57778.2022.10013559 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
A review of scalable and privacy-preserving multi-agent frameworks for distributed energy resources
Huo, X., Huang, H., Davis, K., Poor, H. V., & Liu, M. (2024) · Advances in Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.adapen.2024.100205 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Implementation of DevSecOps for a microservices-based application with service mesh
Chandramouli, R. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-204c · Cited by 24 · see citing works
State-of-the-Art VANET Trust Models: Challenges and Recommendations
Sateesh, H., & Zavarsky, P. (2020) · IEEE Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON) · doi:10.1109/iemcon51383.2020.9284953 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Idika, C. N., James, U. U., Okika, N., et al. (2024) · International Journal of Scientific Research and Modern Technology. · doi:10.38124/ijsrmt.v3i6.635 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Towards a quantum-safe 5G: Quantum Key Distribution in core networks
Atutxa, A., Sanz, A., Sasiain, J., et al. (2024) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2024.06.005 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Zero-Trust Principles for Legacy Components: 12 Rules for Legacy Devices: An Antidote to Chaos
Køien, G. M. (2021) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-021-09055-1 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Strengthening SDN Security: Protocol Dialecting and Downgrade Attacks
Sjoholmsierchio, M., Hale, B., Lukaszewski, D., & Xie, G. G. (2021) · IEEE International Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft) · doi:10.1109/netsoft51509.2021.9492614 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Choe, H., & Kang, D. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3536014 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Zero Trust Cybersecurity: Procedures and Considerations in Context
Lund, B. D., Lee, T.-H., Wang, Z., et al. (2024) · Encyclopedia · doi:10.3390/encyclopedia4040099 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Evolution and Trends of Cloud on Industrial OT Networks
Perducat, C., Mazur, D. C., Mukai, W., et al. (2023) · IEEE Open Journal of Industry Applications · doi:10.1109/ojia.2023.3309669 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Deepfakes and trust in technology
Laas, O. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04363-4 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Toward pre-standardization of reputation-based trust models beyond 5G
Valero, J. M. J., Sánchez, P. M. S., Pérez, M. G., Celdrán, A. H., & Pérez, G. M. (2021) · Computer Standards & Interfaces · doi:10.1016/j.csi.2021.103596 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
ZTEI: Zero-Trust and Edge Intelligence Empowered Continuous Authentication for Satellite Networks
Fu, P., Wu, J., Lin, X., et al. (2022) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10000958 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Challenges with Passwordless FIDO2 in an Enterprise Setting: A Usability Study
Kepkowski, M., Machulak, M. P., Wood, I. G., et al. (2023) · IEEE Secure Development Conference (SecDev) · doi:10.1109/secdev56634.2023.00017 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
U.S. Geological Survey 21st-Century science strategy 2020–2030
Survey, U. S. G. (2021) · U.S. Geological Survey circular/U.S. Geological Survey Circular · doi:10.3133/cir1476 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Lakhal, H., Zegrari, M., & Bahnasse, A. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3623834 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Hybrid QKD & PQC Protocols implemented in the Berlin OpenQKD testbed
Geitz, M., Döring, R., & Braun, R.-P. (2023) · International Conference on Frontiers of Signal Processing (ICFSP) · doi:10.1109/icfsp59764.2023.10372894 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Private and Trustworthy Distributed Lending Model Using Hyperledger Besu
Praitheeshan, P., Pan, L., & Doss, R. (2021) · SN Computer Science · doi:10.1007/s42979-021-00500-3 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Choubey, B., James, U. U., Ijiga, O. M., & Enyejo, L. A. (2023) · International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology · doi:10.32628/cseit23906189 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Scenario-Agnostic Zero-Trust Defense with Explainable Threshold Policy: A Meta-Learning Approach
Ge, Y., Li, T., & Zhu, Q. (2023) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS) · doi:10.1109/infocomwkshps57453.2023.10225816 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Data Security in Autonomous Driving: Multifaceted Challenges of Technology, Law, and Social Ethics
Xu, Y., Wei, J., Mi, T., & Chen, Z. H. (2024) · World Electric Vehicle Journal · doi:10.3390/wevj16010006 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Prakash, P. S., Ramana, K. S., Pecho, R. D. C., Janardhan, M., Arellano, M. T. C., Mahalakshmi, J., Bhavsingh, M., & Samunnisa, K. (2024) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2024.04.007 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
The Role of Information Security Culture in Zero Trust Adoption: Insights From UAE Organizations
Zyoud, B., & Lutfi, S. L. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3402341 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Exploiting blockchain for dependable services in zero-trust vehicular networks
Hao, M., Tan, B., Wang, S., Yu, R., Liu, R. W., & Yu, L. (2023) · Frontiers of Computer Science · doi:10.1007/s11704-023-2495-0 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
Identity authentication for edge devices based on zero‐trust architecture
Liu, H., Ai, M. S., Huang, R. H., Qiu, R., & Li, Y. (2022) · Concurrency and Computation Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/cpe.7198 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
Characterization and Evaluation of IoT Protocols for Data Exfiltration
Uroz, D., & Rodríguez, R. J. (2022) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2022.3163469 · Cited by 18 · see citing works
- Authors
- Rose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S.
- Published
- 2020-08-11
- OpenAlex
- W2976189582
- Cited by
- 1,174
- References
- 22
- Citations by year
- 2026: 404 · 2025: 270 · 2024: 168 · 2023: 152 · 2022: 104 · 2021: 63 · 2020: 13
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Funders
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, information security, access control, network partitioning, federal information systems
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review