Lineage: A UMA2.0 Protocol Extension for Multi-Hop LLM Agent Delegation
Open accessAbstract
Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents in enterprise and compliance-sensitive systems delegate authority to sub-agents to decompose complex tasks. OAuth 2.0 and User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 support delegated authorization between a single requesting party and a resource server, but they lack primitives for the multi-hop authority propagation typical of agent chains. This produces ad hoc permission models and audit gaps incompatible with regulations such as the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). This paper presents Lineage, an authorization architecture that extends UMA 2.0 with a cryptographically verifiable delegation-chain primitive: every protected request carries a signed record of its full delegation ancestry, validated at the resource server without an additional authorization-server round-trip. Scope monotonicity and bounded delegation depth are enforced by construction, and every authorization decision is recorded in a tamper-detecting audit log. These properties directly implement the technical controls that DORA Article 9 mandates: least-privilege access (Art. 9(4)(c)), data integrity and authenticity (Art. 9(2)), and continuous ICT monitoring (Art. 9(1)). Full DORA compliance requires broader institutional governance beyond any software protocol; Lineage addresses the protocol-layer subset. We validated the design end-to-end on a reference implementation running live LLM agents under DORA-representative scenarios. One test involved an active promp…
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Attested delegation ancestry binds outputs to signed delegation paths, strengthening provenance for downstream verification.
“Attested delegation ancestry binds outputs to signed delegation paths, strengthening provenance for downstream verification [16, 25].”
From Authorization for Self-Modifying AI Agent Populations: Conserving Authority across Replacement, Forking, and Rollback (2026) · cites this paper as [25]
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Zhu, G., & Wang, C. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2610.00347
Jôrgensen, B. N., & Ma, Z. G. (2026) · Information · doi:10.3390/info17090923
Jogos de Sinalização para Agentes de IA Comprometidos
Bento, L. M. S., & Boccardo, D. R. (2026) · Simpósio Brasileiro de Cibersegurança (SBSeg) · doi:10.5753/sbseg_estendido.2026.33825
- Authors
- Ştefănescu, Ş., & Aciobăniţei, I.
- Affiliations
- Military Technical Academy (RO)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2026
- Volume
- 14
- Pages
- 104574-104591
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7166687811
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2
- FWCI
- 23.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation (UEFISCDI), Romania (20PTE/2025)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Keywords
- OAuth 2.0, authorization delegation, LLM agents, Digital Operational Resilience Act, least privilege access, audit logging, prompt injection, cryptographic signing, corporate compliance
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