Cited by 3Access Control and TrustAdvanced Authentication Protocols SecurityBlockchain Technology Applications and Security

Lineage: A UMA2.0 Protocol Extension for Multi-Hop LLM Agent Delegation

Open access
Ştefănescu, Ştefania, Aciobăniţei, Iulian·2026·IEEE Access

Abstract

Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents in enterprise and compliance-sensitive systems delegate authority to sub-agents to decompose complex tasks. OAuth 2.0 and User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 support delegated authorization between a single requesting party and a resource server, but they lack primitives for the multi-hop authority propagation typical of agent chains. This produces ad hoc permission models and audit gaps incompatible with regulations such as the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA). This paper presents Lineage, an authorization architecture that extends UMA 2.0 with a cryptographically verifiable delegation-chain primitive: every protected request carries a signed record of its full delegation ancestry, validated at the resource server without an additional authorization-server round-trip. Scope monotonicity and bounded delegation depth are enforced by construction, and every authorization decision is recorded in a tamper-detecting audit log. These properties directly implement the technical controls that DORA Article 9 mandates: least-privilege access (Art. 9(4)(c)), data integrity and authenticity (Art. 9(2)), and continuous ICT monitoring (Art. 9(1)). Full DORA compliance requires broader institutional governance beyond any software protocol; Lineage addresses the protocol-layer subset. We validated the design end-to-end on a reference implementation running live LLM agents under DORA-representative scenarios. One test involved an active promp…

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Authors
Ştefănescu, Ş., & Aciobăniţei, I.
Affiliations
Military Technical Academy (RO)
Venue
IEEE Access
Published
2026
Volume
14
Pages
104574-104591
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7166687811
Cited by
2
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 2
FWCI
23.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Executive Unit for Financing Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation (UEFISCDI), Romania (20PTE/2025)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
Keywords
OAuth 2.0, authorization delegation, LLM agents, Digital Operational Resilience Act, least privilege access, audit logging, prompt injection, cryptographic signing, corporate compliance

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