Dynamic ransomware protection using deterministic random bit generator
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Ransomware has become a very significant cyber threat. The basic idea of ransomware was presented in the form of a cryptovirus in 1995. However, it was considered as merely a conceptual topic since then for over a decade. In 2017, ransomware has become a reality, with several famous cases of ransomware having compromised important computer systems worldwide. For example, the damage caused by CryptoLocker and WannaCry is huge, as well as global. They encrypt victims' files and require user's payment to decrypt them. Because they utilize public key cryptography, the key for recovery cannot be found in the footprint of the ransomware on the victim's system. Therefore, once infected, the system cannot be recovered without paying for restoration. Various methods to deal this threat have been developed by antivirus researchers and experts in network security. However, it is believed that cryptographic defense is infeasible because recovering a victim's files is computationally as difficult as breaking a public key cryptosystem. Quite recently, various approaches to protect the crypto-API of an OS from malicious codes have been proposed. Most ransomware generate encryption keys using the random number generation service provided by the victim's OS. Thus, if a user can control all random numbers generated by the system, then he/she can recover the random numbers used by the ransomware for the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a dynamic ransomware protection method that replaces the random number generator of the OS with a user-defined generator. As the proposed method causes the virus program to generate keys based on the output from the user-defined generator, it is possible to recover an infected file system by reproducing the keys the attacker used to perform the encryption.
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In the citing paper
“Ransomware attacks restrict and block access to the victim's data and files by encrypting them [29].”
From Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey (2019) · cites this paper as [29]
Citations
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Cited by
Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey
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“This involves three main steps: causing a problem such as crashing the network; advertising that the attacker is the only person to fix that problem; solving the problem while getting the desired information and leaving without being detected [18].”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kim, H., Yoo, D., Kang, J.-S., & Yeom, Y.
- Affiliations
- Kookmin University (KR)
- Venue
- 2017 IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-11
- Pages
- 64-68
- OpenAlex
- W2786685397
- Cited by
- 24
- References
- 10
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5
- FWCI
- 1.94
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Keywords
- ransomware, random number generators, encryption key recovery, file encryption, public-key cryptography, WannaCry
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