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False data injection attacks against state estimation in wireless sensor networks

Mo, Yilin, Garone, Emanuele, Casavola, Alessandro, Sinopoli, Bruno · 2010 · 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In this paper we study the effect of false data injection attacks on state estimation carried over a sensor network monitoring a discrete-time linear time-invariant Gaussian system. The steady state Kalman filter is used to perform state estimation while a failure detector is employed to detect anomalies in the system. An attacker wishes to compromise the integrity of the state estimator by hijacking a subset of sensors and sending altered readings. In order to inject fake sensor measurements without being detected the attacker will need to carefully design his actions to fool the estimator as abnormal sensor measurements would result in an alarm. It is important for a designer to determine the set of all the estimation biases that an attacker can inject into the system without being detected, providing a quantitative measure of the resilience of the system to such attacks. To this end, we will provide an ellipsoidal algorithm to compute its inner and outer approximations of such set. A numerical example is presented to further illustrate the effect of false data injection attack on state estimation.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/cdc.2010.5718158

Cites

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. mo, 2010, False data injection attacks in cyber physical systems, First Workshop on Secure Control Systems
  2. byres, 2004, The myths and facts behind cyber security risks for industrial control systems, Proceedings of the VDE Kongress VDE Congress
  3. 2007, Sensor Networks and Configuration

Cited by

See all 440

Metadata

Authors
Mo, Y., Garone, E., Casavola, A., & Sinopoli, B.
Affiliations
  • Carnegie Mellon University (US)
  • University of Calabria (IT)
Venue
49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2010-12
Pages
5967-5972
ISSN
0191-2216 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2107043025
Cited by
440
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 23 · 2023: 25 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 41 · 2020: 55 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 56 · 2017: 52 · 2016: 26 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 12
FWCI
13.04
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) (publishedVersion)
  • Archive of Doctoral Theses and Digital Collections (University of Calabria) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Stability and Control of Uncertain Systems
Keywords
false data injection attacks, state estimation, wireless sensor networks, Kalman filter, fault detection, estimation bias, attack detection, ellipsoidal approximation, discrete-time linear time-invariant systems, network security

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