Robotics cyber security: vulnerabilities, attacks, countermeasures, and recommendations

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Robots have helped counter IED threats, notably in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“robots were used to counter the Improvized Explosive Device (IED) threat, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan [59].”

• cites [59] Wilson, C.: Improvised explosive devices in Iraq: effects and countermeasures. In: CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service (2005)Supported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

French forces deployed UGVs and UAVs in Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other militant groups.

“France used them in Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria [70, 71] against the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) and Al-Qaeda operatives, and other terrorist factions (i.e. Boko Haram, Al-Shabab).”

• cites [70] Abiodun, T.F., Taofeek, C.R.: Unending war on boko haram terror in northeast Nigeria and the need for deployment of military robots or autonomous weapons systems to complement military operations. Journal DOI 6(6) (2020) sourceCould not verify

  The ISR section (p. 10) discusses UAVs and UGVs generally, while the Abstract (p. 1) recommends deploying military robots in northeast Nigeria. Searches for France, Mali, Somalia, and the named militant groups found no passage reporting that French forces deployed those vehicles in the stated countries against those groups. (LLM, conf=0.76)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [71] Westerheijden, V.R.: Remote warfare comes home: an inquiry in the Dutch government’s development of discourse on airstrikes and drones between 1998–2020. Master’s thesis, Utrecht University (2020)Not checked yet

  Not checked in the free run.

May combine two claims.

Naval warfare now uses robotics in autonomous vessels, submarines, torpedoes, mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, and counterterrorism.

“robotics became included in the naval warfare domain as part of autonomous boats, ships, submarines, torpedoes and as part of Naval Mine Counter-Measures (NMCM), passive Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) [97–99], anti-piracy operations (i.e. Somalian coasts, Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Gulf of Guinea, Gulf of Aden [100, 101], and Guardafui Channel) and countering-terrorism, relying on the Combined Task”

• cites [97] O’Donohue, Commander Mark: Autonomous underwater vehicles. Niobe Papers 9(11) (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [98] Keane, J., Joiner, K.: Experimental test and evaluation of autonomous underwater vehicles. Aust. J. Multi-Discip. Eng. 16(1), 67–79 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [99] Nasu, H., Letts, D.: The legal characterization of lethal autonomous maritime systems: warship, torpedo, or naval mine? Int. Law Stud. 96(1), 4 (2020)Partly supported

  The Introduction (page unavailable) describes unmanned maritime systems, torpedoes, and developing autonomous underwater vehicles; the Torpedo section discusses a mine that targets submarines. The cited paper does not establish the claimed uses in naval mine countermeasures, passive anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, or counterterrorism, and it distinguishes most existing remotely controlled vehicles from fully autonomous ones. (LLM, conf=0.87)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [100] Mvelle, G.: Fighting piracy in the gulf of guinea: small states’ pursuit of strategic autonomy. Revue internationale et strategique 2, 35–46 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The section on Western support for Gulf of Guinea states describes maritime exercises and anti-piracy operations in that region, which supports that example in the citing sentence. It does not say robotics or autonomous vessels are used in those operations, and the passages found on submarines and mines discuss capability limits rather than robotic warfare. No page number is available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [101] Broohm, D.A., Wang, G., Gao, J.: Maritime security: a new strategy for merchant shipping to avoid piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Open J. Soc. Sci. 8(5), 392–410 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  Section 3.2 describes armed maritime patrols and vessel-protection operations in the Gulf of Guinea and off Somalia, supporting the anti-piracy setting for which this source is cited. It does not say that those operations use robotics or autonomous vessels; the broader claim about robotics in naval warfare is therefore unsupported by this source. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [102] Grasso, R., Braca, P., Osler, J., Hansen, J.: Asset network planning: integration of environmental data and sensor performance for counter piracy. In: 21st European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO 2013), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2013)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [103] Karahalios, H.: Appraisal of a ship’s cybersecurity efficiency: the case of piracy. J. Transp. Secur. 13, 1–23 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [104] AU African Union, COIN Counterinsurgency, and CT Counterterrorism. Ctf counter terrorist financing ctf 150 combined task force 150 cwc chemical weapons convention dfg deutsche forschungsgemeinschaft/German research foundationNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Since the 1970s, the British military deployed robots in Northern Ireland against IRA IEDs.

“they were being used by the British army in Northern Ireland since 1970s [60], to combat the IEDs threat imposed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its different factions and descendants [61–63].”

• cites [60] Lesley-Dixon, K.: Northern Ireland: the troubles: from the provos to the det, 1968–1998. Pen and Sword (2018)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [61] Miller, D.: Rethinking Northern Ireland: Culture. Ideology and Colonialism. Routledge, London (2014) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [62] Krishnan, A.: Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons. Routledge, London (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [63] Barboza, A.R.: The Irish Republican Army: an examination of imperialism, terror, and just war theory. Master’s thesis, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The paper’s Chapter 1 and Additional information sections describe IRA bombings in Northern Ireland, including attacks against British soldiers in the 1970s. That supports the bombing threat for which this source is cited, but the cited passages do not establish that the threat came from the IRA’s different factions and descendants. The robot-deployment clause has a separate citation [60] and is not attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.82)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Israel developed countermeasures against UAVs and UGVs and fielded improved models to counter Iranian influence in Syria, southern Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza.

“Israel extensively relied on developing Anti-UAV/UGV countermeasures (i.e. Iron Dome patriot missiles, AI-based sensors, facial-recognition and heat-measuring cameras, jammers, laser-guided weapons, etc.), and introduced its own advanced version of UAV and UGV variants to combat the threatening Iranian presence in Syria (Unit 840, trans-border operations near Golan Heights), Southern Lebanon (Hezb”

• cites [87] Borg, S.: Assembling Israeli drone warfare: loitering surveillance and operational sustainability. Security Dialogue, p. 0967010620956796 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [88] Benjamin, G.: Drone culture: perspectives on autonomy and anonymity. AI & SOCIETY, pp. 1–11 (2020) sourceCould not verify

  The available indexed passages are bibliographic metadata, including an entry labeled Abstract (no page number); they do not discuss Israeli countermeasures or UAV and UGV deployments. Searches for Israel, Iran, the named regions, and the listed technologies found no passage addressing the claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [89] Popister, F., Steopan, M., Pusca, A.: Surveillance robot for military use. Acta Tech. Napocensis-Ser. Appl. Math. Mech. Eng. 63(3) (2020)Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [91] Marcus, R.D.: Learning ‘under fire’: Israel’s improvised military adaptation to Hamas tunnel warfare. J. Strateg. Stud. 42(3–4), 344–370 (2019) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [92] Michael, K., Dostri, O.: The Hamas military buildup. The crisis of the Gaza strip: a way out (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2017), pp. 49–60 (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [93] White, J.: The combat performance of Hamas in the Gaza war of 2014. CTC Sentin 7(9), 9–13 (2014)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Israeli police reportedly deployed drones, some with tear gas, against Gaza protests and threats from armed infiltrators and incendiary kites or balloons.

“the Israeli police is known to have used drones (i.e. spiderman urban assault drone), with others equipped with tear gas to counter the Gaza protests and to reduce the threat imposed by possibly armed infiltrators [54, 55] and burning/armed explosive incendiary kites and balloons [56].”

• cites [54] Ringrose, K., Ramjee, D.: Watch where you walk: law enforcement surveillance and protester privacy. Calif. L. Rev. Online 11, 349 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [55] Schulte, P.: Future war: Ai, drones, terrorism and counterterror. In: Handbook of Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Post 9/11. Edward Elgar Publishing (2019) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [56] Zych, J.: The use of weaponized kites and balloons in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Secur. Def. Q. 27(5), 71–83 (2019) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

After the Beirut port blast, robots and UAVs assisted with damage assessment and locating missing people.

“both robots and UAVs were used after the devastating Beirut port explosion that occurred at around 6:07 pm on August 4th, 2020, to help with assessing the damage and impact radius, as well as in the search for missing personnel [49–52].”

• cites [49] Mansour, H., Bitar, E., Fares, Y., Makdessi, A., Maalouf, A., El Ghoul, M., Mansour, M., Chami, A., Khalil, M., Jalkh, A., et al.: Beirut port ammonium nitrate explosion. SSRN (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [50] Cheaito, M.A., Al-Hajj, S.: A brief report on the beirut port explosion. Mediterr. J. Emerg. Med, Acute Care (2020) sourceCould not verify

  The main text of “A Brief Report on the Beirut Port Explosion” describes when the blast occurred and how far its damage extended, but does not discuss how that damage was assessed. Searches for robots, UAVs or drones, and searches for missing-person efforts found no passage about their use after the blast. (LLM, conf=0.76)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [51] Oxford Analytica. Beirut blast could bring hunger, disease and fury. Emerald Expert Briefings (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [52] Stennett, C., Gaulter, S., Akhavan, J.: An estimate of the TNT-equivalent net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the Beirut port explosion using publicly-available tools and data. Propellants Explos, Pyrotech. 45(11), 1675–1679 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

US-led NATO forces employed UGVs and UAVs in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

“Such robot techniques (Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)) evolved and were also used by US-led NATO forces (including the UK) in Iraq and Syria [64, 65], in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan [66–69].”

• cites [64] Karnozov, V., et al.: Russia and Turkey put their latest equipment to the test in Syria. Def. Rev. Asia 14(2), 20 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [65] Zoltán, Ő.: Special features of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. Hadmérnök 15(1), 207–220 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The “Bulk deployment of drones” section (p. 8) describes NATO’s use of drones as long-range detectors, supporting the general point about NATO and UAVs. It does not describe UGV use or place US-led NATO forces using either technology in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. (LLM, conf=0.78)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [66] Okpaleke, F., Burton, J.: 9 US grand strategy and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles during the George W. Bush administration. In: Emerging Technologies and International Security: Machines, the State, and War, p. 153 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [67] Scipanov, L.V., Dolceanu, D.: The opportunity for using remotely operated underwater vehicles in support of naval actions. Bull. Carol I Natl. Def. Univ. 9(3), 62–68 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [68] Siwek, M., Wacławik, K.: Legal aspects of production and operation of autonomous combat robots. Problemy Mechatroniki: uzbrojenie, lotnictwo, inżynieria bezpieczeństwa, 11 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [69] Thornton, R., Miron, M.: Towards the ‘third revolution in military affairs’ the Russian military’s use of AI-enabled cyber warfare. RUSI J. 165, 1–10 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Medical settings use robots for tele-medicine, virtual care, and remote treatment.

“Robots have been deployed in the medical domain to be used in tele-medicine, virtual care, and remote treatment concepts [29, 39].”

• cites [29] Bokolo Anthony Jnr: Use of telemedicine and virtual care for remote treatment in response to covid-19 pandemic. J. Med. Syst. 44(7), 1–9 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction reports that physicians provide care remotely through telemedicine and virtual services, and the Findings describe a mobile telemedicine device used for remote patient monitoring. Neither passage says robots were deployed for those purposes, so the robotics part of the claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [39] Kadir, M.A.: Role of telemedicine in healthcare during covid-19 pandemic in developing countries. Telehealth Med, Today (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The Conclusions (p. 3) describe virtual healthcare services, and the discussion on p. 2 describes remote consultations and treatment through telemedicine. Neither passage says robots are used or have been deployed for those purposes, which is the citing sentence’s central assertion. (LLM, conf=0.78)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Several other nations, including Turkey, Hong Kong, China, South Korea, Japan, India, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand, used similar robotic methods for monitoring, supplies, disinfection, and deliveries.

“Other countries were also reported to adapt a similar technique including Turkey, Hong Kong, China (Wuhan), South Korea, Japan, India (using Mitra medical robot), Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand to monitor cases and maintain medical supply tests, labs and deliveries, aerial spray and disinfection, as well as consumers delivery [116, 119].”

• cites [116] Moon, M.J.: Fighting COVID-19 with agility, transparency, and participation: Wicked policy problems and new governance challenges. Public Adm. Rev. 80(4), 651–656 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [119] Ye, J.: The role of health technology and informatics in a global public health emergency: practices and implications from the covid-19 pandemic. JMIR Med. Inform. 8(7), e19866 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The Artificial intelligence (AI) section (page unavailable) says intelligent robots can provide disinfection, food-delivery, and medicine-delivery services. It does not identify the listed countries as using those robots or describe robotic case monitoring, testing, or aerial spraying. The Internet of Things (IoT) section discusses remote patient monitoring, but not as a robotic method. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Multiple threats to Industrial IoT systems must be addressed before further examining robotic security.

“Despite the already listed issues, there are various threats [139] targeting Industrial IoT systems [23] that need to be addressed before diving further into the security aspect of the robotic domain.”

• cites [139] Yousef, K.M.A., AlMajali, A., Ghalyon, S.A., Dweik, W., Mohd, B.J.: Analyzing cyber-physical threats on robotic platforms. Sensors 18(5), 1643 (2018) sourceCould not verify

  The Introduction and Conclusions discuss multiple threats to robotic platforms, particularly communications between Adept mobile robots and their clients. The passages do not address threats targeting Industrial IoT systems; searches for “Industrial IoT” and “Industrial Internet of Things” found no supporting passage. The statement about addressing threats before turning to robotic security is the citing authors’ framing, not a finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.72)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [23] Rubio, J.E., Alcaraz, C., Roman, R., Lopez, J.: Current cyber-defense trends in industrial control systems. Comput. Secur. 87, 101561 (2019) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Difficulties in tracking and tracing can impair real-time location of robotic transits and deliveries, causing supply chain poisoning and reduced performance, particularly with 5G adoption.

“Track and trace problems can affect the real-time ability to locate robotic transits and deliveries. This may lead to supply chain poisoning and reduction of supply chain performance, especially, with the adoption of 5G technology [148].”

• cites [148] Sobb, T., Turnbull, B., Moustafa, N.: Supply chain 4.0: a survey of cyber security challenges, solutions and future directions. Electronics 9(11), 1864 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  Section 5.1 (page unavailable) describes 5G-enabled track and trace as locating goods in transit in real time and helping prevent supply-chain poisoning and performance-reducing attacks. Section 5.1.2 says threats to these systems can degrade real-time military capabilities. The paper does not specifically tie those tracking problems to robotic transits or deliveries; it discusses robotic systems separately in Section 5.4.1. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

COVID-19 robot use points toward future telemedicine and telehealth supported by robotics.

“Thus, this paves the way to futuristic robotics-assisted telemedicine and telehealth applications, based on the lessons learnt and to-be-learnt, during the Ebola outbreak and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, such as the smart field hospital trial in Wuhan, China, and the use of smart medical “Xiao Bao” robot [126], as well as the use of “companion robots” to combat loneliness [127].”

• cites [126] Bhaskar, S., Bradley, S., Sakhamuri, S., Moguilner, S., Chattu, V.K., Pandya, S., Schroeder, S., Ray, D., Banach, M.: Designing futuristic telemedicine using artificial intelligence and robotics in the covid-19 era. Front. Public Health 8, 708 (2020) sourceSupported
• cites [127] Odekerken-Schröder, G., Mele, C., Russo-Spena, T., Mahr, D., Ruggiero, A.: Mitigating loneliness with companion robots in the covid-19 pandemic and beyond: an integrative framework and research agenda. J. Serv. Manag. (2020) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Replay attacks store and replay old messages between robot and operator to disrupt traffic, manipulating location and routing tables to masquerade identity, affecting availability of data and systems.

“Replay attacks occur when a given adversary stores and replays at a later time the old messages sent between the robot and its operator to disrupt the ongoing traffic. The replay attack’s mechanism is based on broadcasting the previous transmitted message to manipulate the location and the nodes’ routing tables [11] to masquerade the identity of the attacker. Therefore, this affects the”

• cites [11] Vuong, T., Filippoupolitis, A., Loukas, G., Gan, D.: Physical indicators of cyber attacks against a rescue robot. In: 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), pp. 338–343. IEEE (2014) sourceCould not verify

  The Related Work discussion (p. 2) mentions replay attacks but does not describe storing and replaying robot–operator messages, disrupting traffic, altering location or routing tables, or masquerading as another identity. The paper’s experiment instead examines a denial-of-service attack that floods the robot’s network interface with TCP traffic (DoS Attack Characteristics, p. 3). Searches for the claimed replay mechanism and routing-table manipulation found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Disruption of semi- or fully automated supply chains can cause severe financial losses, long repair times, and threaten the availability of robotic services and activities.

“Supply-chain disruption the disruption of semi- or fully automated supply chain systems may lead to drastic financial losses, significant time-to-repair, in addition to risking the availability of robotic services and activities [146].”

• cites [146] Salamai, A., Hussain, O.K., Saberi, M., Chang, E., Hussain, F.K.: Highlighting the importance of considering the impacts of both external and internal risk factors on operational parameters to improve supply chain risk management. IEEE Access 7, 49297–49315 (2019) sourcePartly supported

  The table in “Risk Management Approaches for Other Processes” (p. 10) links supply-chain disruptions to financial losses, and the delivery-process discussion (p. 8) describes risks to cost and timely delivery. The paper does not address semi- or fully automated supply chains, significant repair times, or the availability of robotic services and activities. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Cloud decentralization for network connectivity reduces denial of service attacks but reduces resource elasticity and invites targeted attacks, while also risking supply chain management and agility.

“Network connectivity which is also linked to the cloud decentralization strategy helps reducing denial of service attacks. However, it comes at a cost of reduced resource elasticity and targeted attack behaviours [149]. Moreover, it also risks affecting the supply chain management and disrupts the agility of supply chains [148].”

• cites [149] Sha, K., Yang, T.A., Wei, W., Davari, S.: A survey of edge computing-based designs for IoT security. Digit. Commun. Netw. 6(2), 195–202 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [148] Sobb, T., Turnbull, B., Moustafa, N.: Supply chain 4.0: a survey of cyber security challenges, solutions and future directions. Electronics 9(11), 1864 (2020) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The COVID-19 pandemic saw rapid growth in robots, drones, and autonomous vehicles, alongside AI and ML, to speed detection and reduce infection spread.

“During the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus [25], which started its outbreak in late 2019, the extensive use of robots, drones, UAVs, autonomous and unmanned vehicles grew fast, along the adoption of AI and ML techniques to ensure a faster detection of infected personnel and to limit the outbreak and infection rates [115].”

• cites [115] Naudé, W.: Artificial intelligence vs covid-19: limitations, constraints and pitfalls. Ai & Society, p. 1 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The Social control section describes AI-assisted thermal screening for potentially infected people and tools for enforcing social distancing, and anticipates greater short-term use of robots. It does not report rapid growth in the use of robots, drones, or autonomous vehicles, or establish that their use reduced infection rates; the Concluding remarks instead say AI use had so far been limited. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

ASA requires extensive focus on security and safety of human elements, adoption of security awareness programs, training, modules, and online lessons to grow an effective and affordable security awareness culture targeting all personnel in the robotic field.

“This requires an extensive focus on the security and safety of human elements business on the adoption of various security awareness programs, training, modules and (online) lessons to help growing an effective and affordable security awareness culture targeting all the personnel working in the robotic field and domain [236].”

• cites [236] De Cubber, G., Doroftei, D., Rudin, K., Berns, K., Matos, A., Serrano, D., Sanchez, J., Govindaraj, S., Bedkowski, J., Roda, R., et al.: Introduction to the use of robotic tools for search and rescue (2017) sourcePartly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 1 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Vuong et al.'s study found that an adversary can affect rescue robots' operation and impair an emergency response action.

“Their study found how an adversely can affect rescue robots’ operation and impair an emergency response action.”

• cites [11] Vuong, T., Filippoupolitis, A., Loukas, G., Gan, D.: Physical indicators of cyber attacks against a rescue robot. In: 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications Workshops (PERCOM Workshops), pp. 338–343. IEEE (2014) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Medical robots have been reported to negatively impact patients' lives due to inaccuracy mistakes and errors, or due to cyber-attacks such as data exposure/leakage, e.g., North Korea Unit 180 attack on UK NHS in 2017.

“On health care despite the known advantages of using robots in surgeries, medical robots were reported to have a negative impact on patients’ lives due to inaccuracy mistakes and errors [210], or due to cyber-attacks (i.e. data exposure/leakage) such as the case of North Korea-Unit 180 (Lazarus) attack on UK’s National Health Service (NHS) in 2017 [211, 212].”

• cites [210] Alemzadeh, H., Raman, J., Leveson, N., Kalbarczyk, Z., Iyer, R.K.: Adverse events in robotic surgery: a retrospective study of 14 years of FDA data. PloS one 11(4), e0151470 (2016) sourceSupported
• cites [211] Bloomfield, R.E.G.: Bullets to bytes: defending the United Kingdom in cyberspace (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [212] Rotjan, R.D., Blum, J., Lewis, S.M.: Shell choice in pagurus longicarpus hermit crabs: does predation threat influence shell selection behavior? Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 56(2), 171–176 (2004) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Robots can be re-modified to carry lethal weapons or reprogrammed to perform excessive force, leading to human and material losses.

“Robots can be re-modified to carry lethal weapons or can be re-programmed to perform an excessive use force which can lead to both human and material losses [200].”

• cites [200] Block, J.: A laws of war review of contemporary land-based missile defence system ‘iron dome’. Sci. Mil. S. Afr. J. Mil. Stud. 45(2), 105–128 (2017) sourcePartly supported

  The section on the international-law framework (page not provided) discusses lethal autonomous weapons and the possibility of civilian collateral damage from missile-defence systems operating in automated mode. It does not say that robots can be modified to carry lethal weapons or reprogrammed to use excessive force, which are the mechanisms asserted in the citing sentence. (LLM, conf=0.78)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

CTI sources include HUMINT, OSINT, TECHINT, and dark web intelligence.

“In fact, CTI sources include information gathered from HUMman INTelligence (HUMINT), Open Source INTelligence (OSINT), TECHnical INTelligence (TECHINT) and intelligence gathered from the dark web (silk road) [232, 233].”

• cites [232] Afzaliseresht, N., Miao, Y., Michalska, S., Liu, Q., Wang, H.: From logs to stories: human-centred data mining for cyber threat intelligence. IEEE Access 8, 19089–19099 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  The 'a: KNOWLEDGE BASE' and 'B. EXTRACTION LAYER' sections describe external public repositories and technical security logs as information sources, broadly supporting the OSINT and TECHINT portions. Our copy does not identify HUMINT or dark-web intelligence as sources; searches for those terms and Silk Road found no supporting passage. The passages have no page numbers in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [233] Koloveas, P., Chantzios, T., Tryfonopoulos, C., Skiadopoulos, S.: A crawler architecture for harvesting the clear, social, and dark web for IoT-related cyber-threat intelligence. In: 2019 IEEE World Congress on Services (SERVICES), vol. 2642, pp. 3–8. IEEE (2019) sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (p. 1) identifies the clear, social, and dark web as CTI sources, supporting the dark-web portion of the claim. It does not identify HUMINT, OSINT, or TECHINT as CTI-source categories or name Silk Road. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

He et al.'s scheme is more secure and efficient compared to other well-known authentication schemes.

“Both security and performance analysis state that it is more secure and efficient compared to other well-known authentication schemes.”

• cites [272] He, D., Gao, Y., Chan, S., Chen, C., Jiajun, B.: An enhanced two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Sens. Wirel. Netw. 10(4), 361–371 (2010)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [273] Yeh, H.-L., Chen, T.-H., Liu, P.-C., Kim, T.-H., Wei, H.-W.: A secured authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks using elliptic curves cryptography. Sensors 11(5), 4767–4779 (2011) sourceCould not verify

  The Security and Performance Analysis compares the authors’ own ECC protocol with schemes by Wong, Watro, Das, and Chen; it does not assess a scheme by He et al. The Performance Analysis also says the authors’ protocol has higher computation cost than most comparators. Searches for He et al.’s scheme and its security and efficiency found no supporting passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.76)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Li et al.'s scheme significantly reduces implementation cost against various attacks including insider attacks by using lightweight one-way hashing computation.

“By using lightweight one-way hashing computation, this authentication scheme significantly reduces the implementation cost against various attacks including insider attacks.”

• cites [278] Li, C.-T., Weng, C.-Y., Lee, C.-C.: An advanced temporal credential-based security scheme with mutual authentication and key agreement for wireless sensor networks. Sensors 13(8), 9589–9603 (2013) sourceSupported
  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Das et al.'s proposed solution lacks both mutual authentication and user anonymity.

“However, the proposed solution lacks both mutual authentication and user anonymity [275].”

• cites [275] Kim, J., Lee, D., Jeon, W., Lee, Y., Won, D.: Security analysis and improvements of two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement in wireless sensor networks. Sensors 14(4), 6443–6462 (2014) sourcePartly supported

  The Introduction (page unavailable) reports that Chen and Shih found Das’s scheme did not provide mutual authentication. Our copy does not say that Das’s scheme lacks user anonymity; a search for “anonymity” found no passage supporting that part of the claim. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Behavioural biometric techniques are mainly based on voice recognition, hand geometry recognition, and signature recognition.

“Behavioural biometric techniques are mainly based on voice recognition [260, 264], hand geometry recognition [265, 266] and signature recognition [260, 263].”

• cites [260] Douglas, M., Bailey, K., Leeney, M., Curran, K.: An overview of steganography techniques applied to the protection of biometric data. Multimed. Tools Appl. 77(13), 17333–17373 (2018) sourcePartly supported

  Sections 2 and 2.1 (pp. 3–4) classify voice and signature as behavioural biometrics. They classify hand geometry as physiological, not behavioural, so that part of the attributed claim is contradicted by the source. (LLM, conf=0.90)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
• cites [264] George, J.P.: Development of efficient biometric recognition algorithms based on fingerprint and face. Ph.D. thesis, Christ University (2012)Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [265] Al-Ani, M.S., Rajab, M.A.: Biometrics hand geometry using discrete cosine transform (DCT). Sci. Technol. 3(4), 112–117 (2013)Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [266] Jain, A.K., Kumar, A.: Biometric recognition: an overview. In: Second Generation Biometrics: The Ethical, Legal and Social Context, pp. 49–79. Springer (2012) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [263] Jain, A.K., Ross, A., Prabhakar, S.: An introduction to biometric recognition. IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol. 14(1), 4–20 (2004) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Beaudoin et al. presented an original software/hardware solution to obtain a universal low-level architecture for agile and easily replicable close-range remote sensing robots in different environments and platforms.

“Beaudoin et al. presented an original software/hardware solution to obtain a universal low-level architecture for agile and easily replicable close-range remote sensing robots in different environments and on different platforms (land, surface, submarine and air) [256].”

• cites [256] Beaudoin, L., Avanthey, L., Villard, C.: Porting ardupilot to esp32: towards a universal open-source architecture for agile and easily replicable multi-domains mapping robots. Int. Arch. Photogramm. Remote Sens. Spat. Inf. Sci. 43, 933–939 (2020) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Kumar et al.'s scheme can resist popular attacks and achieves better efficiency at low computation cost.

“Despite this scheme having its own pros and cons, it can resist against popular attacks, and achieves better efficiency at low computation cost.”

• cites [285] Kumar, P., Choudhury, A.J., Sain, M., Lee, S.-G., Lee, H.-J.: Ruasn: a robust user authentication framework for wireless sensor networks. Sensors 11(5), 5020–5046 (2011) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Biometric techniques can be divided into physical and behavioural biometric techniques.

“These biometric techniques can be divided into physical and behavioural biometric techniques [260].”

• cites [260] Douglas, M., Bailey, K., Leeney, M., Curran, K.: An overview of steganography techniques applied to the protection of biometric data. Multimed. Tools Appl. 77(13), 17333–17373 (2018) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Beaudoin et al. discussed Ardupilot as an autopilot and presented ESP32 as an effective new hardware solution in terms of price and energy consumption.

“Beaudoin et al. also discussed the wise choice of Ardupilot as an autopilot and presented the ESP32 as an effective new hardware solution in terms of price and energy consumption.”

• cites [256] Beaudoin, L., Avanthey, L., Villard, C.: Porting ardupilot to esp32: towards a universal open-source architecture for agile and easily replicable multi-domains mapping robots. Int. Arch. Photogramm. Remote Sens. Spat. Inf. Sci. 43, 933–939 (2020) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

Strobel et al. compared consensus protocols used in swarm robotics and showed how they fail in the presence of Byzantine robots.

“Strobel et al. compared consensus protocols used in swarm robotics and showed how they fail in the presence of Byzantine (malicious) robots [301].”

• cites [301] Strobel, V., Ferrer, E.C., Dorigo, M.: Blockchain technology secures robot swarms: a comparison of consensus protocols and their resilience to byzantine robots. Front. Robot. AI 7, 54 (2020) sourcePartly supported

  Section 6.2 compares consensus approaches and shows that the classical approaches can fail in the presence of Byzantine robots. The claim overgeneralizes that result: the same section reports that the blockchain approach continues to work, while W-MSR can handle a few Byzantine robots. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

May combine two claims.

Almalawi et al. presented GATUD as an add-on anomaly threshold technique that identifies abnormal deviation and improves performance of SCADA unsupervised anomaly detection approaches.

“Lastly, Almalawi et al. presented the Global Anomaly Threshold to Unsupervised Detection (GATUD) as an add-on anomaly threshold technique that identifies any abnormal deviation, and improves the performance of the Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) unsupervised anomaly detection approaches [315].”

• cites [315] Almalawi, A., Fahad, A., Tari, Z., Khan, A.I., Alzahrani, N., Bakhsh, S.T., Alassafi, M.O., Alshdadi, A., Qaiyum, S.: Add-on anomaly threshold technique for improving unsupervised intrusion detection on scada data. Electronics 9(6), 1017 (2020) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Stream ciphers can be constructed by block ciphers using CTR and OFB operation mode.

“On the other hand, stream ciphers can be constructed by block ciphers using the Counter (CTR) and Output FeedBack (OFB) operation mode [294].”

• cites [294] Dworkin, M.: Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation. Methods and techniques. Technical report, National Inst of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, Computer Security Div (2001) sourceSupported

May combine two claims.

ARGoS-blockchain interface was presented to provide secure robot swarm coordination via blockchain-based smart contracts as meta-controllers, also overcoming Sybil attacks.

“As a result, ARGoS–blockchain interface was presented to provide a secure robot swarm coordination via blockchain-based smart contracts as “meta-controllers”, that also overcome Sybil attacks.”

• cites [301] Strobel, V., Ferrer, E.C., Dorigo, M.: Blockchain technology secures robot swarms: a comparison of consensus protocols and their resilience to byzantine robots. Front. Robot. AI 7, 54 (2020) sourceSupported

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Physical Layer Security (PLS) is an emerging paradigm employed to enhance wireless network security without relying on higher-layer encryption techniques.

“Physical Layer Security (PLS) is an emerging paradigm employed to enhance wireless network security without relying on hnoura2021secureigher-layer encryption techniques.”

• cites [19] Hellaoui, H., Koudil, M., Bouabdallah, A.: Energy-efficient mechanisms in security of the internet of things: a survey. Comput. Netw. 127, 173–189 (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [346] Noura, H.N., Melki, R., Chehab, A.: Efficient data confidentiality scheme for 5g wireless NOMA communications. J. Inf. Secur. Appl. 58 (2021) sourceSupported
• cites [347] Noura, H.N., Melki, R., Kanj, R., Chehab, A.: Secure MIMO d2d communication based on a lightweight and robust PLS cipher scheme. Wirel. Netw. 27(1), 557–574 (2021) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

No research was based on the adoption of self-healing robotic system to overcome any possible power/system failure with systems serving as back up.

“No research was based on the adoption of self-healing robotic system to overcome any possible power/system failure with systems serving as back up.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The most widely used authentication mechanism in robotic systems is the one-factor authentication scheme.

“the most widely used authentication mechanism in robotic systems is the one-factor authentication scheme”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Pre-shared password suffers from different security issues.

“the pre-shared password suffers from different security issues”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

ROS forensics are not being given a great importance in order to trace back and reconstruct any possible attack event(s).

“ROS forensics are not being given a great importance in order to trace back and reconstruct any possible attack event(s)”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Existing literature does not provide a comprehensive view of robotic security problems and what causes them.

“Unfortunately, the related work lacks a global understanding of the robotics security issues and their causes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Over 40 million robots were reportedly sold during 2016-2019.

“more than 40 million robots were reportedly sold between 2016 and 2019 [4].”

• cites [4] Shyvakov, O.: Developing a security framework for robots. Master’s thesis, University of Twente (2017)Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Disaster robots can operate in locations inaccessible to humans.

“Disaster robots can perform jobs and reach places that humans cannot [45].”

• cites [45] Stager, P.: Visual search capability in search and rescue(sar) (1974)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

US law enforcement has used weaponized drones carrying tasers, tear gas, and rubber bullets.

“The American police and law enforcement are also using “weaponized drones” armed with tasers, tear gas, and rubber bullets [57].”

• cites [57] Engberts, B., Gillissen, E.: Policing from above: drone use by the police. In: The Future of Drone Use, pp. 93–113. Springer (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Russian forces reportedly deployed drones and UGVs in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine.

“Russia also reportedly used drones and UGVs in its conflict in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine [64, 78, 79].”

• cites [64] Karnozov, V., et al.: Russia and Turkey put their latest equipment to the test in Syria. Def. Rev. Asia 14(2), 20 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [78] Jenzen-Jones, N.R.: Understanding the threat posed by cots small UAVs armed with CBR payloads. In: 21st Century Prometheus, pp. 179–204. Springer (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [79] Kaya, E.K.: Walking a fragile path: assessing the idlib de-militarization deal (2018)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Some newer medical robots can perform CPR.

“new medical robots are capable of performing Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) [41].”

• cites [41] Rosen, J., Hannaford, B.: Doc at a distance. IEEE Spectr. 43(10), 34–39 (2006) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Disaster robots can locate trapped or isolated individuals, such as flood victims or people who are lost.

“Disaster robots can be used to reach and find helpless people who were isolated by floods, or stuck and lost somewhere [43, 44].”

• cites [43] Murphy, R.R., Tadokoro, S., Nardi, D., Jacoff, A., Fiorini, P., Choset, H., Erkmen, A.M.: Search and rescue robotics. In: Siciliano, B., Khatib, O. (eds.) Springer Handbook of Robotics, pp. 1151–1173. Springer, Berlin (2008) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [44] Murphy, R.R., Tadokoro, S., Kleiner, A.: Disaster robotics. In: Siciliano, B., Khatib, O. (eds.) Springer Handbook of Robotics, pp. 1577–1604. Springer, Berlin (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Armed forces have increasingly adopted robots, particularly UAVs for surveillance and air strikes.

“Military robots became the latest adopted weapons to be used in most of military operations, especially with the extensive use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to perform target detection and to launch airstrikes [58].”

• cites [58] Shachtman, N.: Military stats reveal epicenter of us drone war. Wired. com 9 (2012)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Medical robots include surgical and hospital robots.

“they were designed to serve as medical robots, surgical robots, and hospital robots [40].”

• cites [40] Beasley, R.A.: Medical robots: current systems and research directions. J. Robot. (2012) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Iran built its own UGVs and UAVs and used various UAV models in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza through operators, advisers, and proxies.

“Iran developed its own UGVs and UAVs, with many UAV variants being used in Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Gaza (Shahed, Ababil, Ayoub, Samad, Mohajer, Karrar, Mirsad, Qasef, etc.) via its operators [80], advisers [81–83] and proxies (i.e. Houthis, Hamas, Hezbolah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) [84–86].”

• cites [80] Sadat, S.A.: Iran ties to the Palestinian Islamic resistance movement with emphasis on the Islamic Jihad Movement (PIJ), pp. 77–105 (2016)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [81] Bendett, S.: Battle robots rivalry and the future of war (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [82] Brookes, P.: The growing Iranian unmanned combat aerial vehicle threat needs us action. Herit. Found. Backgr. 3437 (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [83] Sims, A.: The rising drone threat from terrorists. Georget. J. Int. Aff. 19, 97–107 (2018) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [84] Rossiter, A.: Bots on the ground: an impending UGV revolution in military affairs? Small Wars Insurgencies 31(4), 851–873 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [85] Chávez, K., Swed, O.: Off the shelf: the violent nonstate actor drone threat. Air Space Power J. 29, 29 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [86] Vogiatzis, D.: The way to the promised land or the door to Armageddon: how severe are the threats against the physical security of israeli offshore gas platforms? Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Ph.D. thesis (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Turkey deployed combat drones and UGVs in Libya and Syria against Syrian forces, Kurdish groups, and Hezbollah.

“Turkey also used mainly combat drones (i.e. Bayraktar TB2), and UGV robots (TMR 2 (Kutlu), Zafer (Victory) and KAPLAN) in its campaign in Libya (along the United Arab Emirates who used Chinese-made UCAVs: Wing Loong II [72]) against Haftar forces, and in Syria against Syrian troops, Kurdish factions and Hezbollah members [73, 74].”

• cites [73] Milan, F.F., Tabrizi, A.B.: Armed, unmanned, and in high demand: the drivers behind combat drones proliferation in the Middle East. Small Wars Insurgencies 31(4), 730–750 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [74] Gallagher, K.: Killer optics: exports of Wescam sensors to Turkey (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

SAR robots helped find the Thai cave boys and bring them out safely.

“Search and Rescue (SAR) robots were deployed to locate and find lost Thai cave boys safely [46].”

• cites [46] McKirdy, E.: Thailand cave rescue: boys appear in new video, ‘i am healthy’ (2018)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Robots have gained artificial intelligence and can execute tasks more quickly, safely, and efficiently.

“Robots have become artificially smart and able to perform jobs faster, safer, and with higher efficiency [38].”

• cites [38] Gogu, G., Ray, P., Neagoe, M., Gogu, G., Diaconescu, D., Pocola, A.G., Pop, D.O., Petra, C.: Robotics and manufacturing. In: Talaba, D., Roche, T. (eds.) Product Engineering: Eco-Design, Technologies and Green Energy, p. 348. Springer, Cham (2006)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Firefighting robots help protect firefighters and enter spaces that are unsafe, cramped, or high-risk for humans.

“robots were used in the firefighting domain [47, 48], which helps in sparing the lives of firefighters and to access areas that are deemed too dangerous, too small, and/or too risky for firefighters.”

• cites [47] Naghsh, A.M., Gancet, J., Tanoto, A., Roast, C.: Analysis and design of human–robot swarm interaction in firefighting. In: The 17th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, 2008. RO-MAN 2008, pp. 255–260. IEEE (2008) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [48] Hong, J.H., Matson, E.T., Taylor, J.M.: Design of knowledge-based communication between human and robot using ontological semantic technology in firefighting domain. In: Robot Intelligence Technology and Applications, vol. 2, pp. 311–325. Springer (2014) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Agricultural robots are adopted because they cut labor and resource use while improving performance.

“Robots are used in agriculture due to their efficient and increased performance in reducing manpower and resource consumption [42].”

• cites [42] Cheein, F.A.A., Carelli, R.: Agricultural robotics: unmanned robotic service units in agricultural tasks. IEEE Ind. Electron. Mag. 7(3), 48–58 (2013) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Spies conduct cyber espionage and sabotage between rival nations, exemplified by the Iranian-Israeli cyber conflict that peaked in May 2020 with cyber-attacks and sabotage.

“Spies are constantly being used to conduct (cyber) espionage and sabotage operations, typically between rival countries such as Iranian-Israeli cold cyber-war, which reached its height in May 2020, including cyber-attacks and sabotage operations [136–138].”

• cites [136] Siman-Tov, D., Even, S.: A new level in the cyber war between Israel and Iran. INSS Insight (1328) (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [137] Losa, L.: The impact of cyber capabilities on the Israeli–Iranian relationship (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [138] Kaye, D.D., Efron, S.: Israel’s evolving Iran policy. Survival 62(4), 7–30 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks break encrypted robotic communication using 2-DES or 3-DES (168-bit) via brute-force-like techniques, targeting confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.

“Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks or plaintext attacks occur when the robotic communication is encrypted using a 2-DES, and now 3-DES key (168-bit) using a brute-force like technique to break the encrypted communication channel and either actively or passively eavesdrop. This type of attacks targets robotic data’s confidentiality, integrity and authentication.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Advanced eavesdropping can take the form of a cloning and replay attack that recovers data via information gathering before the eavesdropping attempt.

“In fact, advanced eavesdropping can take the form of a “cloning and replay” attack, which recovers the data via an information gathering process, before conducting the eavesdropping attempt.”

May combine two claims.

Poorly configured robotic applications or those with third-party access enable backdoor and rootkit attacks, compromising user privacy and subjecting them to surveillance, monitoring, tracking, and potential keystroke logging or covert image/video capture.

“Back-doors ill-configured robotic applications or applications with third-party access lead to various backdoor and rootkit attacks. This would expose robotic users by targeting their privacy first, and then by keeping them under constant surveillance, monitoring, and tracking, with possibility of registering keystrokes and capturing snapshots or even videos without their knowledge [10].”

• cites [10] Cerrudo, C., Apa, L.: Hacking robots before skynet. Cybersecurity Insight, IOActive Report, Seattle, USA (2017)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Masquerading attacks can slow down or speed up a robot, potentially causing incidents, and target availability and integrity by affecting accuracy.

“This attack has different objectives such as slowing down or up the speed of a robot, which may lead to an incident, or target its operational activity and performance. This type of attacks targets the robotic systems’ availability and integrity by affecting its accuracy.”

May combine two claims.

Because applications depend on software programs, those programs are vulnerable to application attacks, making the application susceptible to malware (viruses, worms, Trojans), buffer overflow, and malicious code injection.

“On the other hand, since applications rely on running software programs to perform the required tasks, these software programs are vulnerable to application attacks, rendering the application itself prone to various types of attacks. This includes malware that including viruses, worms, software Trojans attacks, in addition to buffer overflow and malicious code injection attacks [154].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

France used 'Big Brother' drones for social distancing enforcement until a May 2020 ban.

“In France, “Big Brother” drones were used to enforce social distancing before being banned in May 2020 [118].”

• cites [118] Scott, J.E., Scott, C.H.: Models for drone delivery of medications and other healthcare items. In: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice, pp. 376–392. IGI Global (2019) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

A drone from the Anti-COVID-19 Volunteer Drone Task Force told New Yorkers in May 2020 to mask, distance, and follow quarantine rules.

“In May 2020, a drone representing the “Anti-COVID-19 Volunteer Drone Task Force” was urging New-Yorkers to wear their masks and maintain their social distancing, and respect quarantine rules [116, 117].”

• cites [116] Moon, M.J.: Fighting COVID-19 with agility, transparency, and participation: Wicked policy problems and new governance challenges. Public Adm. Rev. 80(4), 651–656 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [117] Yakas, B.: Faa investigating” anti-covid-19 volunteer drone” filmed admonishing people in nyc (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Jamming attacks disrupt robot-to-robot and robot-to-human communication, aiming to suspend robotic activities and targeting availability of systems and data.

“Jamming attacks aim to interrupt and disrupt the robot-to-robot and robot-to-humans communication with the aim to suspend further robotic activities and jam any sort of communication and control. Thus, targeting both systems and data availability.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

In Africa, drones monitored cases and transported medical supplies and test samples to curb COVID-19.

“In fact, drones were also used to monitor cases and ensure medical deliveries and testing samples to limit the COVID-19 outbreak in Africa [123].”

• cites [123] Oguamanam, C.: Covid-19 and Africa: does one size fit all in public health intervention? Vulnerable: The Policy, Law and Ethics of COVID-19.University of Ottawa Press, Ottawa (2020) (Forthcoming in 2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Masquerading attacks use a valid identity (mask) to appear authentic, forming blackholes or generating false messages broadcast to other robots.

“The attacker (fake robot or controller) seems to be authentic since a valid identity is used, which is known as a mask. This is done by forming a blackhole or generating false messages which are then broadcast to the other robots.”

May combine two claims.

Without security-by-design, attackers can breach robotic architecture, find weaknesses, and inject or alter data.

“Lack of security by-design features leads to breaking into the robotic system’s architecture and design to scan and exploit its vulnerability/security gap(s) for further attacks, including malicious data injection and modification [10].”

• cites [10] Cerrudo, C., Apa, L.: Hacking robots before skynet. Cybersecurity Insight, IOActive Report, Seattle, USA (2017)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Man-in-the-Middle (MiMA) attacks actively intercept and alter communication between robotic entities without detection, allowing control, targeting confidentiality, integrity, and authentication.

“Man-in-the-Middle (MiMA) attacks occur when an attacker is capable of actively listening and intercepting the communication between two robotic entities or nodes, alter the information and inject it without being detected. This allows the attacker to control the communication between these legitimated entities [173]. This mainly targets robotic data’s confidentiality, integrity and authentication.”

• cites [173] Navas, R.E., Le Bouder, H., Cuppens, N., Cuppens, F., Papadopoulos, G.Z.: Do not trust your neighbors! a small IoT platform illustrating a man-in-the-middle attack. In: International Conference on Ad-Hoc Networks and Wireless, pp. 120–125. Springer (2018) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

False data injection can deviate robots from intended activity or cause response delays.

“This can be done through the initial interception of the ongoing robotic communication and altering it by injecting false data and information, which deviates the robots from performing their intended activity in an accurate manner, or leave them prone to response delays.”

May combine two claims.

External adversaries seek to access robotic systems via the Internet to obtain information maliciously, cause malfunctions, or disrupt services by injecting fake or malicious data.

“Outsiders aim to gain access to a robotic system through the Internet. The external adversary’s aim is to get access to information for malicious purposes [134], to cause malfunction or/and disrupt the system’s services through the injection of either fake or malicious data.”

• cites [134] Atamli, A.W., Martin, A.: Threat-based security analysis for the internet of things. In: 2014 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT), pp. 35–43. IEEE (2014) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Worm attacks exploit vulnerabilities in networked devices to self-propagate and replicate, infecting other robotic devices and targeting industrial control systems.

“Worm attacks aim to target the robotic systems by exploiting the vulnerabilities of their network’s connected devices before self-propagation and self-replicating to infect other robotic devices, and target industrial control systems [155].”

• cites [155] Falliere, N., Murchu, L.O., Chien, E.: W32. stuxnet dossier. White paper, Symantec Corp., Security Response 5(6), 29 (2011)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

DoS/DDoS attacks can be conducted locally or globally simultaneously, preventing legitimate users from accessing robotic systems.

“(Distributed) denial of service attacks can be conducted locally or globally (distributed) in a simultaneous manner which aim to prevent legitimate users from accessing robotic systems and devices.”

May combine two claims.

Insecure or open wireless communications and unclosed unused ports can allow interception, enabling attackers to remotely access robotic systems and launch cyber-attacks, particularly for robots using vulnerable LoRaWAN communications.

“Remote-access insecure and open wireless communications and communication ports, as well as unused ones if not closed, could lead to interception whereby attackers use them to gain remote access to a given robotic system to launch their cyber-attack, especially, robots relying on vulnerable LoRaWAN communications [145].”

• cites [145] Noura, H.N., Hatoum, T., Salman, O., Yaacoub, J.-P., Chehab, A.: Lorawan security survey: issues, threats and possible mitigation techniques. Internet of Things, p. 100303 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

OS upgrades occur via internet connection using firmware stored on flash memory, but each upgrade can expose the OS to new attacks; the OS is vulnerable to DoS, DDoS, arbitrary code execution, and rootkit attacks.

“The Operating System (OS) upgrades are achieved via internet connection, due to the presence of firmware codes that are usually stored on a flash memory [153]. However, with each upgrade, the OS might be vulnerable to new types of attacks. According to [154], the OS is prone to DoS and D-DoS attacks, along with the arbitrary code execution, and root-kit attacks.”

• cites [153] Elmiligi, H., Gebali, F., El-Kharashi, M.W.: Multi-dimensional analysis of embedded systems security. Microprocess. Microsyst. 41, 29–36 (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Threats to robotic systems can come from various sources and may be classified as cyber-crimes, cyber-warfare, cyber-espionage, or cyber-terrorism.

“Threats can originate from different sources [134], and can be part of cyber-crimes, cyber-warfare, cyber-espionage, or even cyber-terrorism.”

• cites [134] Atamli, A.W., Martin, A.: Threat-based security analysis for the internet of things. In: 2014 International Workshop on Secure Internet of Things (SIoT), pp. 35–43. IEEE (2014) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Rivals in the robotic industry seek to maintain a competitive advantage, employing insiders or industrial espionage to leak confidential documents and harm the rival's reputation.

“Competitors usually, rivals in the robotic industry aim to maintain a leading edge in this domain. Many methods can be adopted such as the reliance on insiders, or part of industrial espionage to leak confidential documents and damage the rival company’s reputation [135].”

• cites [135] Hou, T., Wang, V.: Industrial espionage-a systematic literature review (slr). Comput. Secur. 98, 102019 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Hardware attacks on robots range from low-risk (phishing) to high-risk (hardware Trojans) and can create backdoors for attackers to gain unauthorized access during use or maintenance.

“These attacks can vary from least dangerous (e.g. phishing) to the most dangerous ones (e.g. hardware Trojans [151]). Such attacks can lead to the implementation of back-doors for the attacker to lead another attack by gaining unauthorized access to the robots being used, or during their maintenance [152].”

• cites [151] Tehranipoor, M., Koushanfar, F.: A survey of hardware Trojan taxonomy and detection. IEEE Des. Test Comput. 27(1), 10–25 (2010) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [152] Wang, X., Mal-Sarkar, T., Krishna, A., Narasimhan, S., Bhunia, S.: Software exploitable hardware Trojans in embedded processor. In: 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT), pp. 55–58. IEEE (2012) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Knowing robots will perform surgical operations can scare patients and affect their trust psychologically.

“Moreover, the idea of knowing that robots will perform the surgical operation can scare many patients and affect their trust in a psychological manner [154].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Network impersonation attacks obtain credentials of a legitimate entity by claiming its network ID, allowing fake data advertisement and DoS flooding.

“Network impersonation attacks aim to obtain the credentials of a legitimate entity in a given robotic network by claiming its network ID. This allows an attacker to advertise fake data which confuses other network entities, and to flood the robotic networks via DoS attacks.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Adopting a common standardized OS such as NuttX OS prevents firmware exploitation and reduces attack likelihood.

“Clark et al. have suggested the adoption of a common standardized OS such as NuttX OS [154]. This prevents the exploitation of the firmware and reduces the likelihood of an attack.”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The proposed RRS method evaluates likelihood and impact of attacks against main system components, security services targeted, impact, and system exposure level, and presents security measures per attack.

“As a result, we present our Robotic Risk Assessment (RRS) method (Table 3), based on evaluating the likelihood and impact of a given attack (High/Very High, Damaging/Devastating) against the main system components presented earlier, along which security service the attack targets along its impact (critical, major, minor). Moreover, the system exposure level (i.e. high, medium, low) is also”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Assessing risks quantitatively in robotics is a challenging and complex task.
• AssumptionRests on an assumption: A new risk assessment is needed to quantify security risks in the robotic domain.

May combine two claims.

Medical concerns arose about physical or logical attacks against human patients, and about potential assassination attempts.

“As a result, medical concerns arose about the possibility of performing physical (i.e. loss of control) or logical (i.e. malicious data modification/injection) attack against a human patient [154], along the possibility of potentially performing assassination attempts (i.e. Vice President Dick Cheney) [213].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [213] Peterson, A.: Yes, terrorists could have hacked Dick Cheney’s heart. Washington Post (2013)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

TIM lacked security level testing and requires further performance testing.

“However, it lacked the security level testing, and requires further testing performance-wise.”

• cites [253] Wagner, H.J., Alvarez, M., Kyjanek, O., Bhiri, Z., Buck, M., Menges, A.: Flexible and transportable robotic timber construction platform-tim. Autom. Constr. 120, 103400 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Identity attacks include identity revealing attacks that retrieve robot identity to risk operator privacy, and can track robot location, exposing information and geographical location.

“Identity attacks this type of attacks includes identity revealing attacks, which consists of retrieving the identity of the robot to put its operator’s privacy at risk. Equally important, the attacker can track the robots location, which exposes all the needed information and geographical location about robotics systems along their users and devices.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

McLean et al. presented a new method that identifies risks surrounding mobile agent systems.

“McLean et al. presented a new method that identifies the risks that surround mobile agent systems [251].”

• cites [251] McLean, I., Szymanski, B., Bivens, A.: Methodology of risk assessment in mobile agent system design. In: Information Assurance Workshop, 2003. IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics Society, pp. 35–42. IEEE (2003) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Adoption of robots boosts productivity and economic growth, creates new jobs and opportunities, and increases labour quality, TFP, CFP, MFP, and GDP.

“On economy and finance the adoption of robots will surely boost productivity and economic growth, and creates new jobs and opportunities, especially in terms of creativity and social intelligence [206].”

• cites [206] Cellan-Jones, R.: Robots ‘to replace up to 20 million factory jobs’ by 2030. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48760799 (27.01. 2020) (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [207] Vermeulen, B., Pyka, A., Saviotti, P.P.: A taxonomic structural change perspective on the economic impact of robots and artificial intelligence on creative work. In: The Future of Creative Work. Edward Elgar Publishing (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Message tampering-fabrication-alteration attacks break integrity of exchanged messages by altering or creating fake messages, affecting authentication and data integrity, and can change robot events log.

“Message tampering–fabrication–alteration attacks aim to break the integrity of the exchanged messages, which is done by altering or creating fake messages, with both authentication and data integrity being affected in this case. This can lead to change the robot events log.”

May combine two claims.

EBIOS identifies risks according to severity level but lacks ability to indicate what security solution is needed to mitigate a given risk.

“Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité (EBIOS) [222] was used to identify different risks according to their severity level. However, EBIOS lacked the ability to indicate what security solution is needed to mitigate a given risk.”

• cites [222] Secrétariat Général Défense Nationale. Ebios-expression des besoins et identification des objectifs de sécurité (2004)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Combining human-machine analytical capability with AI reaches a higher level of INFOSEC.

“This is achieved by combining the human–machine analytical capability to reach a higher level of INFOrmation SECurity (INFOSEC) by relying on human assistance and AI combined [235].”

• cites [235] Gupta, S., Sabitha, A.S., Punhani, R.: Cyber security threat intelligence using data mining techniques and artificial intelligence. Int. J. Recent Technol. Eng. 8, 6133–6140 (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

Adopting these active response measures provides advantages including AI-based detection, hybrid detection, constant vulnerability monitoring, advanced activity monitoring, easier deployment, easier management, and enhanced access management.

“AI-based detection through the adoption of ML-based mechanisms to ensure a higher accuracy in a timely manner.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Traffic concerns arose especially with fatal incidents related to autonomous driving cars constantly reported.

“In fact, traffic concerns also arose especially with fatal incidents related to autonomous driving cars were constantly being reported [154, 215].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [215] Checkoway, S., McCoy, D., Kantor, B., Anderson, D., Shacham, H., Savage, S., Koscher, K., Czeskis, A., Roesner, F., Kohno, T., et al.: Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 77–92. San Francisco (2011)Not checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Employment of robotics leads to many job losses worldwide, mainly affecting low-skilled workers and poorer local economies, leading to socio-political economic crisis.

“Despite the economic boost that the employment of robotics offer especially in industrial and manufacturing fields, except that it comes with a negative impact. Such employment is leading to many job losses worldwide, which is mainly affecting low-skilled workers and poorer local economies, leading to socio-political economic crisis [208, 209].”

• cites [208] Cooper, A.: How robots change the world; what automation really means for jobs and productivity. Technical report (Tech. Rep.). Oxford Economics, Oxford (2019)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [209] Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P.: Robots and jobs: evidence from US labor markets. J. Polit. Econ. 128(6), 2188–2244 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Developing well-built, well-defined, well-secure application code makes robot control systems less prone to malicious code injection or modification.

“Thus, this makes the robots control system less prone to malicious code injection or modification attempt(s) [154].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Diab et al. presented SkillMaN as a planning and execution framework using a module with experiential knowledge to integrate perception, planning, knowledge-based reasoning, and execute skills such as robot trajectories.

“Diab et al. presented SkillMaN as a planning and execution framework using a module with experiential knowledge to integrate perception, planning, knowledge-based reasoning, and to execute various skills such as robot trajectories [254].”

• cites [254] Diab, M., Pomarlan, M., Beßler, D., Akbari, A., Rosell, J., Bateman, J., Beetz, M.: Skillman-a skill-based robotic manipulation framework based on perception and reasoning. Robot. Auton. Syst. 134, 103653 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Illusion attacks place legally compromised robots in the network to generate false data that spreads, and authentication countermeasures are ineffective because the attacker is authentic; fake messages can change robot controller decisions.

“Illusion attacks legally compromised robots are placed in the network to generate false data. As a result, false data can spread over the network. In this attack, the authentication countermeasure is not efficient, since the attacker is already authentic. In the robotics case, fake messages are capable of changing the decision of the robot controller.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Other risks are associated with weak authentication and password cracking attacks, allowing remote unauthorized access to perform malicious tasks.

“Other risks are also associated with weak authentication and password cracking attacks, allowing attackers to gain a remote unauthorized access to the system to perform malicious tasks.”

May combine two claims.

Reliance on cloud services, third-party applications, and open communication leads to network bottleneck, overhead, delays, and vulnerability to interception and alteration with lack of repudiation and accountability.

“However, the reliance on cloud services and third party applications and open communication leads to causing network bottleneck, overhead and delays [214], as well as being prone to interception and alteration with lack of repudiation and accountability.”

• cites [214] Senthilkumar, K.S., Pirapaharan, K., Julai, N., Hoole, P.R.P., Othman, A.-H., Harikrishnan, R., Hoole, S.R.H.: Perceptron ANN control of array sensors and transmitters with different activation functions for 5g wireless systems. In: 2017 International Conference on Signal Processing and Communication (ICSPC), pp. 107–111. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Without proper programming for safer deployment, robots in police and law enforcement may engage in blue-on-blue incidents, friendly fire, or engage wrong targets including civilians.

“In fact, without a proper programming that ensures a safer and much more secure deployment and use of robots in police and law enforcement fields, robots may end up in a blue-on-blue engagement which may result in friendly fire, or engaging the wrong targets including civilians.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Wagner et al. presented TIM, a large-scale flexible and transportable robotic timber construction platform.

“Moreover, Wagner et al. presented TIM, which is a large-scale flexible and transportable robotic timber construction platform [253].”

• cites [253] Wagner, H.J., Alvarez, M., Kyjanek, O., Bhiri, Z., Buck, M., Menges, A.: Flexible and transportable robotic timber construction platform-tim. Autom. Constr. 120, 103400 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.

CTI benefits the robotic domain by enabling proactive and predictive cyber-security, enhanced incident response, and enhanced decision making.

“This benefits the robotic domain to boost its cyber-security levels by:Development of proactive cyber-security which bolster the overall risk assessment and risk management policies and procedures.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: CTI helps mitigate harmful cyber-events through early detection and prevention.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Active response includes adoption and deployment of centralized and decentralized hybrid, lightweight, and AI-based intrusion detection and prevention systems, and antivirus mechanisms to trigger automated response through constant monitoring.

“This includes the adoption and deployment of centralized and decentralized hybrid, lightweight [237, 238] and AI-based [239, 240] intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems, as well as antivirus mechanisms to trigger an automated response through a constant and continuous monitoring.”

• cites [237] Davahlia, A., Shamsib, M., Abaeic, G.: A lightweight anomaly detection model using SVM for WSNs in IoT through a hybrid feature selection algorithm based on GA and GWO. J. Comput. Secur. 7(1), 63–79 (2020)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [238] Pham, V., Seo, E., Chung, T.-M.: Lightweight convolutional neural network based intrusion detection system. J. Commun. 15(11) (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [239] He, H., Gray, J., Cangelosi, A., Meng, Q., McGinnity, T.M., Mehnen, J.: The challenges and opportunities of artificial intelligence in implementing trustworthy robotics and autonomous systems. In: 3rd International Conference on Intelligent Robotic and Control Engineering (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [240] Soe, Y.N., Feng, Y., Santosa, P.I., Hartanto, R., Sakurai, K.: Towards a lightweight detection system for cyber attacks in the IoT environment using corresponding features. Electronics 9(1), 144 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Kriaa et al. presented a comprehensive survey of existing designs and risk assessment studies considering both security and safety for industrial infrastructures.

“Moreover, as for risk assessment, Kriaa et al. presented a comprehensive survey of existing designs and risk assessment studies that took into consideration both security and safety for industrial infrastructures [250].”

• cites [250] Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., Halgand, Y.: A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 139, 156–178 (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Hardware testing and monitoring are key to avoid future exploitation of robot hardware.

“As a result, hardware testing and monitoring are key to avoid any future exploitation [154].”

• cites [154] Clark, G.W., Doran, M.V., Andel, T.R.: Cybersecurity issues in robotics. In: 2017 IEEE Conference on Cognitive and Computational Aspects of Situation Management (CogSIMA), pp. 1–5. IEEE (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

CTI includes tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence types.

“CIT includes three intelligence types that can be described as follows:Tactical CIT assists in identifying threat actors.Operational CIT assists in identifying the threat actors’ motives, used tools, techniques and tactics.Strategic CIT assists in developing high-level organizational strategy.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Applying ASA provides advantages including solid security policies, security requirement analysis, formal security processes, reduced operational risks, real-time security awareness, and advanced employee education.

“The advantage of applying ASA includes:Solid security policies which are developed in a professional way to enforce security to show a resilient commitment in achieving the needed robotic security and cyber-security.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: The ASA program can greatly reduce robotic risks that cannot be easily addressed using robotic software and hardware devices.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

TIM is location independent, reconfigurable, rapidly integrated, and offers higher quality and productivity.

“TIM is location independent, reconfigurable and rapidly integrated, offering higher levels of quality and productivity.”

• cites [253] Wagner, H.J., Alvarez, M., Kyjanek, O., Bhiri, Z., Buck, M., Menges, A.: Flexible and transportable robotic timber construction platform-tim. Autom. Constr. 120, 103400 (2020) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Robots can be prone to technical and operational problems threatening safety of working personnel, and cyber-attacks including disclosure of secret business trades.

“However, robots can also be prone to technical and operational problems that threatens the safety of the working personnel [203], as well as cyber-attacks including the disclosure of secret business trades [10].”

• cites [203] Morris, I.: War! what is it good for?: conflict and the progress of civilization from primates to robots. Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2014)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [10] Cerrudo, C., Apa, L.: Hacking robots before skynet. Cybersecurity Insight, IOActive Report, Seattle, USA (2017)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Robotic systems and platforms are vulnerable to various attack types, risking disclosure, destruction, alteration, and modification of sensitive information.

“Robotic systems and platforms are vulnerable to various attack types, risking the disclosure, destruction, alteration and modification of sensitive information.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Xue et al.'s scheme offers more security features and high security level without communication, computation, and storage overhead.

“Security and performance analysis state that this scheme offers more security features and high security level without any communication, computation and storage overhead.”

• cites [276] Xue, K., Ma, C., Hong, P., Ding, R.: A temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 36(1), 316–323 (2013) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Xue et al. presented a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication scheme among user, Gateway Node, and sensor node.

“In addition, different authentication-factor solutions have also been presented in [276], where Xue et al. presented a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication scheme among the user, Gateway Node (GWN) and the sensor node.”

• cites [276] Xue, K., Ma, C., Hong, P., Ding, R.: A temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 36(1), 316–323 (2013) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Gope et al.'s solution offers more security features with high security levels at low communication and computation cost.

“This solution offers more security features with high security levels at a low communication and computation cost.”

• cites [279] Gope, P., Hwang, T., et al.: A realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for securing real-time application data access in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 63(11), 7124–7132 (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Song et al. presented a dual-factor authentication scheme based on smart cards.

“Song et al. presented a dual-factor authentication scheme based on the use of smart cards [270].”

• cites [270] Song, R.: Advanced smart card based password authentication protocol. Comput. Stand. Interfaces 32(5–6), 321–325 (2010) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Das et al. presented the first smart-card-based password authentication scheme for WSNs.

“Das et al. presented the first smart-card-based password authentication scheme for WSNs [274].”

• cites [274] Chen, T.-H., Shih, W.-K.: A robust mutual authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks. ETRI J. 32(5), 704–712 (2010) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Amin-Biswas's scheme resists certain security weaknesses but achieves complete security requirements such as energy efficiency, user anonymity, mutual authentication, and user-friendly password change phase with more efficiency.

“Both security and performance analysis show that this scheme resists certain security weaknesses but achieves complete security requirements such as energy efficiency, user anonymity, mutual authentication, and user-friendly password change phase with more efficiency.”

• cites [282] Amin, R., Biswas, G.P.: A secure light weight scheme for user authentication and key agreement in multi-gateway based wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 36, 58–80 (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Authentication is primarily used as a first defensive line that ensures authentication of both source and destination.

“In fact, authentication is primarily used as a first defensive line that ensures the authentication of both, source and destination alike [267].”

• cites [267] Wei, X., Wang, T., Tang, C., Fan, J.: Collaborative mobile jammer tracking in multi-hop wireless network. Future Gener. Comput. Syst. 78, 1027–1039 (2018) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

González Muñiz and Laud stated that symmetric-key techniques were not enough to construct message recognition protocols.

“However, González Muñiz and Laud stated that symmetric-key techniques were not enough to construct message recognition protocols in [284].”

• cites [284] González Muñiz, M., Laud, P.: On the (im) possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 1510–1515. ACM (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

A database is needed to store biometric templates safely before setting up a biometric system, allowing stored data to be used for future use.

“However, prior to the biometric system’s set-up, there is also a need for a database to store the biometric templates safely. This allows the stored data to be used for future use [258].”

• cites [258] Wallhoff, F.: Fgnet-facial expression and emotion database. Technische Universität München (2004)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

González Muñiz and Laud presented strong evidence that Message Recognition Protocols cannot be built from cheap primitives using only hash functions and XORing.

“Moreover, the authors also presented a very strong evidence that Message Recognition Protocols (MRPs) cannot be built from “cheap” primitives using only hash functions and XORing.”

• cites [284] González Muñiz, M., Laud, P.: On the (im) possibility of perennial message recognition protocols without public-key cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 1510–1515. ACM (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Gope et al. presented a realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for securing real-time application data access for WSN.

“Meanwhile, Gope et al. presented a realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for securing real-time application data access for WSN [279].”

• cites [279] Gope, P., Hwang, T., et al.: A realistic lightweight anonymous authentication protocol for securing real-time application data access in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron. 63(11), 7124–7132 (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Jiang et al. revealed that Xue et al.'s initial temporal-credential-based authentication was prone to various types of attacks, and presented a scheme that further cuts computational cost.

“Jiang et al. revealed that the initial temporal-credential-based authentication that was presented by Xue et al. was prone to various types of attacks, and presented a scheme that further cuts the computational cost [280].”

• cites [280] Jiang, Q., Ma, J., Xiang, L., Tian, Y.: An efficient two-factor user authentication scheme with unlinkability for wireless sensor networks. Peer-to-peer Netw. Appl. 8(6), 1070–1081 (2015) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Nguyen et al. found that password-authenticated key exchange and public-key encryption are incomparable under black-box reductions.

“In fact, Nguyen et al. did investigate the relationship between password protocols and other cryptographic primitives and realized that password-authenticated key exchange and public-key encryption are incomparable under black-box reductions in [268].”

• cites [268] Nguyen, M.-H.: The relationship between password-authenticated key exchange and other cryptographic primitives. In: Theory of Cryptography Conference, pp. 457–475. Springer (2005) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Symmetric cryptographic protocols are preferred because they are more lightweight than asymmetric ciphers, with AES being faster than ECC.

“In this context, symmetric cryptographic protocols are preferred since they are known to be more lightweight than asymmetric ciphers, especially with the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) being faster than Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) in [286].”

• cites [286] Eisenbarth, T., Kumar, S., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Uhsadel, L.: A survey of lightweight-cryptography implementations. IEEE Des. Test Comput. 6, 522–533 (2007) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Amin-Biswas's scheme is prone to spoofing attacks and offline password guessing attacks.

“However, this scheme is prone to spoofing attacks and offline password guessing attacks.”

• cites [282] Amin, R., Biswas, G.P.: A secure light weight scheme for user authentication and key agreement in multi-gateway based wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 36, 58–80 (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Several biometric techniques are needed to achieve identification and/or verification.

“In order to achieve identification and/or verification process, several biometric techniques are needed [259].”

• cites [259] Johnson, N.F., Jajodia, S.: Exploring steganography: seeing the unseen. Computer 31(2), 26–34 (1998) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Wu et al. presented an efficient two-factor authentication scheme for single-gateway environment that achieves user anonymity while preventing de-synchronization attacks.

“Hence, Wu et al. presented an efficient two-factor authentication scheme for the single-gateway environment that achieves user anonymity, while preventing de-synchronization attacks in [281].”

• cites [281] Fan, W., Lili, X., Kumari, S., Li, X.: A new and secure authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks with formal proof. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 10(1), 16–30 (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Srinivas et al.'s scheme supports dynamic node addition and user-friendly password change mechanisms using BAN-logic, providing mutual authentication.

“This scheme supports dynamic node addition and user friendly password change mechanisms using the BAN-logic, providing mutual authentication.”

• cites [283] Srinivas, J., Mukhopadhyay, S., Mishra, D.: Secure and efficient user authentication scheme for multi-gateway wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 54, 147–169 (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Wang et al. presented a systematical evaluation framework for schemes to be assessed objectively.

“Moreover, Wang et al. presented a systematical evaluation framework for schemes to be assessed objectively in [277].”

• cites [277] Wang, D., Li, W., Wang, P.: Measuring two-factor authentication schemes for real-time data access in industrial wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. (2018) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Physical biometric techniques include facial recognition, fingerprint, retina, and iris scan.

“Physical biometric techniques include facial recognition [261], fingerprint [262], retina [263] and iris scan [264].”

• cites [261] Woodward, J.D., Jr., Horn, C., Gatune, J., Thomas, A.: Biometrics: a look at facial recognition. Technical report, Rand Corp Santa Monica, CA (2003)Not checked — no full text of the source
• cites [262] Taupin, J.M.: Using forensic DNA evidence at trial: a case study approach. CRC Press, Boca Raton (2016) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [263] Jain, A.K., Ross, A., Prabhakar, S.: An introduction to biometric recognition. IEEE Trans. Circuits Syst. Video Technol. 14(1), 4–20 (2004) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Lamport was the first to present a remote user authentication scheme using a password.

“At first, Lamport [269] was the first to present a remote user authentication scheme using a password.”

• cites [269] Lamport, L.: Password authentication with insecure communication. Commun. ACM 24(11), 770–772 (1981) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Choi et al.'s experimental results on a quad-rotor and a rover reveal the ability to safely recover the vehicle from various attacks and prevent crashing.

“The experimental results, conducted on a quad-rotor and a rover, reveal the ability to safely recover the vehicle from various attacks and prevent crashing.”

• cites [255] Choi, H., Kate, S., Aafer, Y., Zhang, X., Xu, D.: Software-based realtime recovery from sensor attacks on robotic vehicles. In: 23rd International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2020), pp. 349–364 (2020)Not checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Evaluation results indicate that all existing authentication schemes are not ideal.

“Evaluation results indicate that all existing schemes are not ideal.”

• cites [277] Wang, D., Li, W., Wang, P.: Measuring two-factor authentication schemes for real-time data access in industrial wireless sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. (2018) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Wu et al.'s models were not scalable enough in multi-gateway industrial WSNs but offered more security characters than Jiang et al. and Choi et al.'s schemes, especially for WSNs.

“However, such models were not scalable enough in multi-gateway industrial WSNs, but proved to offer more security characters than Jiang et al. and Choi et al.’s schemes, especially for WSNs.”

• cites [281] Fan, W., Lili, X., Kumari, S., Li, X.: A new and secure authentication scheme for wireless sensor networks with formal proof. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 10(1), 16–30 (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Different lightweight ciphers were presented recently, including KATAN, KLEIN, mCrypton, Piccolo, PRESENT, TWINE, and EPCBC.

“Different lightweight ciphers were presented recently and described in [19], including KATAN [287], KLEIN [288], mCrypton [289], Piccolo [290], PRESENT [291], TWINE [292], and EPCBC [293].”

• cites [19] Hellaoui, H., Koudil, M., Bouabdallah, A.: Energy-efficient mechanisms in security of the internet of things: a survey. Comput. Netw. 127, 173–189 (2017) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [287] De Canniere, C., Dunkelman, O., Knežević, M.: Katan and ktantan—a family of small and efficient hardware-oriented block ciphers. In: Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-CHES 2009, pp. 272–288. Springer (2009) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [288] Gong, Z., Nikova, S., Law, Y.W.: Klein: a new family of lightweight block ciphers. In: International Workshop on Radio Frequency Identification: Security and Privacy Issues, pp. 1–18. Springer (2011) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Srinivas et al. proposed a scheme to overcome these problems.

“Hence, Srinivas et al. proposed a scheme to overcome these problems in [283].”