Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study honest signaling in the Philip Sidney game. Until now, researchers concentrated on verifying under what circumstances honest signaling is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Whereas the concept of ESS assumes infinite populations, we analyze here, for the first time, the more realistic scenario where populations are finite-which allows us to study the effect of varying the population size with respect to the viability of honest signaling. We show that honest signaling is much less frequent than previously observed within the infinite population setting. We observe that population size has a similar effect as selection pressure, namely, the larger the population the more important the difference in fitness between the strategies. Our experiments reveal, furthermore, that evolutionary stability is not very predictive for the viability of honest signaling. Most surprisingly, we found cases where honest signaling is the most prevalent strategy but not evolutionarily stable.
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“Whereas most models assume infinite populations; it is worth noting that an analysis of the game in finite populations found much lower prevalence of honest signalling [34].”
From Maynard Smith revisited: A multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to the coevolution of signalling behaviour (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
In the citing paper
“the use of inclusive fitness instead of individual reward is in line with Maynard Smith's original formulation [12] and subsequent studies [6,30,34].”
From Maynard Smith revisited: A multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to the coevolution of signalling behaviour (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
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“Since the 1970’s, both biologists [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and economists [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] have paid much attention to the emergence and stability of honest signaling.”
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“The game, see Figure 1, is a signaling game, introduced by Maynard Smith [11].”
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“To compute the probability that honest signaling is an ESS, similarly to the methods described in [32], [33], we randomly sample from the game’s entire parameter space (10(6) samples in (0, 1)(5), see Table 1 for the game’s parameters).”
MethodSosis, R. (2000) · Cross-Cultural Research · doi:10.1177/106939710003400105 · Cited by 203 · cited 1×
“It is sufficient if they have some common interest, as are the cases for individuals in the same group [24], in a longterm committed relationships [25], [26] and having the same religion [27].”
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1998) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.95.9.5100 · Cited by 173
Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication
Zollman, K., Bergstrom, C. T., & Huttegger, S. M. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.1878 · Cited by 136 · cited 1×
“Examples are the socalled “partial pooling equilibria” where the same signal is used in slightly different situations [4], and mixed equilibria where signals may sometimes be truthful, and sometimes be deceptive [18].”
BackgroundThe continuous Sir Philip Sidney game: a simple model of biological signalling
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Bergstrom, C. T., & Lachmann, M. (1997) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.1997.0041 · Cited by 89 · cited 6×
“Moreover, it is noteworthy that those games where honest signaling is not ESSN are mostly the ones with a high signal cost, which has been shown to be a hindrance to the viability of honest signaling [3].”
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Hayes, R. A. (2006) · Austral Ecology · doi:10.1111/j.1442-9993.2006.01647.x · Cited by 80
Dynamic stability and basins of attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney game
Huttegger, S. M., & Zollman, K. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2009.2105 · Cited by 69 · cited 2×
“The first dynamic analysis on the Philip Sidney game is, to our knowledge, the work of Huttegger and Zollman [15], where the authors apply the replicator dynamics.”
MethodSobel, J. (2009) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-30440-3_481 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“See also [14] for an overview of the economics literature on signaling games.”
BackgroundOn equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
Han, T. A., Traulsen, A., & Gokhale, C. S. (2012) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2012.02.004 · Cited by 58 · cited 1×
“To compute the probability that honest signaling is an ESS, similarly to the methods described in [32], [33], we randomly sample from the game’s entire parameter space (10(6) samples in (0, 1)(5), see Table 1 for the game’s parameters).”
MethodSelf-citationHan, T. A. (2013) · Studies in applied philosophy, epistemology and rational ethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-37512-5 · Cited by 51 · cited 1×
“It is sufficient if they have some common interest, as are the cases for individuals in the same group [24], in a longterm committed relationships [25], [26] and having the same religion [27].”
BackgroundSelf-citationPereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2013) · International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence · Cited by 38
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2013) · Cited by 8
Self-citationHonesty and deception in populations of selfish, adaptive individuals
Catteeuw, D., & Manderick, B. (2016) · The Knowledge Engineering Review · doi:10.1017/s0269888915000168 · Cited by 2
Self-citation
Cited by
Evolution of honest signaling by social punishment
Catteeuw, D., Han, T. A., & Manderick, B. (2014) · Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO) · doi:10.1145/2576768.2598312 · Cited by 19
“Interestingly, that occurs even for low values of c, which is not the case in the original Philip Sidney game [6, 43, 11].”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe signalling game between plants and pollinators
Sun, S., Leshowitz, M. I., & Rychtář, J. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-24779-0 · Cited by 16
Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation
Cimpeanu, T., & Han, T. A. (2020) · IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) · doi:10.1109/cec48606.2020.9185749 · Cited by 8
“Pre-play signalling has also been studied in the context of the evolution of honest signalling, showing that honest signalling only emerges when signalling is costly [7].”
BackgroundSelf-citationMacmillan-Scott, O., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013302 · Cited by 1
“At time t , each player has an action a and state s - this state is made up of both players’ actions in the previous round.”
CDC (Cindy and David’s Conversations) game: Advising President to survive pandemic
Ma, Z. S., & Yang, L. (2023) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2023.107079 · Cited by 1
“, Catteeuw 2013, 2014, Tanimoto 2015, 2019, 2021).(25,26,43-45) Another limitation of our study is that the CDC model does not have an explicit and direct punishment/reward mechanism to either Cindy or David, unlike some existing studies (e.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Catteeuw, D., Manderick, B., & Han, T. A.
- Affiliations
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-06
- Pages
- 2864-2870
- OpenAlex
- W2076654090
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 1.04
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) (publishedVersion)
- Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (submittedVersion)
- VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- honest signaling, evolutionarily stable strategy, finite population, population size, selection pressure, costly signaling, evolutionary game theory
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