Modeling the Stuxnet attack with BDMP: Towards more formal risk assessments
Abstract
Attack modeling has recently been adopted by security analysts as a useful tool in risk assessment of cyber-physical systems. We propose in this paper to model the Stuxnet attack with BDMP (Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes) formalism and to show the advantages of such modeling. After a description of the architecture targeted by Stuxnet, we explain the steps of the attack and model them formally with a BDMP. Based on estimated values of the success probabilities and rates of the elementary attack steps, we give a quantification of the main possible sequences leading to the physical destruction of the targeted industrial facility. This example completes a series of papers on BDMP applied to security by modeling a real case study. It highlights the advantages of BDMP compared to attack trees often used in security assessment.
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In Kriaa et al. (2012), the method is said to enable a coarse quantification of the attack success probability, but it is not validated whether the quantification suggested is accurate enough to back up security decisions.
“In Kriaa et al. (2012), the method is said to “enable a coarse quantification of the attack success probability”, but it is not validated whether the quantification suggested is accurate enough to back up security decisions.”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Kriaa et al. (2012)
Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers.
“Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers, namely Baiardi et al. (2009); Cardenas et al. (2011); Kriaa et al. (2012); LeMay et al. (2011); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Roy et al. (2010); Ten et al. (2010).”
From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Kriaa et al. (2012)
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A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems
Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 · Cited by 606 · see citing works
“Out of twenty-four papers examined a software prototype or tool supporting the method is discussed only in seven papers, namely Baiardi et al. (2009); Cardenas et al. (2011); Kriaa et al. (2012); LeMay et al. (2011); Patel and Zaveri (2010); Roy et al. (2010); Ten et al. (2010).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialCybersecurity for industrial control systems: A survey
Bhamare, D., Zolanvari, M., Erbad, A., Jain, R., Khan, K., & Meskin, N. (2020) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.101677 · Cited by 394 · see citing works
A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems
Kriaa, S., Pietre-Cambacedes, L., Bouissou, M., & Halgand, Y. (2015) · Reliability Engineering & System Safety · doi:10.1016/j.ress.2015.02.008 · Cited by 375 · see citing works
Self-citationFalse sequential logic attack on SCADA system and its physical impact analysis
Li, W., Xie, L., Deng, Z., & Wang, Z. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2016.01.001 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
- Authors
- Kriaa, S., Bouissou, M., & Pietre-Cambacedes, L.
- Affiliations
- Institut polytechnique de Grenoble (FR)
- École Centrale Paris (FR)
- ORCID
- Bouissou, Marc
- Venue
- 2012 7th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-10
- Pages
- 1-8
- OpenAlex
- W2041938856
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 5 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 4.03
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems (CRiSIS) (publishedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Risk and Safety Analysis
- Keywords
- Stuxnet, attack modeling, cyber-physical systems, cybersecurity risk assessment, attack trees, industrial control systems
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