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Mitigating DoS attacks against signature-based authentication in VANETs

He, Li, Zhu, Wen Tao · 2012 · 2012 IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Automation Engineering (CSAE)
Cited by 85

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Abstract

Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) are supposed to improve traffic safety and drivers' experiences. In a typical VANET, a vehicle broadcasts safety messages to its neighbors. Since behaviors based on safety messages could be life-critical, authentication of these messages must be guaranteed. Many signature-based schemes have been proposed for authentication in VANETs, but few of them have addressed the problem of denial of service (DoS) attacks against signature-based authentication. In such a DoS attack, attackers can broadcast forged messages with invalid signatures to force the receiving vehicles to perform lots of unnecessary signature verifications, and thus the benign vehicles cannot verify the messages from other legitimate vehicles. Our scheme features a pre-authentication process before signature verifying process to deal with this kind of DoS attack. The pre-authentication process takes advantage of the one-way hash chain and a group rekeying scheme. Evaluations show that the proposed scheme mitigates such DoS attacks effectively.

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Metadata

Authors
He, L., & Zhu, W. T.
Venue
2012 IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Automation Engineering (CSAE)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2012-05
Pages
261-265
OpenAlex
W2048882932
Cited by
85
References
0
FWCI
3.68
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Mitigating DoS attacks against signature-based authentication in VANETs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/csae.2012.6272951
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He, L., & Zhu, W. T. (2012). Mitigating DoS attacks against signature-based authentication in VANETs. 2012 IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Automation Engineering (CSAE). https://doi.org/10.1109/csae.2012.6272951

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