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Robust declassification
Abstract
Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems that control information flow often include mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information; however, declassification can easily result in the unexpected release of confidential information. This paper introduces a formal model of information flow in systems that include intentional information leaks and shows how to characterize what information leaks. Further, we define a notion of robustness for systems that include information leaks introduced by declassification. Robust systems have the property that an attacker is unable to exploit declassification channels to obtain more confidential information than was intended to be released. We show that all systems satisfying a noninterference-like property are robust; for other systems, robustness involves a nontrivial interaction between confidentiality and integrity properties. We expect this model to provide new tools for the characterization of information flow properties in the presence of intentional information leaks. 1
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Citations
Cites
Security Policies and Security Models
Goguen, J. A., & Meseguer, J. (1982) · 1982 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.1982.10014 · Cited by 2,119
Cited by
Language-based information-flow security
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C. (2003) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2002.806121 · Cited by 1,907
Self-citationSecure Information Flow as a Safety Problem
Terauchi, T., & Aiken, A. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11547662_24 · Cited by 282
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
Sabelfeld, A., & Sands, D. (2005) · 18th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW'05) · doi:10.1109/csfw.2005.15 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C.
- Venue
- Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001.
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2005-08-29
- Pages
- 15-23
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2295903522
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 13.12
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zdancewic, S., & Myers, A. C. (2005). Robust declassification. Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1109/csfw.2001.930133
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