Cited by 1,907Security and Verification in ComputingLogic, programming, and type systemsCryptography and Data Security

Language-based information-flow security

Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.·2003·IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Abstract

Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Previously, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of work in the area and identify some important open challenges.

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Crossref · 10.1109/jsac.2002.806121

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157 of 157 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • As tasks are decomposed across agents, intermediate outputs may implicitly encode or propagate sensitive information beyond intended scopes, creating implicit information flows that bypass explicit access controls.

    “As tasks are decomposed across agents, intermediate outputs (e.g., summaries, plans, or tool calls) may implicitly encode or propagate sensitive information beyond intended scopes, creating implicit information flows that bypass explicit access controls (Denning, 1976;Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003).”

    From Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents (2025) · cites this paper as Sabelfeld & Myers, 2003

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Authors
Sabelfeld, A., & Myers, A. C.
Affiliations
Cornell University (US)
Venue
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Published
2003-01
Volume
21
Issue
1
Pages
5-19
ISSN
0733-8716 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2122049982
Cited by
1,907
References
164
Citations by year
2026: 29 · 2025: 38 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 50 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 56 · 2019: 87 · 2018: 67 · 2017: 83 · 2016: 77 · 2015: 101 · 2014: 135 · 2013: 105 · 2012: 122
FWCI
97.28
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (publishedVersion)
Funders
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, programming, and type systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
information flow security, confidentiality, static analysis, information flow policies, programming languages, policy enforcement, end-to-end security, open problems

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