Investigation of False Data Injection Attacks on Smart Inverter Settings
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
With drive towards renewable-heavy smart grid, the use of smart inverters to provide grid support services is becoming more attractive. The dynamic operation of smart inverters (SI) are determined by their settings and operating curves. Though, it is generally believed that an attack on the SI settings could have a negative impact on the system, till date, no study has presented any findings. This paper presents an investigation of the potential impact of false data injection (FDI) on SI operation and their impacts on the distribution feeder using real word data from a 1.4 MW PV plant located on the Engineering campus in FIU. A case study of the IEEE 8500 node (which captures the characteristic of actual distribution feeder) with six PVs is investigated. Three SI functions (Volt-VAR, Volt-Watt and constant power factor) are used for FDI attack scenarios. The simulation results show the potential impacts of these attacks on the voltage profiles, overall system looses and the operations of other voltage control legacy devices in the network. The severity of the FDI attacks depends of the prevailing SI functions during the attack.
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In the citing paper
“In such cases of FDIA, the severity depends on the prevailing SI functions [10].”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [10]
In the citing paper
“The settings of these inverters represent a point where FDIA can be particularly damaging to the smart grid [10].”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [10]
Citations
Cites
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks
Liang, G., Weller, S. R., Zhao, J., Luo, F., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2631891 · Cited by 1,248 · cited 1×
“The authors of [8] have analyzed the implications of FDI attacks highlighting the 2015 Ukraine blackout incident.”
BackgroundCyber–Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure
Mo, Y., Kim, T. H.-J., Brancik, K., Dickinson, D., Lee, H., Perrig, A., & Sinopoli, B. (2012) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2011.2161428 · Cited by 1,096
Cyber-security in smart grid: survey and challenges
Mrabet, Z. E., Kaabouch, N., Ghazi, H. E., & Ghazi, H. E. (2018) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.01.015 · Cited by 482
False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids
Rahman, M. A., & Mohsenian-Rad, H. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM) · doi:10.1109/glocom.2012.6503599 · Cited by 313 · cited 1×
“Another study on FDIs in smart grid can be found in [9] which addresses the situation that the attacker has incomplete information about the admittance of transmission lines.”
BackgroundDetection of False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks in DC Microgrids Based on Recurrent Neural Networks
Habibi, M. R., Baghaee, H. R., Dragicevic, T., & Blaabjerg, F. (2021) · IEEE Journal of Emerging and Selected Topics in Power Electronics · doi:10.1109/jestpe.2020.2968243 · Cited by 241
Cybersecurity for distributed energy resources and smart inverters
Qi, J., Hahn, A., Lu, X., Wang, J., & Liu, C. (2016) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2016.0018 · Cited by 225 · cited 1×
“1: Potential attack points on a grid connected DER individual energy management systems (EMS) that controls their power electronic converters such as SIs [12].”
BackgroundThe IEEE 8500-node test feeder
Arritt, R. F., & Dugan, R. C. (2010) · IEEE PES T&D 2010 · doi:10.1109/tdc.2010.5484381 · Cited by 178 · cited 2×
“information and event management (SIEM), data loss prevention (DLP) technology, and IDS [14].”
BackgroundFuture challenges and mitigation methods for high photovoltaic penetration: A survey
Olowu, T. O., Sundararajan, A., Moghaddami, M., & Sarwat, A. I. (2018) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en11071782 · Cited by 167 · cited 1×
“The increased use of distributed energy resources (DER) have necessitated advanced power electronics to support managing the generation mix and loads [1].”
BackgroundSelf-citationCybersecurity: Risks, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to prevent social engineering attacks
Conteh, N. Y., & Schmick, P. J. (2016) · International Journal of Advanced Computer Research · doi:10.19101/ijacr.2016.623006 · Cited by 147 · cited 1×
“The detection of this kind of intrusions are even harder since the threat is not visible until a major breakdown occur [5].”
BackgroundCybersecurity Risks, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures to Prevent Social Engineering Attacks
Conteh, N. Y., & Schmick, P. J. (2021) · Advances in Information Security, Privacy, and Ethics · doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-6504-9.ch002 · Cited by 95
Cited by
Cybersecurity of Smart Inverters in the Smart Grid: A Survey
Yuanliang, L., & Yan, J. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics · doi:10.1109/tpel.2022.3206239 · Cited by 190
“The study of [53] shows that attacking settings of the volt–var and constant-PF functions could increase the number of tap changes of the grid’s voltage regulator, which will affect its service life.”
BackgroundTuyen, N. D., Quan, N. S., Linh, V. B., Vu, T., & Fujita, G. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3163551 · Cited by 148
Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure.
Riggs, H., Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Tariq, M., Khan, M. A., Amir, A., Vuda, K. V., & Sarwat, A. I. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23084060 · Cited by 124
“With many examples of cyber attacks affecting critical infrastructure (CI) in recent years, it has become evident that these incidents are a major threat to the existing critical infrastructure and, thus, society as a whole [1–10].”
BackgroundSelf-citationFalse data injection threats in active distribution systems: A comprehensive survey
Husnoo, M. A., Anwar, A., Hosseinzadeh, N., Islam, S. N., Mahmood, A. N., & Doss, R. (2022) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2022.10.021 · Cited by 71
Smart Grid Resilience for Grid-Connected PV and Protection Systems under Cyber Threats
Alasali, F., Itradat, A., Ghalyon, S. G. A., Abudayyeh, M., El‐Naily, N., Hayajneh, A. M., & AlMajali, A. (2023) · Smart Cities · doi:10.3390/smartcities7010003 · Cited by 38
Metadata
- Authors
- Olowu, T. O., Dharmasena, S., Jafari, H., & Sarwat, A.
- Affiliations
- Florida International University (US)
- Venue
- 2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2020-10-13
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W3118967547
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4
- FWCI
- 5.25
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power System Optimization and Stability
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- false data injection attacks, smart inverters, photovoltaic power plants, voltage regulation, volt/var control, Volt-Watt control, constant power factor control, voltage profile, power losses, smart grid cybersecurity
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Investigation of False Data Injection Attacks on Smart Inverter Settings. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/cyberpels49534.2020.9311541
- The paper
- Olowu, T. O., Dharmasena, S., Jafari, H., & Sarwat, A. (2020). Investigation of False Data Injection Attacks on Smart Inverter Settings. 2020 IEEE CyberPELS (CyberPELS). https://doi.org/10.1109/cyberpels49534.2020.9311541
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