The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 63 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 14 of the 79 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure.
Open accessAbstract
Several critical infrastructures are integrating information technology into their operations, and as a result, the cyber attack surface extends over a broad range of these infrastructures. Cyber attacks have been a serious problem for industries since the early 2000s, causing significant interruptions to their ability to produce goods or offer services to their clients. The thriving cybercrime economy encompasses money laundering, black markets, and attacks on cyber-physical systems that result in service disruptions. Furthermore, extensive data breaches have compromised the personally identifiable information of millions of people. This paper aims to summarize some of the major cyber attacks that have occurred in the past 20 years against critical infrastructures. These data are gathered in order to analyze the types of cyber attacks, their consequences, vulnerabilities, as well as the victims and attackers. Cybersecurity standards and tools are tabulated in this paper in order to address this issue. This paper also provides an estimate of the number of major cyber attacks that will occur on critical infrastructure in the future. This estimate predicts a significant increase in such incidents worldwide over the next five years. Based on the study's findings, it is estimated that over the next 5 years, 1100 major cyber attacks will occur on critical infrastructures worldwide, each causing more than USD 1 million in damages.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This is a review paper on cyber attacks against critical infrastructure, with a focus on the energy sector, summarizing attack types, vulnerabilities, standards, and mitigation/defense strategies. It also projects that over the next 5 years, more than 1,100 significant critical-infrastructure cyber attacks worldwide will each cause more than USD 1 million in damages.
## Key findings
- The paper defines “significant” cyber attacks using CSIS data as incidents causing at least USD 1 million in damage, and reports a projection that there will be more significant cyber attacks in the next five years than the combined significant attacks since 2005.
- The abstract states that, based on the study’s findings, over the next 5 years, 1100 major cyber attacks will occur on critical infrastructures worldwide, each causing more than USD 1 million in damages.
- Phishing is identified as the initial access point in many critical-infrastructure attacks; the paper cites 241,342 phishing complaints in 2020 in the FBI’s Internet Crime Report, versus 108,869 complaints for the next highest category.
- The paper highlights several concrete impacts from attacks, including the 2015 Ukrainian power grid attack that de-energized around 225,000 customers, and a 2000 Yahoo DoS attack that kept the site non-operational for more than 3 hours; it also notes a DoS on electric-grid operations in Los Angeles County and Salt Lake County that interrupted operations for more than 10 hours.
## Methods
- The paper is a review of cybersecurity research and incidents targeted at critical infrastructure, with a stated focus on energy critical infrastructure.
- It uses research questions to organize the review, and the publications/reports are contextualized using the MITRE adversary techniques matrix.
- The paper includes a systematic search and selection of peer-reviewed journal/conference papers, theses, and white papers from sources including IEEE Xplore, ACM, Science Direct, Springer Link, and SANS; it also analyzes CSIS significant-attack data and uses polynomial regression for a projection through 2025.
## Limitations
- The paper explicitly says it is limited by the vast extent of vulnerabilities that cannot be covered within the paper but are documented in the Common Weakness Enumeration database.
- The review’s scope is narrowed to critical infrastructure, with focus on energy critical infrastructure; this is a scope limitation made evident by the text.
- The paper states that its attack projections are based on CSIS significant-attack data and keyword-based attribution to critical infrastructure categories; this makes the categorization method dependent on how attacks are labeled in the source data, which is evident from the text.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
12 Valid · 10 Not valid · 52 Not checked · 29 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The opening for cyber attackers grows as CIs have evolved their operational technologies [16].”
§ Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure > 1. Introduction With many examples of cyber attacks affecting critical infrastructure (CI) in recent years, it has become evident that these incidents are a major threat to the existing critical infrastructure and, thus, society as a whole [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. In this paper, we define CI based on the definition from the Cyber & Infrastructure Security Agency. Critical infrastructure includes cyber and physical assets, systems, and networks of chemical and commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare, and public health, information technology (IT), nuclear reactors, materials and waste, transportation systems, and water and waste management. Not only are these sectors highly significant to modern countries but they also have strong interdependencies. A disruptive effect on one CI sector can have a cascading failure effect on other CIs, specifically, outages in electrical CIs affect most other CIs [11,12,13]. CIs are sets of physical and virtual assets, systems, and networks that provide a nation with economic security, public health, and safety [12]. This review focuses on electrical grid CIs due to the dependence that other CIs have on the electrical grid. The electrical grid has numerous remote terminal units for controlling physical systems and is a balanced system between load and generation. Cyber attacks against the electrical grid can lead to a cascading failure affecting most other CIs. CI was listed in [13] as agriculture and food, water, public health and safety, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and finance, industry/manufacturing, postal, and shipping. CI is not immune to cyber attacks; for example, parts of the power grid in Ukraine have been taken down by malware named BlackEnergy3. Other examples show that industry-scale food processing plants have closed due to ransomware, and multiple businesses and their retail functions have been shuttered by malware embedded in trusted third-party updating services [14]. In March 2019, a denial of service (DoS) attack was launched against part of the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) infrastructures of electric utilities in Utah, which shut down some of their observation capabilities. The exploitative programs that are in use today on the internet have enabled cybercriminals to acquire and update malicious programs with ease. The avenue for attack, once opened, allows the attacker to explore further attacks over potential vulnerabilities in the victim’s system. Communications in a network are often assumed to be private; however, an attacker may exploit the network in a man-in-the-middle attack to steal confidential information, sabotage a cyber-physical system, or maliciously alter information. Cyber attacks have malicious intents; they were identified in [15] as obstruction of information, undermining cybersecurity measures, retardation of the decision-making process, denial in providing public services, abatement of public confidence, lowering the reputation of the victim country, and destroying a legal interest. > 1.1. Evolution of Cyber Attacks
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [16] Oz, 2022, A Survey on Ransomware: Evolution, Taxonomy, and Defense Solutions, ACM Comput. Surv. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4.1.2 (p. 9) says industrial IoT and cyber-physical devices are used in critical infrastructure and are becoming more widespread, making them potential future ransomware targets. It does not establish that evolving operational technology has already increased openings for cyber attackers generally; its assessment concerns prospective ransomware targeting. (LLM, conf=0.83)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“The cybercriminal economy has emerged worldwide, enabling many types of cyber attack functions as a service.”
§ Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure > 3. Types of Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure > 3.1. Cybercrime Economy The cybercriminal economy has emerged worldwide, enabling many types of cyber attack functions as a service. However, while the focus is on cyber attacks in these sections, the cybercrime economy enables many other types of criminal activity. In [5], a literature review yields an extensive and consistent survey of the services used by the cybercrime business, organized using the value chain perspective, to understand cyber attacks systematically. Further, an understanding of the specialization, commercialization, and cooperation in coordinating a cyber attack is developed. They identify 24 value-added activities and their relations in the cybercrime market. These can be offered “as a service” for use in a cyber attack. The framework in [5] of cyber attacks “as a service” helps us understand the modern cybercriminal ecosystem and hacking innovations. Some services that facilitate cyber attacks include training and recruiting, development of exploitative software, scanning networks, denying service, phishing, target ranking, and money laundering. These services are provided as subscriptions, licenses, pay-per-records, or commission-based services [5,19]. The prominent concern for CIs is APTs. APTs are groups that are supported by their host nations and perform long-term targeting of the victim’s CI. The general goal of APTs is to steal data from the victim. However, they also target the control management systems and components [19] of CI. The critical importance of the power infrastructure to the socioeconomic stability and the effect of blackouts make the smart grid a primary target [6]. APTs represent a subset of the cybercrime economy, and an APT is often a benefit to the host nation’s economy, as they are compensated for their actions. This is due to the subterfuge of critical infrastructures slowing the economies of competitors to the host nation. An emergent factor for the electrical infrastructure is electricity theft, which is a major contributor to nontechnical losses in the distribution systems of the smart grid [4].
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [5] Huang, 2018, Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey, ACM Comput. Surv. source
Section 3 describes cybercrime-as-a-service as an important trend in the cybercriminal ecosystem, with attack activities offered as independent components. The Conclusion surveys many primary and supporting attack services and describes a global view of this underground business. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“It has been found that many existing IDS signatures are based on obsolete attack classes that do not map to modern attacks.”
§ Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure > 4. Processes for Building Cyber Defenses A successful cyber attack resulting in the unavailability of a critical infrastructure (CI), such as power delivery, can have an economic impact that extends beyond the systems sustaining direct and physical damage. The effects can impact regional and global economies. To identify security risks, analysis is based on what assets are valuable, who wants to attack them, and how they can be compromised. Security decisions are based on understanding the potential damage that can be done to these assets. Recommended cybersecurity for enterprise systems is provided by NIST. Recommended cybersecurity practices for control systems are provided by various organizations, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) standards, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [55]. Two of the common IT technologies to mitigate cyber attacks against networks are illustrated in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The protection scheme for web services and the distribution of content uses load-balancing proxy servers with regionally specific deployments. These proxies are used to absorb DDoS attacks while secondary proxies continue to serve legitimate user requests, as shown in Figure 6. In remotely accessed CI devices, a virtual private network (VPN) can isolate a CI network from the greater internet while leveraging the internet for communication routing, as depicted in Figure 7. > 4.4. IT/OT Practices to Mitigate Malware
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [78] Nisioti, 2018, From intrusion detection to attacker attribution: A comprehensive survey of unsupervised methods, IEEE Commun. Surv. Tutor. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “IDS attack classes,” the paper says the four traditional classes are no longer sufficient as attacks evolve. In “Detection Mechanism Classification,” it separately describes signatures as patterns of known attacks whose databases need updating. It does not say that IDS signatures are based on those obsolete classes, so the claim conflates two related limitations. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Certain zero-day exploits and socially engineered credential theft are expected to remain perpetual weak points in computer networks for the foreseeable future [5].”
§ Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure > 7. Conclusions
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [5] Huang, 2018, Systematically Understanding the Cyber Attack Business: A Survey, ACM Comput. Surv. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.1.1 identifies zero-day vulnerabilities as possible entry points, and Definition 1 calls human and process vulnerabilities a frequent “weakest link” targeted by social engineering (page numbers unavailable). The paper does not specifically identify socially engineered credential theft as the weak point or predict that either threat will remain perpetual for the foreseeable future. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The projection, using polynomial regression, shows that there will be more significant cyber attacks in the next five years than the combined significant cyber attacks since 2005.”
§ Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure > 3. Types of Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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- It may state two separate claims as one. 49
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Citations
Cites
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks
Liang, G., Weller, S. R., Zhao, J., Luo, F., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2631891 · Cited by 1,248 · cited 2×
“With many examples of cyber attacks affecting critical infrastructure (CI) in recent years, it has become evident that these incidents are a major threat to the existing critical infrastructure and, thus, society as a whole [1–10].”
BackgroundHardware Trojan attacks: Threat analysis and countermeasures
Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M. S., Banga, M., & Narasimhan, S. (2014) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2014.2334493 · Cited by 766 · cited 1×
“It requires the adversary to have physical access to the integrated circuits [63,64].”
BackgroundPsiaki, M. L., & Humphreys, T. E. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2016.2526658 · Cited by 736 · cited 1×
“Exploits that are used to enter a MITM include internet protocol (IP) spoofing, address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing, and domain name system (DNS) spoofing [38].”
MethodA Survey of Man in the Middle Attacks
Conti, M., Dragoni, N., & Lesyk, V. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2548426 · Cited by 724 · cited 1×
“This redirects internet traffic to fraudulent websites that resemble intended destinations [41–43].”
BackgroundCyber-security on smart grid: Threats and potential solutions
Gunduz, M. Z., & Das, R. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107094 · Cited by 717
Distributed denial of service attacks
Lau, F., Rubin, S. H., Smith, M. H., & Trajkovic, L. (2002) · SMC 2000 Conference Proceedings. 2000 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 'Cybernetics Evolving to Systems, Humans, Organizations, and their Complex Interactions' (Cat. No.00CH37166) · doi:10.1109/icsmc.2000.886455 · Cited by 582
Phishing Attacks: A Recent Comprehensive Study and a New Anatomy
Alkhalil, Z., Hewage, C., Nawaf, L., & Khan, I. (2021) · Frontiers in Computer Science · doi:10.3389/fcomp.2021.563060 · Cited by 524 · cited 1×
“CEO fraud is a reciprocal tactic in which the phishing attempt is made to impersonate the CEO [52].”
BackgroundRansomware threat success factors, taxonomy, and countermeasures: A survey and research directions
Al-rimy, B. A. S., Maarof, M. A., & Shaid, S. Z. M. (2018) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2018.01.001 · Cited by 383
Static detection of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
Wassermann, G., & Su, Z. (2008) · Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Software engineering - ICSE '08 · doi:10.1145/1368088.1368112 · Cited by 382
Man-in-the-Middle Attack to the HTTPS Protocol
Callegati, F., Cerroni, W., & Ramilli, M. (2009) · IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.12 · Cited by 347
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Sarwat, A.I., Sundararajan, A., Parvez, I., Moghaddami, M., and Moghadasi, A. (2018). Sustainable Interdependent Networks: From Theory to Application, Springer International Publishing.
- (2008, January 26–27). Vishing. Proceedings of the 5th Annual Conference on Information Security Curriculum Development, Kennesaw, GA, USA.
- Pratama, 2012, Computer worm classification, Int. J. Comput. Sci. Inf. Secur., 10, 21
- Miller, B., and Rowe, D. Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Research in Information Technology.
- Kifayat, K., Merabti, M., and Younis, Y.A. (2013, January 24–25). Secure Cloud Computing for Critical Infrastructure: A Survey. Proceedings of the 14th Annual Post Graduate Symposium on The Convergence of Telecommunications, Networking and Broadcasting, Liverpool, UK.
Cited by
A comprehensive survey on cyber deception techniques to improve honeypot performance
Javadpour, A., Ja'fari, F., Taleb, T., Shojafar, M., & Benzaïd, C. (2024) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2024.103792 · Cited by 177
“The significant impact and rapid spread of WannaCry shed light on the critical need for timely software patching and effective cybersecurity measures [209, 210].”
BackgroundRansomware on cyber-physical systems: Taxonomies, case studies, security gaps, and open challenges
Benmalek, M. (2024) · Internet of Things and Cyber-Physical Systems · doi:10.1016/j.iotcps.2023.12.001 · Cited by 128
Berguiga, A., Harchay, A., & Massaoudi, A. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3543127 · Cited by 63
“As a result, these devices are unable to implement intricate security algorithms, leaving them vulnerable to various security risks like data integrity attacks, denial of service (DoS) attacks, interception, and information leakage [8], [9], [10], [11].”
Alansary, S. A., Ayyad, S. M., Talaat, F. M., & Saafan, M. M. (2025) · Knowledge and Information Systems · doi:10.1007/s10115-025-02556-6 · Cited by 65
“Figure 2 indicates how the attackers exploit the assets [49, 50].”
Hybrid FEM-AI Approach for Thermographic Monitoring of Biomedical Electronic Devices
Pratticò, D., Carlo, D. D., Silipo, G., & Laganà, F. (2025) · Computers · doi:10.3390/computers14090344 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Riggs, H., Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Tariq, M., Khan, M. A., Amir, A., Vuda, K. V., & Sarwat, A. I.
- Affiliations
- Florida International University (US)
- Utah Valley University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tariq, Mohd
- Sarwat, Arif I.
- Venue
- Sensors
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2023-04-17
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 4060
- ISSN
- 1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC10145335
- OpenAlex
- W4366290225
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 63
- Citations by year
- 2026: 27 · 2025: 41 · 2024: 49 · 2023: 7
- FWCI
- 5.12
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Social Sciences › Law › Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
- Keywords
- critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, cyberattacks, attack surface, vulnerability (computer security), mitigation measures, cybercrime, data breaches, cyber-physical systems, cybersecurity standards
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/s23084060
- The paper
- Riggs, H., Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Tariq, M., Khan, M. A., Amir, A., Vuda, K. V., & Sarwat, A. I. (2023). Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. Sensors. https://doi.org/10.3390/s23084060
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