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Cited by 371

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Buffer overflows: attacks and defenses for the vulnerability of the decade

Cowan, C., Wagle, F., Calton Pu, Beattie, S., Walpole, J.·2002·Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX'00

Abstract

Buffer overflows have been the most common form of security vulnerability for the last ten years. Moreover, buffer overflow vulnerabilities dominate the area of remote network penetration vulnerabilities, where an anonymous Internet user seeks to gain partial or total control of a host. If buffer overflow vulnerabilities could be effectively eliminated, a very large portion of the most serious security threats would also be eliminated. We survey the various types of buffer overflow vulnerabilities and attacks and survey the various defensive measures that mitigate buffer overflow vulnerabilities, including our own StackGuard method. We then consider which combinations of techniques can eliminate the problem of buffer overflow vulnerabilities, while preserving the functionality and performance of existing systems.

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Metadata

Authors
Cowan, C., Wagle, F., Pu, C., Beattie, S., & Walpole, J.
Venue
Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX'00
Published
2002-11-07
Volume
2
Pages
119-129
OpenAlex
W2180474751
Cited by
371
References
8
FWCI
21.48
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Buffer overflows: attacks and defenses for the vulnerability of the decade. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/discex.2000.821514
The paper
Cowan, C., Wagle, F., Pu, C., Beattie, S., & Walpole, J. (2002). Buffer overflows: attacks and defenses for the vulnerability of the decade. Proceedings DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition. DISCEX'00. https://doi.org/10.1109/discex.2000.821514

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.