The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fault Attacks on AES with Faulty Ciphertexts Only
Abstract
Classical Fault Attacks often require the ability to encrypt twice the same plaintext, in order to get one or several pairs of correct and faulty cipher texts corresponding to the same message. This observation led some designers to think that a randomized mode of operation may be sufficient to protect block cipher encryption against this kind of threat. In this paper, we consider the case where the adversary neither chooses nor knows the input messages, and has only access to the faulty cipher texts. In this context, we are able to describe several attacks against AES-128 by using non uniform fault models. Our attacks target the last 4 rounds and allow to recover the correct key with practical time complexity, using a limited number of faulty cipher texts. This work highlights the need for dedicated fault attack countermeasures in secure embedded systems.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
Heron, S. (2009) · Network Security · doi:10.1016/s1353-4858(10)70006-4 · Cited by 1,216
Cited by
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX
Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057 · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Fuhr, T., Jaulmes, E., Lomne, V., & Thillard, A.
- Venue
- 2013 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-08
- Pages
- 108-118
- OpenAlex
- W2071722828
- Cited by
- 174
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.42
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fault Attacks on AES with Faulty Ciphertexts Only. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/fdtc.2013.18
- The paper
- Fuhr, T., Jaulmes, E., Lomne, V., & Thillard, A. (2013). Fault Attacks on AES with Faulty Ciphertexts Only. 2013 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography. https://doi.org/10.1109/fdtc.2013.18
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.