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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX

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Murdock, Kit, Oswald, David, Garcia, Flavio D., Van Bulck, Jo, Gruss, Daniel, Piessens, Frank·2020·2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features have been introduced to manage ever-growing heat and power consumption in modern processors. Design restrictions ensure frequency and voltage are adjusted as a pair, based on the current load, because for each frequency there is only a certain voltage range where the processor can operate correctly. For this purpose, many processors (including the widespread Intel Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically regulate processor frequency and operating voltage.In this paper, we demonstrate that these privileged interfaces can be reliably exploited to undermine the system's security. We present the Plundervolt attack, in which a privileged software adversary abuses an undocumented Intel Core voltage scaling interface to corrupt the integrity of Intel SGX enclave computations. Plundervolt carefully controls the processor's supply voltage during an enclave computation, inducing predictable faults within the processor package. Consequently, even Intel SGX's memory encryption/authentication technology cannot protect against Plundervolt. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. We finally discuss why mitigating Plundervolt is not trivial, requiring trusted computing base recovery through microcode updates or hardware changes.

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Metadata

Authors
Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F.
Venue
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-05
Pages
1466-1482
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3015806656
Cited by
314
References
52
FWCI
19.25
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057
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Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F. (2020). Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX. 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057

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