The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX
Open accessAbstract
Dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features have been introduced to manage ever-growing heat and power consumption in modern processors. Design restrictions ensure frequency and voltage are adjusted as a pair, based on the current load, because for each frequency there is only a certain voltage range where the processor can operate correctly. For this purpose, many processors (including the widespread Intel Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically regulate processor frequency and operating voltage.In this paper, we demonstrate that these privileged interfaces can be reliably exploited to undermine the system's security. We present the Plundervolt attack, in which a privileged software adversary abuses an undocumented Intel Core voltage scaling interface to corrupt the integrity of Intel SGX enclave computations. Plundervolt carefully controls the processor's supply voltage during an enclave computation, inducing predictable faults within the processor package. Consequently, even Intel SGX's memory encryption/authentication technology cannot protect against Plundervolt. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. We finally discuss why mitigating Plundervolt is not trivial, requiring trusted computing base recovery through microcode updates or hardware changes.
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Cites
2017 USENIX Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC'17)
Quoc, D. L., Beck, M. S., Bhatotia, P., Chen, R., Fetzer, C. W., & Strufe, T. (2017) · Cited by 3,091
Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
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Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
Self-citationSpectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Horn, J., Fogh, A., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., et al. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00002 · Cited by 1,780
Self-citationDifferential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems
Biham, E., & Adi Shamir, Z. (1997) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/bfb0052259 · Cited by 1,671
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Flipping bits in memory without accessing them: an experimental study of DRAM disturbance errors
Kim, Y., Daly, R., Kim, J., Fallin, C., Lee, J. H., Lee, D., Wilkerson, C., Lai, K., & Mutlu, O. (2014) · ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News · doi:10.1145/2678373.2665726 · Cited by 921
Optical Fault Induction Attacks
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The Sorcerer's Apprentice Guide to Fault Attacks
Bar-El, H., Choukri, H., Naccache, D., Tunstall, M., & Whelan, C. (2006) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2005.862424 · Cited by 743
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
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Cited by
A survey on the (in)security of trusted execution environments
Muñoz, A., Ríos, R., Román, R., & López, J. (2023) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2023.103180 · Cited by 131
SoK: SGX.Fail: How Stuff Gets eXposed
Van Schaik, S., Seto, A., Yurek, T., Batori, A., AlBassam, B., Genkin, D., Miller, A., Ronen, E., Yarom, Y., & Garman, C. (2024) · 2024 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp54263.2024.00260 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F.
- Venue
- 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2020-05
- Pages
- 1466-1482
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3015806656
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 19.25
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Murdock, K., Oswald, D., Garcia, F. D., Van Bulck, J., Gruss, D., & Piessens, F. (2020). Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX. 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp40000.2020.00057
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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