The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
False data injection attacks with incomplete information against smart power grids
Abstract
False data injection attacks have recently been introduced as an important class of cyber attacks against smart grid's wide area measurement and monitoring systems. These attacks aim to compromise the readings of multiple power grid sensors and phasor measurement units in order to mislead the operation and control centers. Recent studies have shown that if an adversary has complete knowledge on the power grid topology and transmission-line admittance values, he can adjust the false data injection attack vector such that the attack remains undetected and successfully passes the residue-based bad data detection tests that are commonly used in power system state estimation. However, in this paper, we explain that a realistic false data injection attack is essentially an attack with incomplete information due to the attackers lack of real-time knowledge with respect to various grid parameters and attributes such as the position of circuit breaker switches and transformer tap changers and also because of the attacker's limited physical access to most grid facilities. We mathematically characterize false data injection attacks with incomplete information from both the attacker's and grid operator's viewpoints. Furthermore, we introduce a novel vulnerability measure that can compare and rank different power grid topologies against such attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study to investigate false data injection attacks with line admittance uncertainty.
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Cites
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Limiting false data attacks on power system state estimation
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Defending false data injection attack on smart grid network using adaptive CUSUM test
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Cited by
The 2015 Ukraine Blackout: Implications for False Data Injection Attacks
Liang, G., Weller, S. R., Zhao, J., Luo, F., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2016.2631891 · Cited by 1,248
A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems
Liang, G., Zhao, J., Luo, F., Weller, S. R., & Dong, Z. Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2015.2495133 · Cited by 1,028
Survey in Smart Grid and Smart Home Security: Issues, Challenges and Countermeasures
Komninos, N., Philippou, E., & Pitsillides, A. (2014) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2014.2320093 · Cited by 560
Cyber‐physical attacks and defences in the smart grid: a survey
He, H., & Yan, J. (2016) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2016.0019 · Cited by 454
Zografopoulos, I., Ospina, J., Liu, X., & Konstantinou, C. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3058403 · Cited by 314
Metadata
- Authors
- Rahman, M. A., & Mohsenian-Rad, H.
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-12
- Pages
- 3153-3158
- ISSN
- 1930-529X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2064111006
- Cited by
- 313
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 18.02
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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