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Exploiting the GOOSE protocol: A practical attack on cyber-infrastructure
Abstract
Security issues for the power industry have become increasingly relevant during the past decade as the industry has relied more and more on communication protocols. The Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) protocol is defined in IEC 61850 for the purpose of distributing event data across entire substation networks. In this paper we demonstrate a practical attack by exploiting weaknesses in GOOSE. We also show that this attack can have devastating consequences on the reliability of the grid and is capable of creating a widespread interruption in power generation and distribution.
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“There have been few research papers [12,24,25] that have demonstrated LAN-based cyberattacks against the GOOSE protocol.”
From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [24]
Citations
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 19
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid
Reda, H. T., Ray, B., Peidaee, P., Anwar, A., Mahmood, A., Kalam, A., & Islam, N. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21041554 · Cited by 80
IEC 61850: Technology standards and cyber-threats
Youssef, T. A., El Hariri, M., Bugay, N., & Mohammed, O. A. (2016) · 2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering (EEEIC) · doi:10.1109/eeeic.2016.7555647 · Cited by 40
Flooding attacks against secure time-critical communications in the power grid
Zhang, F., Mahler, M., & Li, Q. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm) · doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm.2017.8340726 · Cited by 18
Metadata
- Authors
- Hoyos, J., Dehus, M., & Brown, T. X.
- Affiliations
- University of Colorado Boulder (US)
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE Globecom Workshops
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-12
- Pages
- 1508-1513
- OpenAlex
- W2036463896
- Cited by
- 137
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 11 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 5 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 1
- FWCI
- 5.13
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC Wkshps) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- GOOSE protocol, IEC 61850, power system security, cyberattacks, substation communication, power system reliability, smart grid security
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