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Flooding attacks against secure time-critical communications in the power grid
Abstract
Many communication messages in electric substations of the power grid need to be delivered in a very short time (e.g., 3ms according to IEC 61850). However, the delivery delay of such messages is sensitive to flooding attacks that will increase the delay. IEC 62351 specifies that these messages should be signed with digital signatures to provide authentication. The processing of signature generation and verification further increases the delay of message delivery and makes time-critical messages more sensitive to flooding attacks. In this paper, we first experimentally study how flooding attacks affect the delivery delay of time-critical messages protected with popular authentication schemes both in wireless and wired networks. The experimental results show that flooding attacks can easily increase the delay of time-critical communications in wireless networks but not in wired networks. Then we identify a practical intelligent flooding attack where even a small number of flooding packets can significantly increase the delivery delay in a wired network. Finally, we propose a defense scheme to address the intelligent attack and evaluate its effectiveness.
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“However, digitally signed messages in wireless mesh networks are vulnerable to flooding DoS attacks, as demonstrated in [34], in which a model of phasor measurement data collection and transmission was subjected to flooding DoS. The flooding blocked the phasor measurement unit from transmitting data to the load flow control center. This type of interruption can affect the decision-making processes”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [34]
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References 11 · Cited by 18
Research works printed but not linked: 6
- 0, International Standard IEC 61850-7-1 Communication networks and systems in substations-Part 7-1 Basic communication structure for substation and feeder equipment-Principles and models
- janssen, 0, IEC 61850 impact on substaion design Substation automation based on IEC 61850 with new process-close technologies
- 2005, Power Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange
- 2012, Communication Networks and Systems for Power Utility Automation
- 2004, Communication Networks and Systems in Substation
- scheer, 0, comparing the reliability of Ethernet network topologies in substation control and monitoring networks, Western Power Delivery Automation Conference
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, F., Mahler, M., & Li, Q.
- Affiliations
- University of Arkansas at Fayetteville (US)
- Venue
- 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-10
- Pages
- 449-454
- OpenAlex
- W2798683801
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 11
- Citations by year
- 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 0.84
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- U.S. Department of Energy
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Keywords
- flooding attacks, time-critical communication, power system communication, electric substations, IEC 61850, IEC 62351, digital signatures, message delay, authentication protocols, wireless networks, wired networks
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- Zhang, F., Mahler, M., & Li, Q. (2017). Flooding attacks against secure time-critical communications in the power grid. 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm). https://doi.org/10.1109/smartgridcomm.2017.8340726
