Robust hardware true random number generators using DRAM remanence effects
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is an important security primitive used in a variety of applications including cryptographic algorithms, communication systems, simulations, etc. It is critical to be able to produce outputs consisting of fully unpredictable and unbiased bits in a cost-effective manner. In this paper, we present a robust hardware TRNG based on the Dynamic RAM (DRAM) remanence effect, which is a condition whereby information remains in a DRAM even after powering it down. The advantage of our hardware TRNG is that it forms from existing components with no extra circuitry. We assessed and tested the randomness of our proposed hardware TRNG by applying the NIST Statistical Test which indicates the unpredictability and nonrepeatability of our data. Given its strong NIST results, we believe that there is a potential for immediate cryptographic applications.
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Cites
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Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- 10.1109/hst.2015.7140228 · DOI
Cited by
Hamidi, H. (2019) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2018.09.024 · Cited by 175
“[52] LumaCert: conception and creation of new digital certificate for online users in e-banking systems In this work, an alternative method is introduced for designing e-banking systems based on a new solution to authentication and security with the help of the digital certificates called LumaCert.”
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Tehranipoor, F., Karimian, N., Yan, W., & Chandy, J. A. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems · doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2016.2606658 · Cited by 161
“Based on our examination on DRAMs, the remanence approach is not feasible for constructing PUFs; however, remanence effects can be used for creating true random number generators [26].”
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“Tehranipoor+ [111] 2016 Startup Values 3 7 > 60ns > 245.”
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“To address this challenge, researchers propose a wide variety of solutions based on insights and understanding about DRAM behavior gleaned from system-level DRAM error characterization studies [5, 10, 12, 15, 24, 27, 33, 34, 40, 45–47,50–53,56–59,61, 70, 72, 79–81, 85, 95–99, 101, 105, 106, 114–121, 124, 125, 129, 134…”
MethodLiu, W., Gu, C., O'Neill, M. P., Qu, G., Montuschi, P., & Lombardi, F. (2020) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2020.3030121 · Cited by 80
Olgun, A., Patel, M., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Luo, H., Kim, J. S., Bostanci, F. N., Vijaykumar, N., Ergin, O., & Mutlu, O. (2021) · Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Architecture/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/isca52012.2021.00078 · Cited by 77
“, retention failures [63, 81, 150, 154], DRAM start-up values [47]) or (ii) generate randomnumbers at low throughput because they either use small portions of selected DRAM rows as an entropy source (e.”
BackgroundTrue Random Number Generation Using Read Noise of Flash Memory Cells
Ray, B., & Milenković, A. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices · doi:10.1109/ted.2018.2792436 · Cited by 70
“Similarly, DRAM-based TRNGs utilize the memory-specific properties, such as memory cells’ remanence effect [13], or access time variation caused by refresh cycles [14].”
MethodTrends in Data Protection and Encryption Technologies
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Evolving authentication design considerations for the internet of biometric things (IoBT)
Karimian, N., Wortman, P. A., & Tehranipoor, F. (2016) · International Conference on Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis · doi:10.1145/2968456.2973748 · Cited by 53
“01 (normally 1%) means that sequence would be considered to be random with a confidence of 99% [32] [37].”
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Yüksel, İ. E., Tuğrul, Y. C., Olgun, A., Bostanci, F. N., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Junior, G. F. D. O., Luo, H., Gómez-Luna, J., Sadrosadati, M., & Mutlu, O. (2024) · IEEE International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA) · doi:10.1109/hpca57654.2024.00030 · Cited by 49
“Yet, our demonstration shows that existing COTS DRAM chips are already quite capable of computation, and such modifications to DRAM are very promising and likely to be very fruitful.”
BackgroundSutar, S., Raha, A., Kulkarni, A., Shorey, R., Tew, J. D., & Raghunathan, V. (2017) · ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3105915 · Cited by 46
“Prior approaches to DRAM-based PUFs suffer from several shortcomings such as low speed of operation (Keller et al. 2014), non-applicability to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices (Hashemian et al. 2015), and the need for power cycling the DRAM module (Tehranipoor et al. 2015, 2016).”
MethodEnhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported
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DR-STRaNGe: End-to-End System Design for DRAM-based True Random Number Generators
Bostanci, F. N., Olgun, A., Orosa, L., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Kim, J. S., Hassan, H., Ergin, O., & Mutlu, O. (2022) · IEEE International Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA) · doi:10.1109/hpca53966.2022.00087 · Cited by 43
Yüksel, İ. E., Tuğrul, Y. C., Bostanci, F. N., Junior, G. F. D. O., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Olgun, A., Soysal, M., Luo, H., Gómez-Luna, J., Sadrosadati, M., et al. (2024) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn58291.2024.00024 · Cited by 42
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An Overview of DRAM-Based Security Primitives
Anagnostopoulos, N. A., Katzenbeisser, S., Chandy, J. A., & Tehranipoor, F. (2018) · Cryptography · doi:10.3390/cryptography2020007 · Cited by 41
“On the contrary, an intrinsic silicon TRNG, such as a DRAM-based TRNG, can provide increased security in comparison to a PRNG, while providing low generation times and requiring only dedicated software, a need that is also common to most PRNGs. Recent research has proven that the characteristics of DRAMs may, in some…”
MethodInfluentialSelf-citationInvestigation of DRAM PUFs reliability under device accelerated aging effects
Tehranipoor, F., Karimian, N., Yan, W. Q., & Chandy, J. A. (2017) · IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings · doi:10.1109/iscas.2017.8050629 · Cited by 37
“Hardware security is an emerging field that studies the application of security primitives in hardware such as true random number generations (TRNGs) [1], [2] and their vulnerabilities.”
BackgroundSelf-citationDRNG: DRAM-based random number generation using its startup value behavior
Eckert, C. A., Tehranipoor, F., & Chandy, J. A. (2017) · IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) · doi:10.1109/mwscas.2017.8053159 · Cited by 30
“TRNGs are crucial for various applications from governmental security, product labeling, gaming, gambling, lotto drawing to cryptography.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationTehranipoor, F., Wortman, P. A., Karimian, N., Yan, W. Q., & Chandy, J. A. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems · doi:10.1109/tvlsi.2018.2804258 · Cited by 26
“Memory-based TRNGs such as flash memory-based TRNG [9], [10], DRAM data remanence-based TRNG [11], and SRAM-based TRNG [12].”
MethodSelf-citationMicrocontroller TRNGs Using Perturbed States of NOR Flash Memory Cells
Poudel, P., Ray, B., & Milenković, A. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2018.2866459 · Cited by 24
“[10] pro-”
True Random Number Generation From Commodity NVM Chips
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Attacking SRAM PUFs using very-low-temperature data remanence
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Aging-Resilient SRAM-based True Random Number Generator for Lightweight Devices
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“In [18], the authors use the data rema-nence effect of DRAM to implement a TRNG.”
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Rahman, M. T., Forte, D. J., Wang, X., & Tehranipoor, M. M. (2016) · Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST) · doi:10.1109/asianhost.2016.7835559 · Cited by 16
Yüksel, İ. E., Tuğrul, Y. C., Bostanci, F. N., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Olgun, A., Junior, G. F. D. O., Soysal, M., Luo, H., Gómez-Luna, J., Sadrosadati, M., et al. (2023) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2312.02880 · Cited by 15
Flash-Based Security Primitives: Evolution, Challenges and Future Directions
Gordon, H., Edmonds, J., Ghandali, S., Yan, W. Q., Karimian, N., & Tehranipoor, F. (2021) · Cryptography · doi:10.3390/cryptography5010007 · Cited by 14
Self-citationA Study of Power Supply Variation as a Source of Random Noise
Tehranipoor, F., Karimian, N., Yan, W. Q., & Chandy, J. A. (2017) · International Conference on VLSI Design · doi:10.1109/vlsid.2017.24 · Cited by 14
“Various types of TRNGs have been proposed using different noise and random sources such as ring oscillator (RO) TRNGs [2], memory based TRNGs such as flash memory based [3], DRAM data remanence based TRNGs [4], and block memory based TRNGs [5], etc.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationEnabling Effective Error Mitigation in Memory Chips That Use On-Die Error-Correcting Codes
Patel, M. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000542542 · Cited by 13
Karimian, N., Tehranipoor, F., Anagnostopoulos, N. A., & Yan, W. Q. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1902.09094 · Cited by 12
“More specifically, the power-up values of the DRAM cells [4], their data remanence and data retention characteristics [5], [6], as well as their latency variations [7], [8], are all physical characteristics of DRAM modules that have been used in order to implement security primitives.”
MethodSelf-citationDesign and Architecture of Hardware-based Random Function Security Primitives
Tehranipoor, F. (2017) · OpenCommons - UConn (University of Connecticut) · Cited by 11
Self-citationTuRaN: True Random Number Generation Using Supply Voltage Underscaling in SRAMsPreprint
Yüksel, İ. E., Olgun, A., Salami, B., Bostanci, F. N., Tuğrul, Y. C., Yağlıkçı, A. G., Ghiasi, N. M., Mutlu, O., & Ergin, O. (2022) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000595596 · Cited by 11
Tehranipoor, F. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1806.05332 · Cited by 10
“2) Startup Value Based DRAM PUF: In our observation of DRAM refresh and remanence properties, however, we noticed that certain DRAMs actually exhibit behavior similar to SRAMs, i.e. they have seemingly random startup values [23].”
BackgroundSelf-citationYüksel, İ. E., Olgun, A., Bostanci, F. N., Canpolat, O., Junior, G. F. D. O., Sadrosadati, M., Yağlıkçı, A. G., & Mutlu, O. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Computer Design: VLSI in Computers and Processors (ICCD) · doi:10.1109/iccd65941.2025.00130 · Cited by 9
“DRAM-based TRNGs. Prior works propose DRAM-based mechanisms to implement true random number generators (TRNGs) by violating timing parameters [50, 51, 53], using data retention failures [47,79], and using startup values [48,49].”
How to Generate Robust Keys from Noisy DRAMs?
Karimian, N., & Tehranipoor, F. (2019) · ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (GLSVLSI) · doi:10.1145/3299874.3319494 · Cited by 9
“of an adequate amount of entropy [3] and that a part of them can be used, for a limited amount of time, exclusively as a dedicated security primitive, while the system is running.”
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“memory-based [4], arbiter-based PUF (APUF) [5], latch-based [6] and butterfly PUF [7].”
Hassan, H. (2022) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000601914 · Cited by 8
Random Number Generator Based on Hydrogen Gas Sensor for Security Applications
Erbay, C., & Ergün, S. (2018) · IEEE International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS) · doi:10.1109/mwscas.2018.8624016 · Cited by 6
“Many FPGA [6], DRAM [7] and oscillator-based [8] TRNGs are available.”
MethodA Reliable Current Starved Inverter based Arbiter PUF Architecture for IoT Applications
Kumar, A., & Kurra, U. (2019) · International Journal of Engineering and Advanced Technology · doi:10.35940/ijeat.a1038.1291s519 · Cited by 6
DTRNG: Low Cost and Robust True Random Number Generator Using DRAM Weak Write Scheme
Humood, K., Mohammad, B. S., & Abunahla, H. (2021) · IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems proceedings · doi:10.1109/iscas51556.2021.9401156 · Cited by 6
Kim, J. S. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.1184/r1/13318703 · Cited by 6
Novel Placement Bias For Realizing Highly Reliable Physical Unclonable Functions on FPGA
Chauhan, A. S., Sahula, V., & Mandal, A. (2018) · IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Computing and Communication Technologies (CONECCT) · doi:10.1109/conecct.2018.8482381 · Cited by 5
“Memory based [2], Arbiter Based [3], Latch Based [4] and Butterfly PUF [5].”
Bahrami, J., Danger, J., Ebrahimabadi, M., Guilley, S., & Karimi, N. (2023) · IEEE International Conference on IC Design and Technology (ICICDT) · doi:10.1109/icicdt59917.2023.10332319 · Cited by 5
“In [17], the authors develop a TRNG based on the re-manence effects in DRAM relating to the condition where information remains in DRAM cells even after powering off.”
BackgroundDLA-PUF: deep learning attacks on hardware security primitives
Pugazhenthi, A., Karimian, N., & Tehranipoor, F. (2019) · Autonomous Systems: Sensors, Processing, and Security for Ground, Air, Sea, and Space Vehicles and Infrastructure · doi:10.1117/12.2519257 · Cited by 5
Self-citationLISH: A New Random Number Generator using ECG Noises
Lyp, T., Karimian, N., & Tehranipoor, F. (2021) · International Conference on Consumer Electronics · doi:10.1109/icce50685.2021.9427726 · Cited by 5
“For example, when measuring the start values of DRAM computer cells, the outputs can be influenced greatly by the computer’s starting temperature (e.g cold booting) [7].”
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Yüksel, İ. E., Bostanci, F. N., Olgun, A., & Mutlu, O. (2026) · International Conference on Supercomputing · doi:10.1145/3774895.3819989 · Cited by 4
“Prior DRAM-based TRNG designs use DRAM data retention failures [196,197], DRAM startup values [198,199], and non-determinism in DRAM command scheduling [201] to generate true random numbers.”
SAP: Silicon Authentication Platform for System-on-Chip Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Sami, M. S. U. I., Zhou, J., Saha, S. K., Rahman, F., Farahmandi, F., & Tehranipoor, M. M. (2024) · IEEE International Symposium on Performance Analysis of Systems and Software (ISPASS) · doi:10.1109/ispass61541.2024.00020 · Cited by 4
“…employing randomly generated TP 1 and C 1 and calculated the Hamming distance (HD) between the responses of POCA-Primitive and the response generator, as illustrated in Figure 8 and got an approximate HD of 50%, which means in each session, both responses display unique and random attributes [45].”
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Self-citationE-BOOT: Preventing Boot-Time Entropy Starvation in Cloud Systems
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“When a device is turned on, memory cell contents are unpredictable due to interaction between different logic parts, such as precharge, row decoder and column select [76], [77].”
BackgroundOVERVIEW OF MODERN AUTHENTICATION METHODS FOR MICROCONTROLLERS
Chura, T., & Chura, N. N. (2024) · Cybersecurity Education Science Technique · doi:10.28925/2663-4023.2024.25.200214 · Cited by 3
GPU Side-Channel Attack Classification for Targeted Secure Shader Mitigation
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“…provide a secure sanc-tuary for performing sensitive shader computations; this also involves integrating hardware-based random number generators [24] to facilitate secure random number generation for cryptographic operations and masking schemes and implement secure memory partitioning…”
Design of True Random Number Circuit with Controllable Frequency
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“TRN has unpredictable characteristics, which means that no attacker can observe and manipulate it [1].”
BackgroundIntrinsic PUF Instance on Non-Volatile NAND Flash MemoryPreprint
Vasudeva, S., Tehranipoor, F., & Karimian, N. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2111.05459 · Cited by 3
“Hardware security primitives are potential solutions [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] to secure consumer electronic devices [17].”
Self-citationLoaded Dice: Solving the Non-Selection Problem for Scalable Probabilistic RowHammer Defense
Woo, J., Kim, J., Jaleel, A., & Nair, P. J. (2026) · Proceedings - International Symposium on Computer Architecture/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/isca66397.2026.00115 · Cited by 2
“Thus, if PrISM issues at most R RFMs per W activations, the worst-case throughput loss is: This bounds the worst-case throughput loss from default and intersection-induced mitigations under sustained attacks.”
Yan, W. Q., Zhu, H., Yu, Z., Tehranipoor, F., Chandy, J. A., Zhang, N., & Zhang, X. (2020) · IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) · doi:10.1109/host45689.2020.9300293 · Cited by 2
“True random number generation has attracted a significant amount of attention in the past decade [8].”
BackgroundSelf-citationReverse engineering resistant ROM design using transformable via-programming structure
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“Memory devices are essential to application-specific computing systems, such as embedded signal processing systems [1] [2], physical unclonable functions (PUF) [3], and true random number generators (TRNG) [4].”
BackgroundThe method for generating a trust field in wireless distributed communication systems
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“In the hardware methods [1-4], although the random number generation speed is high, the transmitting and receiving terminal could not generate a same random number.”
MethodSon İşlem Algoritmalarının İncelenmesi
Yosunlu, D., & Avaroğlu, E. (2020) · Bilgisayar Bilimleri ve Teknolojileri Dergisi · Cited by 1
Hardware Security Primitives Based on Emerging Technologies
Tehranipoor, M. M., Pundir, N., Vashistha, N., & Farahmandi, F. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-19185-5_9 · Cited by 1
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Mahmod, J. (2024) · VTechWorks (Virginia Tech) · Cited by 1
Attacks on Lightweight Hardware-Based Security PrimitivesPreprint
Edmonds, J., & Tehranipoor, F. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2011.13450
“A few examples that a TRNG could utilize for this purpose include phase noise, thermal noise, jitter, random telegraph noise, and the photoelectric effect [25].”
BackgroundMethodSelf-citationDonon, Y., Künzler, F., Jasiński, P., Piening, C., & Savary, A. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-33386-6_38
Nasution, B. B., Sembiring, R. W., Siregar, I., & Mardi, R. W. (2025) · IFIP advances in information and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-97115-0_10
Memory-Centric Computing: Solving Computing's Memory ProblemPreprint
Mutlu, O., Olgun, A., & Yüksel, İ. E. (2025) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.00458
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tehranipoor, F., Yan, W., & Chandy, J. A.
- Affiliations
- University of Connecticut (US)
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-05
- Pages
- 79-84
- OpenAlex
- W2429633288
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 6.93
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Comcast
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- true random number generator, dynamic random access memory, hardware randomness, NIST statistical tests, cryptographic randomness, hardware security primitives
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.