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Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported

Open access
Martins, Tiago, Oliveira, Sergio Vidal Garcia · 2022 · Sensors

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 24 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

The Zero Trust concept is being adopted in information technology (IT) deployments, while human users remain to be the main risk for operational technology (OT) deployments. This article proposes to enhance the new Modbus/TCP Security protocol with authentication and authorization functions that guarantee security against intentional unauthorized access. It aims to comply with the principle of never trusting the person who is accessing the network before carrying out a security check. Two functions are tested and used in order to build an access control method that is based on a username and a password for human users with knowledge of industrial automation control systems (IACS), using simple means, low motivation, and few resources. A man-in-the-middle (MITM) component was added in order to intermediate the client and the server communication and to validate these functions. The proposed scenario was implemented using the Node-RED programming platform. The tests implementing the functions and the access control method through the Node-RED software have proven their potential and their applicability.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes enhancing the Modbus/TCP Security protocol with two user-defined functions for authentication and authorization to build access control for human users. Tests implemented in Node-RED show role-based read/write permissions and rejection of unknown users, supporting IEC 62443-4-2 security level 1.

Key findings

  • Two new user-defined functions are proposed: authentication with function code 0x69, using a 28-byte username and 32-byte password and returning a 32-byte token, and authorization with function code 0x6A, which encapsulates the original Modbus PDU limited to 216 bytes and uses the token to identify the user.
  • In Node-RED tests, with access control disabled, read and write requests to register 0x64 succeeded, changing the value from 0x00 to 0xFF; with access control enabled, public read and write requests were denied with an illegal function exception.
  • Role segmentation was demonstrated: user Bob (read-only) authenticated and read successfully but had a write request denied; user Alice (read/write) authenticated and both read and wrote successfully, changing register 0x64 to 0xFF; user Cris (unknown) received an authentication exception and the global token was forced to null.
  • The authors state the implementation evidences applicability for constructing access control that allows level one of maturity under IEC 62443-4-2, covering authentication (FR 1) and usage control (FR 2), against casual unauthorized users with generic IACS knowledge, simple means, few resources, and low motivation.

Methods

  • Design: the Modbus/TCP Security protocol is enhanced with two user-defined functions—authentication (0x69) and authorization (0x6A)—and a man-in-the-middle (MITM) component intermediates client–server communication to validate these functions.
  • Implementation and sample: the proposed scenario was simulated using the Node-RED programming platform, with a Modbus server on TCP port 502, a Modbus client, and a MITM flow on TCP port 802; tests used register 0x64 and users Bob, Alice, and Cris.
  • Main analysis: tests compared access control disabled versus enabled, exercised authentication and authorization requests, and verified read/write permissions and exception responses according to each user’s role.

Limitations

  • The paper states that encryption and audit-relevant event storage were not applied in the tests because they were not considered of paramount importance for validating the developed functions; PKI certificates were not used during testing but are essential for the functions to work correctly and must support revocation or limited expiration.
  • The paper states vulnerabilities: other device access interfaces must also be controlled, password-based authenticator secrecy can be compromised by sharing, policies must limit authenticator lifetime, and the implemented access control is vulnerable to actors with many resources and deep IACS knowledge; it recommends multifactor authentication, double approval for critical parameter changes, and other mitigations.
  • The paper states that encapsulating the authorization function required limiting the original PDU to 216 bytes, so care must be taken not to apply the functions with PDUs that exceed this amount.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/s22208024

Cites

19 of 19 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Figures

Figure 1 Modbus application data unit structure.
Figure 1 Modbus application data unit structure.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 PDUs of the new authentication user-defined function.
Figure 2 PDUs of the new authentication user-defined function.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 PDUs of the new authorization user-defined function.
Figure 3 PDUs of the new authorization user-defined function.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Example of an industrial automation and control system.
Figure 4 Example of an industrial automation and control system.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Standard Modbus client-server scenario.
Figure 5 Standard Modbus client-server scenario.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 Laboratory’s scenario, MITM agent.
Figure 6 Laboratory’s scenario, MITM agent.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 Node-RED Modbus server flow simulates the PLC.
Figure 7 Node-RED Modbus server flow simulates the PLC.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 8 Node-RED auxiliary flow.
Figure 8 Node-RED auxiliary flow.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 9 Node-RED man-in-the-middle flow simulates the SBC.
Figure 9 Node-RED man-in-the-middle flow simulates the SBC.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 10 Node-RED authentication request flow simulates the first part of the HMI.
Figure 10 Node-RED authentication request flow simulates the first part of the HMI.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 11 Node-RED Modbus client flow simulates second part of the HMI.
Figure 11 Node-RED Modbus client flow simulates second part of the HMI.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 12 Event log of access control disabled.
Figure 12 Event log of access control disabled.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 13 Read holding register PDUs [32].
Figure 13 Read holding register PDUs [32].CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 14 Write multiple register PDUs [32].
Figure 14 Write multiple register PDUs [32].CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 15 Event log of new function with access control disabled.
Figure 15 Event log of new function with access control disabled.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 16 Event log when enabling access control.
Figure 16 Event log when enabling access control.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 17 Event log of illegal function to read and write registers.
Figure 17 Event log of illegal function to read and write registers.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 18 Event log of Bob’s requests.
Figure 18 Event log of Bob’s requests.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 19 Event log of Alice’s requests.
Figure 19 Event log of Alice’s requests.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 20 User Cris’s authentication event log.
Figure 20 User Cris’s authentication event log.CC BY · PubMed Central

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 2 Not valid · 14 Not checked · 30 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 18
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 23

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Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 19 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Lorenz, 2015, Industry 4.0: The future of productivity and growth in manufacturing industries, Boston Consult. Group, 9, 54

Cited by

See all 45

Metadata

Authors
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G.
Affiliations
  • Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina (BR)
  • Departamento de Engenharia Elétrica, Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina, Joinville 89219-710, Brazil
Venue
Sensors
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2022-10-20
Volume
22
Issue
20
Pages
8024
ISSN
1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4306965903
Cited by
45
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 2
FWCI
3.02
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • LA Referencia (Red Federada de Repositorios Institucionales de Publicaciones Científicas) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior–CAPES–Brazil (1484/2020)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
Keywords
Modbus TCP, security protocols, authentication, authorization, access control, zero-trust architecture, operational technology security, man-in-the-middle attacks, Node-RED, unauthorized access prevention
MeSH terms
Confidentiality, Humans, Software, Computer Security, Telemedicine

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/s22208024
The paper
Martins, T., & Oliveira, S. V. G. (2022). Enhanced Modbus/TCP Security Protocol: Authentication and Authorization Functions Supported. Sensors. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22208024

Data sources

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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