Towards A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on Scada System
Abstract
SCADA (SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION) systems are the software that is used to control the hardware i.e. PLCs, PIDs, etc. and acquires the data from the devices (i.e. SCADA RTU, RTU) into a computer system (i.e. SCADA System). Its function is to handle the plant operations in our plant at remote locations using the control system. This is a modern control system of modern industry where we can read real-time data that means we can exactly monitor the things happening in the field. We emphasize on the differences between SCADA systems and traditional IT systems and on pair of security goals that may secure our computer systems from cyber threats. If the patching goes wrong and it bricks the SCADA system, consequences could be severe like-Contaminated food, explosions, severe death, blackouts, severe injury, etc. Cyber-physical attacks are used on the SCADA system such as switching off the lights of the room where the monitor is present or turning off the camera to perform some attack on a system, hacking the system by cracking a password or destroying firewall. The main intention of SCADA is remote controlling and maintenance.
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The 2015 Black energy cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid exposed the weakness of critical infrastructure and raised questions about the security of other power grids around the world.
“In addition, the 2015 Black energy cyber attack on the Ukrainian power grid [172] exposed the weakness of critical infrastructure and raised questions about the security of other power grids around the world.”
From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [172]
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Sverko, M., Grbac, T. G., & Mikuc, M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3211288 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
“0, CPS, ICS, SCADA systems and the manufacturing industry in general, providing insight into the security risks and implementation of digital security measures in these environments [167], taxonomy of attacks [172], [173] and security standards developed for SCADA networks [173], intrusion detection systems [57], gene…”
Background
- Authors
- Banga, A., Gupta, D., & Bathla, R.
- Affiliations
- Amity University (IN)
- Venue
- 2019 International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Control Systems (ICCS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-05
- Pages
- 343-347
- OpenAlex
- W3017190710
- Cited by
- 7
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 0.77
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Control Systems (ICICCS) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- SCADA systems, cyberattacks, attack taxonomy, cyber-physical attacks, industrial cybersecurity, security objectives, remote monitoring and control, PLC, remote terminal units
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