The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DUP-Net: Denoiser and Upsampler Network for 3D Adversarial Point Clouds Defense
Open accessAbstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which poses a threat to their application in security sensitive systems. We propose a Denoiser and UPsampler Network (DUP-Net) structure as defenses for 3D adversarial point cloud classification, where the two modules reconstruct surface smoothness by dropping or adding points. In this paper, statistical outlier removal (SOR) and a data-driven upsampling network are considered as denoiser and upsampler respectively. Compared with baseline defenses, DUP-Net has three advantages. First, with DUP-Net as a defense, the target model is more robust to white-box adversarial attacks. Second, the statistical outlier removal provides added robustness since it is a non-differentiable denoising operation. Third, the upsampler network can be trained on a small dataset and defends well against adversarial attacks generated from other point cloud datasets. We conduct various experiments to validate that DUP-Net is very effective as defense in practice. Our best defense eliminates 83.8% of C&W and l2 loss based attack (point shifting), 50.0% of C&W and Hausdorff distance loss based attack (point adding) and 9.0% of saliency map based attack (point dropping) under 200 dropped points on PointNet.
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Cites
Adam: A Method for Stochastic Optimization
Kingma, D. P., & Ba, J. (2014) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1412.6980 · Cited by 98,946
Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples
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Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.49 · Cited by 8,859
Intriguing properties of neural networks
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Dynamic Graph CNN for Learning on Point Clouds
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DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
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“When model parameters are known, a paradigm called white-box attacks includes methods based on calculating the gradient of the network, such as FGSM [9], IGSM [10] and JSMA [23], and based on solving optimization problems, such as LBFGS [29], Deepfool [21] and Carlini & Wagner (C&W) attack [3].”
MethodThe Limitations of Deep Learning in Adversarial Settings
Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Jha, S., Fredrikson, M., Celik, Z. B., & Swami, A. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.36 · Cited by 3,993
Practical Black-Box Attacks against Machine Learning
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Frustum PointNets for 3D Object Detection from RGB-D Data
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One Pixel Attack for Fooling Deep Neural Networks
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Adversarial machine learning at scale
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., & Bengio, S. (2016) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1611.01236 · Cited by 2,325
Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples
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Delving into Transferable Adversarial Examples and Black-box Attacks
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Cited by
Advances in Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Computer Vision: A Survey
Akhtar, N., Mian, A., Kardan, N., & Shah, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3127960 · Cited by 302
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhou, H., Chen, K., Zhang, W., Fang, H., Zhou, W., & Yu, N.
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-10
- Pages
- 1961-1970
- OpenAlex
- W2981979099
- Cited by
- 169
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 5.01
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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