Cited by 8,859Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingSoftware Testing and Debugging Techniques

Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks

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Carlini, Nicholas, Wagner, David·2017·2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Neural networks provide state-of-the-art results for most machine learning tasks. Unfortunately, neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples: given an input x and any target classification t, it is possible to find a new input x' that is similar to x but classified as t. This makes it difficult to apply neural networks in security-critical areas. Defensive distillation is a recently proposed approach that can take an arbitrary neural network, and increase its robustness, reducing the success rate of current attacks' ability to find adversarial examples from 95% to 0.5%. In this paper, we demonstrate that defensive distillation does not significantly increase the robustness of neural networks by introducing three new attack algorithms that are successful on both distilled and undistilled neural networks with 100% probability. Our attacks are tailored to three distance metrics used previously in the literature, and when compared to previous adversarial example generation algorithms, our attacks are often much more effective (and never worse). Furthermore, we propose using high-confidence adversarial examples in a simple transferability test we show can also be used to break defensive distillation. We hope our attacks will be used as a benchmark in future defense attempts to create neural networks that resist adversarial examples.

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  • Carlini and Farid (2020) add imperceptible adversarial perturbations to fake/real faces and show that even state-of-the-art DeepFake detectors are vulnerable to both white-box and black-box attacks with significant accuracy reduction on public datasets.

    “For example, Carlini and Farid (2020) add imperceptible adversarial perturbations to the fake/real faces and show that even the state-of-the-art DeepFake detectors are vulnerable to both white-box and black-box attacks (Carlini and Wagner 2017; Brown et al. 2017) with significant accuracy reduction on the public datasets (Wang et al. 2020e; Frank et al. 2020).”

    From Countering Malicious DeepFakes: Survey, Battleground, and Horizon (2022) · cites this paper as Carlini and Wagner 2017

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  • Existing detection methods face challenges with generalization across datasets and vulnerability to adversarial attacks.

    “Existing detection methods face challenges with generalization across datasets and vulnerability to adversarial attacks.”

    From Comprehensive Evaluation of Deepfake Detection Models: Accuracy, Generalization, and Resilience to Adversarial Attacks (2025) · cites this paper as [4]

    The Introduction says neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, and the Original Adversarial section shows that a proposed defense, defensive distillation, fails against stronger attacks (page numbers unavailable). The paper does not establish that detection methods struggle to generalize across datasets; testing attacks on three datasets is not a finding about cross-dataset generalization. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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  • Adversarial attacks have been widely studied against ML models under both white-box and black-box assumptions.

    “Adversarial attacks have been widely studied against ML models [47,50] under both white-box [9, 21, 31, 55] and black-box assumptions [33, 43].”

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. GOODFELLOW, I. J., SHLENS, J., AND SZEGEDY, C. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572 (2014). · arXiv
  2. HUANG, X., KWIATKOWSKA, M., WANG, S., AND WU, M. Safety verification of deep neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.06940 (2016). · arXiv
  3. MAAS, A. L., HANNUN, A. Y., AND NG, A. Y. Rectifier nonlinearities improve neural network acoustic models. In Proc. ICML (2013), vol. 30.
  4. PAPERNOT, N., GOODFELLOW, I., SHEATSLEY, R., FEINMAN, R., AND MCDANIEL, P. cleverhans v1.0.0: an adversarial machine learning library. arXiv preprint arXiv:1610.00768 (2016). · arXiv
  5. SZEGEDY, C., VANHOUCKE, V., IOFFE, S., SHLENS, J., AND WOJNA, Z. Rethinking the Inception architecture for computer vision. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.00567 (2015). · arXiv
  6. YUAN, Z., LU, Y., WANG, Z., AND XUE, Y. Droid-sec: Deep learning in android malware detection. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Commu- nication Review (2014), vol. 44, ACM, pp. 371-372. APPENDIX

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Authors
Carlini, N., & Wagner, D.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Venue
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2017-05
Pages
39-57
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2516574342
Cited by
8,859
References
45
Citations by year
2026: 566 · 2025: 983 · 2024: 1222 · 2023: 1200 · 2022: 1111 · 2021: 1308 · 2020: 1181 · 2019: 801 · 2018: 393 · 2017: 86 · 2016: 5 · 2014: 1 · 2012: 1
FWCI
306.99
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Cisco Systems
  • International Science and Technology Center
  • Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (FA9550-12–1-0040)
  • Air Force Office of Scientific Research (FA9550-, FA9550-12, FA9550‐12‐1, FA9550-12-1-0040)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Software Testing and Debugging Techniques
Keywords
adversarial examples, defensive distillation, adversarial attacks, neural network robustness, attack transferability, distance measures, robustness analysis

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