The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes
Abstract
The Internet's interdomain routing protocol, BGP, is vulnerable to a number of damaging attacks, which often arise from operator misconfiguration. Proposed solutions with strong guarantees require a public-key infrastructure, accurate routing registries, and changes to BGP. However, BGP routers can avoid selecting and propagating these routes if they are cautious about adopting new reachability information. We describe a protocol- preserving enhancement to BGP, Pretty Good BGP (PGBGP), that slows the dissemination of bogus routes, providing network operators time to respond before problems escalate into large- scale Internet attacks. Simulation results show that realistic deployments of PGBGP could provide 99% of Autonomous Systems with 24 hours to investigate and repair bogus routes without affecting prefix reachability. We also show that without PGBGP, 40% of ASs cannot avoid selecting bogus routes; with PGBGP, this number drops to less than 1%. Finally, we show that PGBGP is incrementally deployable and offers significant security benefits to early adopters and their customers.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Understanding BGP misconfiguration
Mahajan, R., Wetherall, D., & Anderson, T. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/633025.633027 · Cited by 533
Cited by
A Survey of Man in the Middle Attacks
Conti, M., Dragoni, N., & Lesyk, V. (2016) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2016.2548426 · Cited by 724
A case for stateful forwarding plane
Yi, C., Afanasyev, A., Moiseenko, I., Wang, L., Zhang, B., & Zhang, L. (2013) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2013.01.005 · Cited by 474
Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies
Apostolaki, M., Zohar, A., & Vanbever, L. (2017) · 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2017.29 · Cited by 469
A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions
Butler, K., Farley, T. R., McDaniel, P., & Rexford, J. (2010) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2009.2034031 · Cited by 350
Self-citationAdaptive forwarding in named data networking
Yi, C., Afanasyev, A., Wang, L., Zhang, B., & Zhang, L. (2012) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/2317307.2317319 · Cited by 308
Metadata
- Authors
- Karlin, J., Forrest, S., & Rexford, J.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2006-11
- Pages
- 290-299
- ISSN
- 1092-1648 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2136680211
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 12.59
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/icnp.2006.320179
- The paper
- Karlin, J., Forrest, S., & Rexford, J. (2006). Pretty Good BGP: Improving BGP by Cautiously Adopting Routes. Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols. https://doi.org/10.1109/icnp.2006.320179
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.