Cited by 536Network Traffic and Congestion ControlNetwork Security and Intrusion DetectionSoftware-Defined Networks and 5G

Understanding BGP misconfiguration

Open access
Mahajan, Ratul, Wetherall, David, Anderson, Tom·2002·Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications

Abstract

It is well-known that simple, accidental BGP configuration errors can disrupt Internet connectivity. Yet little is known about the frequency of misconfiguration or its causes, except for the few spectacular incidents of widespread outages. In this paper, we present the first quantitative study of BGP misconfiguration. Over a three week period, we analyzed routing table advertisements from 23 vantage points across the Internet backbone to detect incidents of misconfiguration. For each incident we polled the ISP operators involved to verify whether it was a misconfiguration, and to learn the cause of the incident. We also actively probed the Internet to determine the impact of misconfiguration on connectivity.Surprisingly, we find that configuration errors are pervasive, with 200-1200 prefixes (0.2-1.0% of the BGP table size) suffering from misconfiguration each day. Close to 3 in 4 of all new prefix advertisements were results of misconfiguration. Fortunately, the connectivity seen by end users is surprisingly robust to misconfigurations. While misconfigurations can substantially increase the update load on routers, only one in twenty five affects connectivity. While the causes of misconfiguration are diverse, we argue that most could be prevented through better router design.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1145/633025.633027

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34 of 34 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Tracing and analysis stacks in large organisations are designed to support rapid, iterative diagnosis at scale, because static dashboards are not enough.

    “Second, tracing and analysis stacks in large organisations are designed to support rapid, iterative diagnosis at scale, because static dashboards are not enough [61], [77], [60], [57].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [61]

    Section 7.4 (page unavailable) argues that tools checking BGP’s dynamic state could shorten the time misconfigurations go undetected, and notes that operators use looking glasses to debug routing problems. It does not describe tracing and analysis stacks in large organisations, rapid iterative diagnosis at scale, or static dashboards as inadequate; its proposed automated checking is not an account of how existing stacks are designed. (LLM, conf=0.75)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Canopy addresses traceability at scale through end-to-end traceability and analysis for high-volume production settings.

    “Canopy addresses this through end-to-end traceability and analysis for highvolume production settings [61].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [61]

    The Introduction and §§4.2–5.2 examine BGP routing misconfigurations, not Canopy. Searches for Canopy, end-to-end traceability, and high-volume production settings found no passage in our copy addressing the attributed claim. Page numbers were not available in the indexed passages. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Production debugging systems are used in practice through writing a discriminating query, refining the candidate set, and then writing the next query.

    “This framing aligns well with how production debugging systems are used in practice, through writing discriminating query, refine the candidate set, and then write the next query [78], [61], [53], [54].”

    From Large language models for agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, evaluation, and safety (2027) · cites this paper as [61]

    Section 7.4 (Protocol Extensions; page unavailable) says operators use public looking glasses to manually debug routing problems. It does not describe writing discriminating queries, refining a candidate set, or choosing a next query. Searches for those terms and for iterative debugging found no passage establishing the claimed workflow. (LLM, conf=0.72)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

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4 of the 38 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. J. Stone and C. Partridge. When the Checksum and the Data Disagree. In ACM SIGCOMM, Aug. 2000.

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Authors
Mahajan, R., Wetherall, D., & Anderson, T.
Affiliations
University of Washington (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2002 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Publisher
ACM
Published
2002-08-19
Pages
3-16
OpenAlex
W1967656199
Cited by
533
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 37
FWCI
24.06
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM) (publishedVersion)
Funders
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Traffic and Congestion Control
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Software-Defined Networks and 5G
Keywords
BGP routing, Internet routing, network outages, router design, Internet backbone

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