The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Security and privacy requirements analysis within a social setting
Abstract
Security issues for software systems ultimately concern relationships among social actors stakeholders, system users, potential attackers - and the software acting on their behalf. We propose a methodological framework for dealing with security and privacy requirements based on i*, an agent-oriented requirements modeling language. The framework supports a set of analysis techniques. In particular, attacker analysis helps identify potential system abusers and their malicious intents. Dependency vulnerability analysis helps detect vulnerabilities in terms of organizational relationships among stakeholders. Countermeasure analysis supports the dynamic decision-making process of defensive system players in addressing vulnerabilities and threats. Finally, access control analysis bridges the gap between security requirement models and security implementation models. The framework is illustrated with an example involving security and privacy concerns in the design of agent-based health information systems. In addition, we discuss model evaluation techniques, including qualitative goal model analysis and property verification techniques based on model checking.
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Cites
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Self-citation
Cited by
On Non-Functional Requirements in Software Engineering
Chung, L., & do Prado Leite, J. C. S. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-02463-4_19 · Cited by 2,247
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Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis
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Towards Achieving Data Security with the Cloud Computing Adoption Framework
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Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, L., Yu, E., & Mylopoulos, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Lightwave Technology
- Publisher
- IEEE Comput. Soc
- Published
- 2004-04-23
- Pages
- 151-161
- ISSN
- 0733-8724 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2110157102
- Cited by
- 393
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 44.75
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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