Development of Injection Attacks Toolbox in MATLAB/Simulink for Attacks Simulation in Industrial Control System Applications
Abstract
Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) introduce the terms such and Industry 4.0 or Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) that led to interconnectivity of several smart devices in an industry ranging from simple sensors to complex machines. With the advantages of interconnectivity, there is an equivalent rise in exposure to threats or attacks. Such attacks on ICS are inevitable and there exists several examples. In order to protect ICS from such attacks, a proper securing mechanism is necessary. This security mechanism needs to get trained for all possible attacks on the industrial network. Relaying of real data for training is almost impossible as we can't get the attack data to train and test the security mechanisms. For this purpose, we provide an injection attack toolbox developed in MATLAB/Simulink to insert manipulated data values into the plant data so that the security mechanism can understand the different behaviors of the possible attacks on ICS. The developed toolbox is freely available in GitHub and can be used for research purpose.
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Better domain knowledge provided a strong basis for building simulation environments proposed as various SCADA testbeds able to visualize the stages of a cyber attack, and a toolbox for attack simulation to train and test security mechanisms.
“The Better domain knowledge, which resulted from aforementioned research, provided a strong basis for building simulation environments that are proposed in form of various SCADA testbeds [57], [177] able to visualize the stages of a cyber attack [178], and a toolbox for attack simulation to train and test the security mechanisms [179]”
From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [178]
Cites
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Tange, K., De Donno, M., Fafoutis, X., & Dragoni, N. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.3011208 · Cited by 410 · see citing works
“through stealthy injection attacks [196], or to establish covert communication channels, as demonstrated in [172], and should be monitored against.”
BackgroundSverko, M., Grbac, T. G., & Mikuc, M. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3211288 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
“The better domain knowledge, which resulted from aforementioned research, provided a strong basis for building simulation environments that are proposed in form of various SCADA testbeds [57], [176], able to visualize the stages of a cyber attack [177], and a toolbox for attack simulation to train and test the securit…”
BackgroundTowards Low-Barrier Cybersecurity Research and Education for Industrial Control Systems
McGuan, C., Yu, C., & Lin, Q. (2023) · 2023 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI) · doi:10.1109/isi58743.2023.10297207 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
- Authors
- Potluri, S., Diedrich, C., Roy Nanduru, S. R., & Vasamshetty, K.
- Affiliations
- Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg (DE)
- Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg,Institute for Automation Engineering,Magdeburg,Germany
- ORCID
- Diedrich, Christian
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE 17th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-07
- Pages
- 1192-1198
- ISSN
- 1935-4576 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3003958018
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 2
- FWCI
- 1.93
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
- Keywords
- injection attacks, industrial control systems, attack simulation, industrial network security, Industrial Internet of Things, cyber-physical security
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