A Framework for Attack-Resilient Industrial Control Systems: Attack Detection and Controller Reconfiguration
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Most existing industrial control systems (ICSs), such as building energy management systems (EMSs), were installed when potential security threats were only physical. With advances in connectivity, ICSs are now, typically, connected to communications networks and, as a result, can be accessed remotely. This extends the attack surface to include the potential for sophisticated cyber attacks, which can adversely impact ICS operation, resulting in service interruption, equipment damage, safety concerns, and associated financial implications. In this work, a novel cyber-physical security framework for ICSs is proposed, which incorporates an analytics tool for attack detection and executes a reliable estimation-based attack-resilient control policy, whenever an attack is detected. The proposed framework is adaptable to already implemented ICS and the stability and optimal performance of the controlled system under attack has been proved. The performance of the proposed framework is evaluated using a reduced order model of a real EMS site and simulated attacks.
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Cites
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Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks
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Cited by
Zhu, Y., & Zheng, W. X. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2019.2953210 · Cited by 303
A blockchain enabled Cyber-Physical System architecture for Industry 4.0 manufacturing systems
Lee, J., Azamfar, M., & Singh, J. (2019) · Manufacturing Letters · doi:10.1016/j.mfglet.2019.05.003 · Cited by 265
State of the art of cyber-physical systems security: An automatic control perspective
Zacchia Lun, Y., D’Innocenzo, A., Smarra, F., Malavolta, I., & Di Benedetto, M. D. (2019) · Journal of Systems and Software · doi:10.1016/j.jss.2018.12.006 · Cited by 211
“Distributed approaches are examined in 14 works (alone in Pasqualetti et al. (2011), Tajer et al.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialA Distributed Cyber-Attack Detection Scheme With Application to DC Microgrids
Gallo, A. J., Turan, M. S., Boem, F., Parisini, T., & Ferrari-Trecate, G. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2020.2982577 · Cited by 187
“In the context of secure control, as highlighted recently in [22], attack detection and resilience schemes can be often divided in data driven and knowledge-based approaches.”
BackgroundA critical review of cyber-physical security for building automation systems
Li, G., Ren, L., Fu, Y., Yang, Z., Adetola, V., Wen, J., Zhu, Q., Wu, T., Candan, K. S., & O'Neill, Z. (2023) · Annual Reviews in Control · doi:10.1016/j.arcontrol.2023.02.004 · Cited by 71
“Paridari et al. (Paridari, et al., 2017) further proposed a data-driven anomaly detection method and a control reconfiguration strategy to maintain the system stability and performance under man-in-the-middle sensor attacks.”
BackgroundMethod
Metadata
- Authors
- Paridari, K., O'Mahony, N., El-Din Mady, A., Chabukswar, R., Boubekeur, M., & Sandberg, H.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the IEEE
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 113-128
- ISSN
- 0018-9219 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2256
- OpenAlex
- W2751913761
- Cited by
- 143
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 5.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Paridari, K., O'Mahony, N., El-Din Mady, A., Chabukswar, R., Boubekeur, M., & Sandberg, H. (2018). A Framework for Attack-Resilient Industrial Control Systems: Attack Detection and Controller Reconfiguration. Proceedings of the IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/jproc.2017.2725482
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