Cited by 278Smart Grid Security and ResilienceInformation and Cyber SecurityRisk and Safety Analysis

Cyber security risk assessment for SCADA and DCS networks

Ralston, P.A.S., Graham, J.H., Hieb, J.L.·2007·ISA Transactions

Abstract

The growing dependence of critical infrastructures and industrial automation on interconnected physical and cyber-based control systems has resulted in a growing and previously unforeseen cyber security threat to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and distributed control systems (DCSs). It is critical that engineers and managers understand these issues and know how to locate the information they need. This paper provides a broad overview of cyber security and risk assessment for SCADA and DCS, introduces the main industry organizations and government groups working in this area, and gives a comprehensive review of the literature to date. Major concepts related to the risk assessment methods are introduced with references cited for more detail. Included are risk assessment methods such as HHM, IIM, and RFRM which have been applied successfully to SCADA systems with many interdependencies and have highlighted the need for quantifiable metrics. Presented in broad terms is probability risk analysis (PRA) which includes methods such as FTA, ETA, and FEMA. The paper concludes with a general discussion of two recent methods (one based on compromise graphs and one on augmented vulnerability trees) that quantitatively determine the probability of an attack, the impact of the attack, and the reduction in risk associated with a particular countermeasure.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/j.isatra.2007.04.003

Cites

54 of 54 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • ICS integrity is critical to OT security and the priority is to detect various security events and incidents, such as failure of devices and services exhausting resources early.

    “ICS integrity is critical to OT security and the priority is to detect various security events and incidents, such as failure of devices and services exhausting resources early [100].”
  • Risk assessment methods in general and in the context of SCADA systems specifically are hard to categorise.

    “Risk assessment methods in general and in the context of SCADA systems specifically are hard to categorise as we con-clude based on our analysis and in agreement with Morgan (2013) and Ralston et al. (2007).”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Ralston et al., 2007

  • Ralston et al. (2007) contains an extensive overview of risk assessment methodologies, but only two methods are examined in detail.

    “An extensive overview of risk assessment meth-odologies is contained in Ralston et al. (2007), but only two methods are examined in detail.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Ralston et al., 2007

  • Risk assessment methods as applied to SCADA systems are difficult to categorise.

    “As pointed out in Morgan (2013) and Ralston et al. (2007), risk assessment methods as applied to SCADA systems are dif-ficult to categorise.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Ralston et al., 2007

  • Among probabilistic tree-based methods for SCADA systems, inductive and deductive methods are distinguished.

    “In Cheminod et al. (2013), Patel et al. (2008), Ralston et al. (2007), Taylor et al. (2002), among proba-bilistic tree-based methods for SCADA systems inductive and deductive methods are distinguished.”

    From A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems (2016) · cites this paper as Ralston et al., 2007

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Authors
Ralston, P. A. S., Graham, J. H., & Hieb, J. L.
Affiliations
University of Louisville (US)
Corresponding author
Ralston, P.A.S.
Venue
ISA Transactions
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2007-10
Volume
46
Issue
4
Pages
583-594
ISSN
0019-0578 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2050588495
Cited by
267
References
62
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 10 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 26 · 2019: 34 · 2018: 27 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 12
FWCI
12.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • ISA Transactions (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • U.S. Department of Homeland Security
  • Furman University
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Risk and Safety Analysis
Keywords
cybersecurity risk assessment, SCADA systems, distributed control systems, industrial control systems, critical infrastructure, risk assessment methodology, HAZOP, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis, attack probability

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