Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Outlook: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Impacts, and Mitigations
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The digitization and decentralization of the electric power grid are key thrusts for an economically and environmentally sustainable future. Toward this goal, distributed energy resources (DER), including rooftop solar panels, battery storage, electric vehicles, etc., are becoming ubiquitous in power systems. Power utilities benefit from DERs as they minimize operational costs; at the same time, DERs grant users and aggregators control over the power they produce and consume. DERs are interconnected, interoperable, and support remotely controllable features; thus, their cybersecurity is of cardinal importance. DER communication dependencies and the diversity of DER architectures widen the threat surface and aggravate the cybersecurity posture of power systems. In this work, we focus on security oversights that reside in the cyber and physical layers of DERs and can jeopardize grid operations. The existing works have underlined the impact of cyberattacks targeting DER assets; however, they either focus on specific system components (e.g., communication protocols), do not consider the mission-critical objectives of DERs, or neglect the adversarial perspective (e.g., adversary/attack models) altogether. To address these omissions, we comprehensively analyze adversarial capabilities and objectives when manipulating DER assets, and then present how protocol and device-level vulnerabilities can materialize into cyberattacks impacting power system operations. Finally, we provide mitigation strategies to thwart adversaries and directions for future DER cybersecurity research.
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Citations
Cites
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security
Stouffer, K., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Abrams, M., & Hahn, A. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r2 · Cited by 1,377 · cited 1×
“The use of physical and logical network segmentation and perimeter security defenses can be used to prohibit access to critical parts of the system and prevent the lateral movement of threat actors between IT and ICS networks (if the prior is compromised) [69].”
BackgroundAttack taxonomies for the Modbus protocols
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Consumer, Commercial, and Industrial IoT (In)Security: Attack Taxonomy and Case Studies
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Self-citationWind farm security: attack surface, targets, scenarios and mitigation
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“Similarly, in [88], by compromising network devices and wind process automation controllers, malicious requests can be sent to”
BackgroundSundararajan, A., Chavan, A., Saleem, D., & Sarwat, A. I. (2018) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en11092360 · Cited by 57 · cited 7×
“MAC addresses can be spoofed, allowing Ethernet frames to be forwarded to adversaries [41].”
BackgroundInfluentialAn event buffer flooding attack in DNP3 controlled SCADA systems
Jin, D., Nicol, D. M., & Yan, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the 2011 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC) · doi:10.1109/wsc.2011.6147969 · Cited by 56
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“For instance, the authors in [114] and [115], propose pulse-width-modulation and a high-frequency resonance scheme, respectively, that can mitigate the power quality degradation introduced by EVs and bidirectional gridtied converters (e.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Zografopoulos, I., Hatziargyriou, N. D., & Konstantinou, C.
- Venue
- IEEE Systems Journal
- Published
- 2023-12
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 6695-6709
- ISSN
- 1932-8184 (ISSN-L)
- 1937-9234
- 2373-7816
- OpenAlex
- W4386362892
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 18.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Zografopoulos, I., Hatziargyriou, N. D., & Konstantinou, C. (2023). Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Outlook: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Impacts, and Mitigations. IEEE Systems Journal. https://doi.org/10.1109/jsyst.2023.3305757
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