Cited by 57Smart Grid Security and ResiliencePower Systems and TechnologiesSmart Grid and Power Systems

A Survey of Protocol-Level Challenges and Solutions for Distributed Energy Resource Cyber-Physical Security

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Abstract

The increasing proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the smart grid has made distributed solar and wind two key contributors to the expanding attack surface of the network; however, there is a lack of proper understanding and enforcement of DER communications security requirements. With vendors employing proprietary methods to mitigate hosts of attacks, the literature currently lacks a clear organization of the protocol-level vulnerabilities, attacks, and solutions mapped to each layer of the logical model such as the OSI stack. To bridge this gap and pave the way for future research by the authors in determining key DER security requirements, this paper conducts a comprehensive review of the key vulnerabilities, attacks, and potential solutions for solar and wind DERs at the protocol level. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point for utilities, vendors, aggregators, and other industry stakeholders to develop a clear understanding of the DER security challenges and solutions, which are key precursors to comprehending security requirements.

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Crossref · 10.3390/en11092360

Cites

92 of 92 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • DNP3, GOOSE, and Modbus protocols transmit data without encryption, creating protocol-level challenges in securing cyber-physical systems within the energy distribution grid.

    “Protocol-level challenges in securing cyber-physical systems within the energy distribution grid are apparent in Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), GOOSE, and Modbus, as these protocols transmit data without encryption [55].”

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

2 of the 94 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. Kumar, 2013, An Enhanced Security for TCP/IP Protocol Suite, Int. J. Comput. Sci. Mob. Comput., 2, 331
  2. Kott, A., Lange, M., and Ludwig, J. (arXiv, 2017). Approaches to Modeling the Impact of Cyber Attacks on a Mission, arXiv.
  3. Robertson, P., Gordon, C., and Loo, S. (2013, January 26–28). Implementing Security for Critical Infrastructure Wide-Area Networks. Proceedings of the Power and Energy Automation Conference, Spokane, WA, USA.
  4. Parekh, K., Zhou, J., McNair, K., and Robinson, G. (2007, January 7–9). Utility Enterprise Information Management Strategies. Proceedings of the Grid-Interop Forum, Albuquerque, NM, USA.
  5. IEEE (2016). 1815.1-2015—IEEE Standard for Exchanging Information between Networks Implementing IEC 61850 and IEEE Std 1815(TM) [Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3)], IEEE Power & Energy Society. IEEE Standards Document.
  6. IEEE (2018). P2030.5—IEEE Approved Draft Standard for Smart Energy Profile Application Protocol, IEEE. Revision of IEEE Standard 2030.5-2013.
  7. Gupta, N., Jain, A., Saini, P., and Gupta, V. (2016, January 16–18). DDoS attack algorithm using ICMP flood. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Computing for Sustainable Global Development (INDIACom), New Delhi, India.
  8. IEEE (2017). 802.1AEcg-2017—IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks—Media Access Control (MAC) Security—Amendment 3: Ethernet Data Encryption Devices, IEEE. IEEE Standards Document.

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Authors
Sundararajan, A., Chavan, A., Saleem, D., & Sarwat, A. I.
Affiliations
  • Florida International University (US)
  • Southern Methodist University (US)
  • National Laboratory of the Rockies (US)
Corresponding author
Sarwat, Arif I.
Venue
Energies
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2018-09-06
Volume
11
Issue
9
Pages
2360
ISSN
1996-1073 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2891638970
Cited by
57
References
94
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 13 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 9
FWCI
3.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Energies (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Florida International University Digital Commons (Florida International University) (submittedVersion)
  • Florida International University Digital Commons (Florida International University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • OSTI OAI (U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • U.S. Department of Energy (DE-AC36-08GO28308)
  • National Science Foundation (1553494)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
Keywords
distributed energy resources, cyber-physical security, smart grid, protocol vulnerabilities, OSI model, secure communication, solar energy systems, wind energy systems, attack surface, security requirements

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