Incentivizing Consensus Propagation in Proof-of-Stake Based Consortium Blockchain Networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In proof-of-stake based consortium blockchain networks, pre-selected miners compete to solve a crypto-puzzle with a successfully mining probability proportional to the amount of their stakes. When the puzzle is solved, the miners are encouraged to take part in mined block propagation for verification to win a transaction fee from the blockchain user. The mined block should be propagated over wired or wireless networks, and be verified as quickly as possible to decrease consensus propagation delay. In this letter, we study incentivizing the consensus propagation considering the tradeoff between the network delay of block propagation process and offered transaction fee from the blockchain user. A Stackelberg game is then formulated to jointly maximize utility of the blockchain user and individual profit of the miners. The blockchain user acting as the leader sets the transaction fee for block verification. The miners acting as the followers decide on the number of recruited verifiers over wired or wireless networks. We apply the backward induction to analyze the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. Performance evaluation validates the feasibility and efficiency of the proposed game model in consensus propagation.
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Cites
Consortium Blockchain for Secure Energy Trading in Industrial Internet of Things
Li, Z., Kang, J., Yu, R., Ye, D., Deng, Q., & Zhang, Y. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2017.2786307 · Cited by 1,103
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Cited by
Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Xie, S., & Zhang, J. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2019.2940820 · Cited by 953
Self-citationKang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Ye, D., Kim, D. I., & Zhao, J. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2894944 · Cited by 604
Self-citationWu, Y., Dai, H.-N., & Wang, H. (2021) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3025916 · Cited by 323
A decentralized lightweight blockchain-based authentication mechanism for IoT systems
Khalid, U., Asim, M., Baker, T., Hung, P. C. K., Tariq, M. A., & Rafferty, L. (2020) · Cluster Computing · doi:10.1007/s10586-020-03058-6 · Cited by 304
Qiu, X., Liu, L., Chen, W., Hong, Z., & Zheng, Z. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2019.2924015 · Cited by 287
Blockchain-enabled Federated Learning: A Survey
Qu, Y., Uddin, M. P., Gan, C., Xiang, Y., Gao, L., & Yearwood, J. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3524104 · Cited by 286
Incentive Design for Efficient Federated Learning in Mobile Networks: A Contract Theory Approach
Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Yu, H., Liang, Y.-C., & Kim, D. I. (2019) · 2019 IEEE VTS Asia Pacific Wireless Communications Symposium (APWCS) · doi:10.1109/vts-apwcs.2019.8851649 · Cited by 255
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kang, J., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Wang, P., Ye, D., & Kim, D. I.
- Venue
- IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
- Published
- 2019-02
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 157-160
- ISSN
- 2162-2337 (ISSN-L)
- 2162-2345
- OpenAlex
- W2887000081
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 25.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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