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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 1 of the 14 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Improved Identity Management with Verifiable Credentials and FIDO

Open access
Chadwick, David W., Laborde, Romain, Oglaza, Arnaud, Venant, Remi, Wazan, Samer, Nijjar, Manreet · 2019 · IEEE Communications Standards Magazine

Abstract

We describe how FIDO and W3C VCs can overcome the problems of existing identity management systems. We describe our conceptual model and architecture, and the protocol we used by extending FIDO's UAF in order to provide both strong authentication and strong authorization. We built a pilot implementation for U.K. NHS patients to validate our implementation. Patients were able to use a mobile phone with a fingerprint reader to access restricted NHS sites in order to make and cancel appointments and order repeat prescription drugs. Our initial user trials with 10 U.K. NHS patients found the system to be easy to use, and fingerprints to be preferable to using usernames and passwords for authentication.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper proposes combining W3C Verifiable Credentials with FIDO UAF into a "FIDO Universal Authentication and Authorization Framework" (UAAF) that extends FIDO's protocol to provide both strong authentication and attribute-based authorization, placing the user rather than the IdP at the center of the identity ecosystem. A pilot NHS app was built and trialed with 10 U.K. patients, who used a fingerprint-enabled phone to make/cancel appointments and order repeat prescriptions.

Key findings

  • The proposed UAAF architecture lets users hold cryptographically protected VCs in a digital wallet and release them to service providers, enabling attribute aggregation and least-privilege access without IdP tracking, phishing redirection, or stealable bearer tokens.
  • In the NHS pilot, 9/10 users said they liked using fingerprints instead of usernames/passwords "very much" and would always use the app if the NHS made it available; 5/10 thought fingerprints made the app more secure and 2/10 less secure.
  • Usability problems were concentrated in specific screens: 9/10 had trouble registering a fingerprint, 9/10 had trouble obtaining the NHS patient VC due to poor screen design, ~6/10 had trouble booking an appointment (small, easily overlooked Sign In button), and a few missed the Order button below the visible screen. All screens were subsequently redesigned.
  • Storage analysis: a single-attribute VC in JSON-LD is under 1 kB, so 2,500 VCs total less than 2.5 MB, "easily manageable on today's smartphones."

Methods

  • Design: conceptual model and protocol extending FIDO UAF with new signed messages (claim request, credential request, authorization response) to add authorization to FIDO's authentication; authorization policies written in DNF or CNF.
  • Implementation: IdP and SP servers built with the Spring framework by extending eBay's UAF FIDO server; UAAF client on Android 6+ (ASM as separate APK, keys in Android KeyStore) and iOS 10.1+ (keys in the security enclave); VCs stored in an SQLite database. Only short-lived VCs are issued, so no revocation service is needed.
  • User trials: 10 patients (9 female, 1 male; three ethnicities; ages under 20 to over 80) waiting to see their consultant at University Hospital Southampton; behavior observed and notes taken, followed by a questionnaire with 10 five-point Likert-scale questions on usability, security, and privacy, plus 4 free-form and 3 demographic questions. One patient had insufficient time to complete the questionnaire.

Limitations

  • Stated: "Our user trials are limited and insufficient to generalize from, so more are needed."
  • Stated: further work is needed to define the attributes user communities will use for identification and authorization, and an ontology with class hierarchies and membership lists would help.
  • Evident from the text: the proof-of-concept implementation does not sign the new claim-request message because current FIDO specifications do not allow extension data passed to the authenticator to be signed, requiring an update to the UAF ASM API; the trial sample is small and predominantly female, and one elderly patient could not enter the 24-character OTP unaided.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/mcomstd.001.1900020

Cites

3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

1 Valid · 1 Not valid · 12 Not checked · 73 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. 2016, EU AARC Project Deliverable DNA2 4 “Training Material Targeted at Identity Providers
  2. 2019, Verifiable credentials data model 1 0 Expressing verifiable information on the web
  3. cantor, 2014, Native SP Auributekesolver
  4. 0, The eBay UAF FIDO Implementation
  5. 2017, EC AARC Project AARC Blueprint Architecture
  6. 2015, NHS to Reveal Cost of Missed Appointments to Patients
  7. 2014, FIDO UAF Architectural Overview, Proposed Standard
  8. 2019, Web Authentication An'API for Accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1
  9. 2018, Huge Facebook breach leaves thousands of other apps vulnerable

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Chadwick, D. W., Laborde, R., Oglaza, A., Venant, R., Wazan, S., & Nijjar, M.
Affiliations
  • University of Kent (GB)
  • Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier (FR)
  • Barts Health NHS Trust (GB)
Venue
IEEE Communications Standards Magazine
Published
2019-12
Volume
3
Issue
4
Pages
14-20
ISSN
  • 2471-2825 (ISSN-L)
  • 2471-2833
OpenAlex
W3012237669
Cited by
42
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 5
FWCI
3.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Communications Standards Magazine (publishedVersion)
  • Open Archive Toulouse Archive Ouverte (University of Toulouse) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Signal Processing › Biometric Identification and Security
Keywords
identity management, verifiable credentials, FIDO, web authentication, strong authentication, authorization, fingerprint authentication, smartphone authentication, user testing, password alternatives

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.