The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks Using the Return Stack Buffer
Open accessAbstract
Modern microprocessors frequently use speculative execution, which can be exploited to exfiltrate sensitive data across protection boundaries. This paper introduces SpectreRSB, a new Spectre-class attack that exploits the return stack buffer (RSB). Unlike previous attacks, SpectreRSB does not rely on the branch predictor unit. Through proof of concept attacks, we demonstrate that SpectreRSB enables both local attacks within the same process and attacks on SGX. The paper also analyzes additional types of attacks on the kernel and shows that they are possible under widely used conditions. Importantly, Retpoline and Intel’s microcode patches do not stop all SpectreRSB attacks. We recommend the use of RSB refilling patches on all machines, especially on Core-i7 Skylake and newer processors, to protect against SpectreRSB. In conclusion, system developers must consider SpectreRSB when developing defenses against speculation attacks.
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Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
Spectre attacks: exploiting speculative execution
Kocher, P., Horn, J., Fogh, A., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., et al. (2020) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3399742 · Cited by 281
Lipp, M., Schwarz, M., Gruss, D., Prescher, T., Haas, W., Mangard, S., Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Yarom, Y., & Hamburg, M. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01207 · Cited by 17
Cited by
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling
Schwarz, M., Lipp, M., Moghimi, D., Van Bulck, J., Stecklina, J., Prescher, T., & Gruss, D. (2019) · Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3319535.3354252 · Cited by 328
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load
van Schaik, S., Milburn, A., Osterlund, S., Frigo, P., Maisuradze, G., Razavi, K., Bos, H., & Giuffrida, C. (2019) · 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2019.00087 · Cited by 310
InvisiSpec: Making Speculative Execution Invisible in the Cache Hierarchy
Yan, M., Choi, J., Skarlatos, D., Morrison, A., Fletcher, C., & Torrellas, J. (2018) · 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO) · doi:10.1109/micro.2018.00042 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Koruyeh, E. M., Khasawneh, K. N., Song, C., & Abu-Ghazaleh, N.
- Venue
- IEEE Design & Test
- Published
- 2024-04
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 47-55
- ISSN
- 2168-2356 (ISSN-L)
- 2168-2364
- OpenAlex
- W2884364581
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 5.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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