Cited by 53Access Control and TrustInformation and Cyber SecuritySecurity and Verification in Computing

Zero trust architecture: does it help?

Open access
Bertino, Elisa·2021·IEEE Security & Privacy

Abstract

Discusses the concept of zero trust architecture (ZTA). ZTA has been introduced as a fine-grained defense approach paradigm that shifts defenses from static, network-based perimeters to users, assets, and resources.1 It assumes that no entities outside and inside the protected system can be trusted and therefore requires articulated and high-coverage deployment of security controls, such as authentication and access control. In a way, ZTA is not new; the idea that securing a system requires pervasive, fine-grained, and continuous deployment of layered security controls is quite obvious. However, the current emphasis on ZTA is important as it pushes systematic approaches to cybersecurity.

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Crossref · 10.1109/msec.2021.3091195

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  • Translating the NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust model into OT introduces three categories of friction: safety-availability priority inversion, legacy protocols unauthenticated by design, and asset lifetime versus crypto lifetime.

    “Translating this canonical model into OT introduces three categories of friction that have been the subject of considerable recent commentary [11], [15], [17].”

    From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [15]

    The Abstract describes technical and organizational friction in deploying zero trust, including application-performance impacts and difficulty upgrading legacy infrastructure. It does not discuss OT or identify the three claimed categories: safety versus availability, unauthenticated legacy protocols, and asset versus cryptographic lifetimes. The citation supports the general point about deployment friction, not that specific OT breakdown. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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  • The Zero Trust security model is emerging as a paradigm shift for cybersecurity and is adopted by the most mature actors from companies to nations.

    “the Zero Trust security model is emerging [4] as a paradigm shift for cybersecurity that is adopted by the most mature actors from companies to nations [5-7].”
  • OT prioritizes safety and availability above confidentiality and integrity, which is the inverse of the classical IT C-I-A triad.

    “First, the safety-availability priority inversion : OT prioritizes safety and availability above confidentiality and integrity, which is the inverse of the classical IT C-I-A triad.”

    From Crypto-Agile Zero Trust Architecture for IT-OT Convergence in Industrial Control Systems: A Digital Twin-Driven Framework over 5G/TSN with Post-Quantum Cryptography (2026) · cites this paper as [15]

    The supplied passages and searches of our copy discuss zero-trust architecture, access-control policies, and deployment challenges (Abstract; no page given). None addresses operational technology’s safety and availability priorities or compares them with the IT confidentiality–integrity–availability triad. (LLM, conf=0.76)

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Authors
Bertino, E.
Affiliations
Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
Corresponding author
Bertino, Elisa
Venue
IEEE Security & Privacy
Published
2021-09
Volume
19
Issue
5
Pages
95-96
ISSN
  • 1540-7993 (ISSN-L)
  • 1558-4046
OpenAlex
W3196576671
Cited by
52
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 2
FWCI
10.05
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
IEEE Security & Privacy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Access Control and Trust
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
zero-trust architecture, network perimeter security, authentication, access control

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