Overview of PUF-based hardware security solutions for the internet of things
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of numerous inter-connected resource-constrained devices such as sensors nodes and actuators, which are linked to the Internet. By 2020 it is anticipated that the IoT paradigm will include approximately 20 billion connected devices. The interconnection of such devices provides the ability to collect a huge amount of data for processing and analysis. A significant portion of the transacted data between IoT devices is private information, which must not in any way be eavesdropped on or tampered with. Security in IoT devices is therefore of paramount importance for further development of the technology. Such devices typically have limited area and energy resources, which makes the use of classic cryptography prohibitively expensive. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a class of novel hardware security primitives that promise a paradigm shift in many security applications; their relatively simple architecture can answer many of the security challenges of energy-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we discuss the design challenges of secure IoT systems; then we explain the principles of PUFs; finally we discuss the outstanding reliability and security problems of PUF technology and outline the open research questions in this field.
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Cites
Borkar, S. (2005) · IEEE Micro · doi:10.1109/mm.2005.110 · Cited by 1,320 · cited 2×
“more difficult due to the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics, [9].”
BackgroundPUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data
Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798 · Cited by 637 · cited 1×
“There are a number of techniques with proven capability in building numerical models of PUF devices, most notably machine learning (ML), linear programming or algebraic methods [15, 16].”
MethodLow-Energy Security: Limits and Opportunities in the Internet of Things
Trappe, W., Howard, R., & Moore, R. S. (2015) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2015.7 · Cited by 246 · cited 2×
“This greatly limits the number of affordable security enhancement solutions, [3].”
Background
Cited by
IoT: Internet of Threats? A Survey of Practical Security Vulnerabilities in Real IoT Devices
Meneghello, F., Calore, M., Zucchetto, D., Polese, M., & Zanella, A. (2019) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2019.2935189 · Cited by 799
Security and Privacy for the Internet of Medical Things Enabled Healthcare Systems: A Survey
Sun, Y., Lo, F. P.-W., & Lo, B. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2960617 · Cited by 292
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) for IoT Devices
Al-Meer, A., & Al-Kuwari, S. (2023) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3591464 · Cited by 176
“[10] presented an overview of PUF in term of principle and design challenges.”
BackgroundPhysical Unclonable Functions in the Internet of Things: State of the Art and Open Challenges
Babaei, A., & Schiele, G. (2019) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s19143208 · Cited by 168
Cryptographic transistor for true random number generator with low power consumption
Kim, S.-I., You, H.-J., Kim, M.-S., An, U.-S., Kim, M.-S., Lee, D. H., Ryu, S.-T., & Choi, Y.-K. (2024) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.adk6042 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Halak, B., Zwolinski, M., & Mispan, M. S.
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE 59th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-10
- Pages
- 1-4
- ISSN
- 1548-3746 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2518327368
- Cited by
- 105
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.24
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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