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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data

Ruhrmair, Ulrich, Solter, Jan, Sehnke, Frank, Xu, Xiaolin, Mahmoud, Ahmed, Stoyanova, Vera, Dror, Gideon, Schmidhuber, Jurgen, Burleson, Wayne, Devadas, Srinivas · 2013 · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

We discuss numerical modeling attacks on several proposed strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a Strong PUF, the goal of our attacks is to construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. If successful, this algorithm can subsequently impersonate the Strong PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. It breaks the security of any applications that rest on the Strong PUF's unpredictability and physical unclonability. Our method is less relevant for other PUF types such as Weak PUFs. The Strong PUFs that we could attack successfully include standard Arbiter PUFs of essentially arbitrary sizes, and XOR Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs up to certain sizes and complexities. We also investigate the hardness of certain Ring Oscillator PUF architectures in typical Strong PUF applications. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques, including a specially tailored variant of logistic regression and evolution strategies. Our results are mostly obtained on CRPs from numerical simulations that use established digital models of the respective PUFs. For a subset of the considered PUFs-namely standard Arbiter PUFs and XOR Arbiter PUFs-we also lead proofs of concept on silicon data from both FPGAs and ASICs. Over four million silicon CRPs are used in this process. The performance on silicon CRPs is very close to simulated CRPs, confirming a conjecture from earlier versions of this work. Our findings lead to new design requirements for secure electrical Strong PUFs, and will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798

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Citations

Cites

Show all 49 references

Research works printed but not linked: 8

  1. pappu, 2001, Physical one-way functions
  2. r�hrmair, 2010, Oblivious transfer based on physical unclonable functions (extended abstract), Proc TRUST 2010, 6101, 430
  3. holcomb, 2007, Initial sram state as a fingerprint and source of true random numbers for RFID tags, Proc Conf RFID Security
  4. lim, 2004, Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
  5. 2004, System and Method of Reliable Forward Secret Key Sharing With Physical Random Functions
  6. brzuska, 0, Physical unclonable functions in the universal composition framework, Proc CRYPTO 2011, 51
  7. s�lter, 2009, Cryptanalysis of Electrical PUFs via Machine Learning Algorithms
  8. schaul, 2010, PyBrain, J Mach Learning Res, 1, 999

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S.
Affiliations
  • Technical University of Munich (DE)
  • University of Massachusetts Amherst (US)
  • Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yafo (IL)
  • MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (US)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2013-11
Volume
8
Issue
11
Pages
1876-1891
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W2044389004
Cited by
637
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 75 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 2
FWCI
51.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
Keywords
physical unclonable functions, arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, challenge-response pairs, logistic regression, evolution strategies, FPGA, ASIC

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798
The paper
Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S. (2013). PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.