The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data
Abstract
We discuss numerical modeling attacks on several proposed strong physical unclonable functions (PUFs). Given a set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of a Strong PUF, the goal of our attacks is to construct a computer algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all CRPs. If successful, this algorithm can subsequently impersonate the Strong PUF, and can be cloned and distributed arbitrarily. It breaks the security of any applications that rest on the Strong PUF's unpredictability and physical unclonability. Our method is less relevant for other PUF types such as Weak PUFs. The Strong PUFs that we could attack successfully include standard Arbiter PUFs of essentially arbitrary sizes, and XOR Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs up to certain sizes and complexities. We also investigate the hardness of certain Ring Oscillator PUF architectures in typical Strong PUF applications. Our attacks are based upon various machine learning techniques, including a specially tailored variant of logistic regression and evolution strategies. Our results are mostly obtained on CRPs from numerical simulations that use established digital models of the respective PUFs. For a subset of the considered PUFs-namely standard Arbiter PUFs and XOR Arbiter PUFs-we also lead proofs of concept on silicon data from both FPGAs and ASICs. Over four million silicon CRPs are used in this process. The performance on silicon CRPs is very close to simulated CRPs, confirming a conjecture from earlier versions of this work. Our findings lead to new design requirements for secure electrical Strong PUFs, and will be useful to PUF designers and attackers alike.
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“However, this approach has also been shown to be vulnerable to modelling attacks that can be used to infer characteristics well enough to support cloning and redistribution [53].”
From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [53]
Citations
Cites
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Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
Suh, G. E., & Devadas, S. (2007) · Proceedings of the 44th annual conference on Design automation - DAC '07 · doi:10.1145/1278480.1278484 · Cited by 2,065 · cited 8×
“1) Arbiter PUFs: Arbiter PUFs (Arb-PUFs) were first introduced in [17], [23], [46].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationPappu, R., Recht, B., Taylor, J., & Gershenfeld, N. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1074376 · Cited by 2,018
Learnability and the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
Blumer, A., Ehrenfeucht, A., Haussler, D., & Warmuth, M. K. (1989) · Journal of the ACM · doi:10.1145/76359.76371 · Cited by 1,839 · cited 1×
“Furthermore, the evaluated “logic” security represents an upper limit on a PUF’s ML-resilience, at the least in any applications where perfect error correction or fuzzy extractors are utilized to obtain stable responses, such as PUF-based key exchange [11], [4] and oblivious transfer [36], [4]…”
BackgroundFuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics and Other Noisy Data
Dodis, Y., Ostrovsky, R., Reyzin, L., & Smith, A. (2008) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/060651380 · Cited by 1,717
Silicon physical random functions
Gassend, B., Clarke, D., van Dijk, M., & Devadas, S. (2002) · Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/586110.586132 · Cited by 1,660
Self-citationFPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection
Guajardo, J., Kumar, S. S., Schrijen, G.-J., & Tuyls, P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_5 · Cited by 1,203 · cited 3×
“Unfortunately, it can be difficult to uphold this requirement in practice.”
Background
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Cited by
Gao, Y., Al-Sarawi, S. F., & Abbott, D. (2020) · Nature Electronics · doi:10.1038/s41928-020-0372-5 · Cited by 613
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406
“However, this approach has also been shown to be vulnerable to modelling attacks that can be used to infer characteristics well enough to support cloning and redistribution [53].”
BackgroundMcGrath, T., Bagci, I. E., Wang, Z. M., Roedig, U., & Young, R. J. (2019) · Applied Physics Reviews · doi:10.1063/1.5079407 · Cited by 353
“12 Alongside the disagreement as to what constitutes a “weak” and “strong” PUF, there is a level of disagreement as to what can be called a PUF in the first place.”
BackgroundThe Gap Between Promise and Reality: On the Insecurity of XOR Arbiter PUFs
Becker, G. T. (2015) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48324-4_27 · Cited by 254
“Their initial analysis was conducted on simulated data but they later verified the results by using measurements taken from an ASIC [26].”
MethodA Multiplexer-Based Arbiter PUF Composition with Enhanced Reliability and Security
Sahoo, D. P., Mukhopadhyay, D., Chakraborty, R. S., & Nguyen, P. H. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2017.2749226 · Cited by 213
“The CM attacks of x-XOR APUF using logistic regression (LR) are reported in [5], [9], [10], and SCM attacks are published in [11]–[15].”
Method
Metadata
- Authors
- Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S.
- Affiliations
- Technical University of Munich (DE)
- University of Massachusetts Amherst (US)
- Academic College of Tel Aviv-Yafo (IL)
- MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (US)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2013-11
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1876-1891
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W2044389004
- Cited by
- 637
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 39 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 62 · 2022: 47 · 2021: 75 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 66 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 49 · 2016: 37 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 2
- FWCI
- 51.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Discrete Mathematics and Combinatorics › Coding theory and cryptography
- Keywords
- physical unclonable functions, arbiter PUF, ring oscillator PUF, challenge-response pairs, logistic regression, evolution strategies, FPGA, ASIC
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- The paper
- Ruhrmair, U., Solter, J., Sehnke, F., Xu, X., Mahmoud, A., Stoyanova, V., Dror, G., Schmidhuber, J., Burleson, W., & Devadas, S. (2013). PUF Modeling Attacks on Simulated and Silicon Data. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2013.2279798
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